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DECEIVED BY DISPARITY STUDIES: WHY THE TENTH
CIRCUIT FAILED TO APPLY CROSON'S STRICT SCRUTINY
STANDARD IN CONCRETE WORKS OF COLORADO
INTRODUCTION
Many state and local governments across the country, including the
City and County of Denver, utilize affirmative action programs that
strive to increase Minority Business Enterprise ("MBE") participation in
government construction and professional design projects. In City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,' the Supreme Court held that such race-
based programs must pass strict scrutiny analysis. 2 The Court found that
the City of Richmond's MBE program did not withstand strict scrutiny,
and, thus, invalidated the program as violating the Equal Protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3
In light of the Croson decision, many local governments eliminated
or modified their MBE programs because of constitutional concerns.4 In
an effort to defend their MBE programs, some governments commenced
statistical studies to help pass Croson's strict scrutiny analysis. 5 This
reaction is based on language in Croson stating: "[w]here there is a sig-
nificant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority
contractors willing and able to perform a particular service and the num-
ber of such contractors actually engaged by the locality or the locality's
prime contractors, an inference of discriminatory exclusion could arise."6
Governments also look to anecdotal evidence to supplement the sta-
tistical evidence in disparity studies.7 In Croson, the Court reasoned that
anecdotal evidence, "if supported by appropriate statistical proof," can
support a government's contention that broad remedial relief is neces-
sary. Anecdotal evidence can show that discrimination is the underlying
cause of disparate statistics, rather than some other race-neutral cause. 9
1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
2. Croson, 488 U.S. at 494-95. Strict scrutiny requirements are discussed infra notes 31-56
and accompanying text.
3. Id. at 511.
4. Jeffrey M. Hanson, Hanging by Yarns?: Deficiencies in Anecdotal Evidence Threaten the
Survival of Race-Based Preference Programs for Public Contracting, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1433,
1444 (2003).
5. Id. at 1444-45.
6. Id. at 1444 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 509).
7. Id. at 1447-48.
8. Id. at 1448 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 509).
9. Id. at 1448-49.
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Reacting to Croson, the City and County of Denver ("Denver")
conducted in-depth statistical studies to support its MBE program. 10
Concrete Works of Colorado ("CWC") challenged Denver's affirmative
action ordinance, claiming that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."'
This Survey discusses affirmative action programs as applied to
public contracting, and the requirements promulgated by the Supreme
Court to pass strict scrutiny analysis. Part I explains the emergence of
judicial strict scrutiny as the standard for government race-conscious
programs. Part I also discusses the Tenth Circuit's decision in Concrete
Works and the facts supporting its decision. In Part II, this survey dis-
cusses the Third and Eleventh Circuit's application of strict scrutiny. Part
III examines Justice Scalia's reaction to the Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari for Concrete Works. Part IV analyzes the strict scrutiny stan-
dard promulgated by the Supreme Court in Croson, and assesses whether
or not the Tenth Circuit adhered to that standard. Additionally, Part IV
addresses Justice Scalia's criticisms of the Tenth Circuit, as well as the
Third and Eleventh Circuit's application of strict scrutiny.
I. STRICT SCRUTINY: THE TEST FOR GOVERNMENT AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROGRAMS
A. J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond
2
Croson stands as the seminal case establishing strict scrutiny as the
test for racial classifications benefiting minorities.13 Prior to 1989, when
Croson was decided, no binding jurisprudence existed regarding the level
14of scrutiny for government affirmative action programs.
1. Facts
In Croson, the Richmond City Council ("the City Council") adopted
the Minority Business Utilization Plan ("the Plan"), which required
prime contractors to subcontract at least 30% of their contract amount to
one or more MBEs. I5 An MBE was defined as a "business at least fifty-
one (51) percent of which is owned and controlled.., by minority group
members."' 6 The Plan defined "minority group members" as "citizens of
the United States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians,
Eskimos, or Aleuts."' 7 The City Council declared the Plan to be remedial
10. See Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 962-69
(10th Cir. 2003).
11. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 957.
12. 488 U.S. 469 (1989)
13. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 706 (2d ed.
2002).
14. See id.
15. Croson, 488 U.S at 477.
16. Id. at 478.
17. Id.
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in nature with the purpose of "promoting wider participation by minority
business enterprises in the construction of public projects."
18
Additionally, the Plan authorized waivers to contractors who made
"every feasible attempt" to comply with the 30% set-aside requirement
but could not.' 9 The waivers could only be granted in exceptional cir-
cumstances and contractors were required to demonstrate that "qualified
Minority Business Enterprises . . . [were] unavailable or unwilling to
participate in the contract to enable meeting the 30% MBE goal. 2°
The City Council adopted the Plan after holding a public hearing.21
Plan proponents relied upon a study indicating that, while Blacks consti-
tuted 50% of Richmond's general population, the city awarded only
0.67% of prime construction contracts to MBEs during a five year pe-
riod.22 The City Council also relied upon oral statements made at the
public hearing claiming that discrimination existed in the construction
industry both nationally and locally.23 Notwithstanding the study and
anecdotal statements, the city failed to present any direct evidence indi-
cating it had participated in race discrimination, or that prime contractors
had discriminated against MBEs.24
After the Plan's adoption, Richmond issued an invitation to bid on
the installation of plumbing fixtures for the city jail, and J.A. Croson
Company ("Croson"), a prime contractor, received the project bid
forms. 25 Despite Croson's efforts to procure bids from MBEs, no MBE
expressed an interest in the project until the day the bid was due, when
Croson secured an MBE for the project.26
However, the MBE was unable to obtain credit and, therefore, sub-
mitted a bid to Croson that would have caused the entire project to ex-
ceed the proposed budget.27 As a result, Croson applied for a waiver.28
Richmond denied Croson's request for a waiver and decided to re-bid the
project.29 Consequently, Croson brought an action against Richmond
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the Plan was unconstitutional on its




20. Id. at 478-79.
21. Id. at 479.
22. Id. at 479-80.
23. Id. at 480.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 481.
26. Id. at 482.
27. Id. at 482-83.
28. Id. at 482.
29. Id. at 483.
30. Id.
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2. Decision
The Court in Croson established the constitutional standards to
which affirmative action programs are subject. Specifically, the Court
held that a government must present a "strong basis in evidence" 3' that a
program is "narrowly tailored ' 32 to serve a "compelling interest. 33
The Plan failed the compelling governmental interest prong of strict
scrutiny analysis.34 The Court reasoned that Richmond could satisfy the
compelling governmental interest requirement if it demonstrated that it
was a "passive participant" in a system of racial discrimination. 35 A gov-
ernment is a passive participant in racial discrimination when it uses pub-
lic dollars to employ private firms that engage in discriminatory con-
duct.36 The Court reasoned that all state and federal governments have a
compelling interest to ensure that public tax dollars, which are drawn
from all citizens, do not finance groups that participate in discriminatory
conduct.37
However, no direct evidence existed that showed Richmond or
prime contractors had discriminated against MBEs.38 The Court held that
a state must identify "discrimination, public or private, with some speci-
ficity before [it] may use race-conscious relief., 39 Richmond's attempt to
use past societal discrimination as the basis for its affirmative action pro-
gram would "open the door to competing claims for 'remedial relief for
every disadvantaged group. 4°
Furthermore, the Court determined that the statistics comparing
Richmond's minority population to the percentage of prime contracts
awarded to MBEs "had little or no probative value in establishing prior
discrimination" in the construction industry. 4' The fact that Blacks con-
stituted 50% of the city's general population, but only received 0.67% of
the city's prime construction contracts, was nothing more than a "general
population statistic. ' '42 The Court held that "when special qualifications
are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population
(rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the neces-
31. Id. at 500.
32. Id. at 506-07.
33. Id. at 505. This survey refers to the Court's two-part strict scrutiny test as composed of
"two prongs": the first being compelling interest and the second narrow tailoring.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 492 ("[1]f the city could show that it had essentially become a 'passive participant'
in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry, we think it
clear that the city could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system.").
36. See id. at 492-93.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 480.
39. Id. at 504.
40. Id. at 505.
41. Id. at 485 (citing J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (4th Cir.
1987) (Croson M1)).
42. Croson 11, 822 F.2d at 1358-59.
[Vol. 81:3
DECEIVED BY DISPARITY STUDIES
sary qualifications) may have little probative value," 43 and such compari-
sons actually suggest the Plan was "more of a political than a remedial
basis for the racial preference." 44
The Plan also failed the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny
analysis.45 A fatal flaw of the Plan was its over-inclusiveness,46 as there
was no evidence of "discrimination against Spanish-speaking, Oriental,
Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut persons" in the local construction industry.47
The Court reasoned that the "random inclusion" of additional racial
groups indicated the Plan was not remedial in nature.4 The Plan could
not possibly serve a remedial purpose if a person of Aleut or Eskimo
descent had never resided in Richmond.49 In addition, the City Council
chose the 30% set-aside figure arbitrarily, failing to show any relevance
to the actual number of MBEs in Richmond, or to any other pertinent
statistic .0
In the absence of evidence of specific instances of discrimination,
the Court required Richmond to consider race-neutral alternatives before
utilizing a race-based plan.51 However, Richmond failed to consider the
use of race-neutral means to increase MBE participation in city con-
tracts.52 The Court proffered an array of race-neutral means by which
Richmond could increase MBE participation, including simplifying the
bidding process, relaxing the bonding requirements, training, and offer-
ing financial assistance.
53
The Plan in Croson was fatally flawed and did not withstand strict
scrutiny. Richmond failed to produce valid statistical evidence concern-
ing discrimination.54 Thus, Richmond could not meet the compelling
governmental interest requirement. Additionally, the arbitrary 30% re-
quirement and the inclusion of extraneous racial groups demonstrated
that the Plan was not narrowly tailored. Significantly, the test set forth
43. Croson, 488 U.S. at 485 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
309 n.13 (1977)).
44. Id. at 485 (citing Croson II, 822 F.2d at 1359). The appeals court in Croson 11 explained
that general population statistics failed to address the statistical disparity between the percentage of
qualified minority business contractors doing business in the city and the percentage of bid funds
awarded to those businesses. Id.
45. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.




50. Id. at 499.
51. Id. at 509.
52. Id. at 507.
53. Id. at 509-10.
54. Id. at 505.
55. Id. at 507.
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by the Court in Croson established that racial classifications benefiting
minorities must withstand strict scrutiny analysis.56
B. Tenth Circuit: Deciphering Croson in Concrete Works of Colorado v.
City and County of Denver
5 7
1. Facts
In 1990, the City and County of Denver adopted an affirmative ac-
tion program, codified as Ordinance No. 513 ("Ordinance"). 58 The Ordi-
nance applied to all city contracts in which a bid was required to receive
a construction project.5 9 The Ordinance required the utilization of MBEs
and Women Business Enterprises ("WBEs") on construction projects
with Denver.60 The Ordinance defined MBEs as businesses: "(1) at least
51% owned by one or more eligible minorities and (2) with daily busi-
ness operations controlled by one or more eligible minorities."6' The
Ordinance defined minorities as "persons of Black, Hispanic, Asian-
American, or American Indian descent."62 The Ordinance required that
16% of the annual dollar amount spent by Denver on construction con-
tracts must be awarded to MBEs.63
Contractors and subcontractors who placed bids on Denver con-
tracts were also required to comply with the Ordinance's criteria. 64 Con-
tractors could comply with the Ordinance either by meeting the project
participation goals or by demonstrating good faith efforts to meet the
participation goals. 65 Under the Ordinance, contractors could meet the
good faith exemption if they attempted to subcontract with MBEs but
were unsuccessful. 66 A contractor could also demonstrate good faith ef-
forts if he rejected an MBE because the MBE failed to submit the lowest
bid or was unqualified.67 If a contractor failed to meet the participation
goals or the good faith requirement, Denver would consider the contrac-
tor's bid "not responsive."
56. Id. at 509.
57. 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2003).
58. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 956.
59. Id.
60. Id. For the purposes of this Survey, only MBE, and not WBE, programs are discussed.
Race-based programs are subject to strict scrutiny, which is the focus of this Survey.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The Ordinance was subsequently amended in 1996 and again in 1998. Id. The 1996
Ordinance expanded the scope of contracts that were covered by the 1999 Ordinance. Id. The 1998
Ordinance reduced the MBE participation goal from 16% to 10%. Id. at 956-57. For the purposes of
this Survey, the 1996 and 1998 amendments have no effect on the strict scrutiny analysis. As such,
this Survey's discussion is limited to the 1990 Ordinance.
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Concrete Works of Colorado ("CWC"), a construction firm owned
by a non-minority male, lost three contracts with Denver when it failed
to comply with the MBE participation goals or meet the good faith re-
quirements set forth in the Ordinance.69 Consequently, CWC filed a
complaint against Denver seeking damages and injunctive relief, claim-
ing that the Ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 70 After the district court ruled that the Ordinance
violated the Equal Protection Clause, Denver appealed.7'
2. Decision
a. Burden of Proof
The Tenth Circuit assessed the burden of proof Denver had to meet
in order to uphold the constitutionality of the Ordinance.72 According to
the Tenth Circuit, Denver could satisfy its burden "without conclusively
proving the existence of past or present racial discrimination., 73 Thus,
Denver could proffer statistical and anecdotal evidence to demonstrate a
disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors and the
number of such contractors actually utilized by local prime contractors.74
Moreover, Denver could meet its burden by "presenting evidence of its
own direct participation in racial discrimination or its passive participa-
tion in private discrimination. 75
Once Denver met its initial burden, CWC was required to "intro-
duce 'credible, particularized evidence to rebut [Denver's] initial show-
ing of ... a compelling interest.', 76 CWC could rebut Denver's statistical
evidence "by (1) showing that the statistics [were] flawed; (2) demon-
strating that the disparities shown by the statistics [were] not significant
or actionable; or (3) presenting contrasting statistical data.' 77 The court
held that the burden of proof at all times remained with CWC to prove
the unconstitutionality of the Ordinance.
b. Statistical Evidence
The Tenth Circuit held that Denver demonstrated a compelling gov-
ernmental interest by producing detailed statistical evidence. 79 Denver
hired several independent research firms to conduct disparity studies in
69. Id. at 957.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 957-58.
73. Id. at 958.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 959 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147, 1175 (10th Cir.
2000) (alteration in original)).
77. Id. (quoting Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 921 (9th Cir. 1991)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 990.
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an effort to justify the Ordinance. 80 The studies created a disparity index
by dividing the percentage of MBE participation in city contracts by the
percentage of MBEs in the local construction population.81 A disparity
index of "one" indicated full MBE utilization, whereas an index closer to
zero indicated underutilization of MBEs.8z Such disparity indices showed
a statistical underutilization of MBEs on Denver projects.83
The court further reasoned that an inference of discriminatory con-
duct could be drawn from statistical disparities.84 Furthermore, Denver
was not required to show that discriminatory conduct in the construction
industry differed from societal discrimination. 85 The court determined
that it was irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether industry dis-
crimination was a result of societal discrimination or whether such dis-
crimination was "the product of policies, practices, and attitudes unique
to the industry., 86 Thus, the Tenth Circuit criticized the district court for
erroneously requiring Denver to show that the existence of discrimina-
tory conduct was more than a reflection of general societal discrimina-
tion.87 Instead, Denver was only required to demonstrate a strong basis in
evidence of discrimination, not prove discrimination.88
The court included additional reasons supporting its finding that
Denver's statistical evidence was sufficient to satisfy the compelling
governmental interest requirement. First, Denver's statistical evidence
did not suffer from the same flaws as the evidence presented in Croson.
89
In Croson, Richmond's MBE program included racial groups that may
never have experienced discrimination. 90 In Concrete Works, by contrast,
Denver presented evidence of discrimination against each racial group
included in the Ordinance. 91 However, Denver was not required to prove
that each racial group experienced discrimination equally.92 Secondly,
the court relied on studies indicating that MBEs experienced difficulties
obtaining financing and forming businesses.93
80. Id. at 962.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 990-91. Denver hired numerous independent research firms to conduct multiple
disparity studies. The disparity indices for MBEs varied, but were always less than one. See id. at
962-69.
84. Id. at 971.
85. Id. at 972.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 973.
88. Id. at 971. "Denver was under no burden to identify any specific practice or policy that
resulted in discrimination." Id. at 972. Nor was Denver "required to demonstrate that the purpose of
any such practice or policy was to disadvantage women or minorities." Id. Such a burden would be
equivalent to "requiring direct proof." Id.
89. Id. at 971.
90. Croson, 488 U.S at 506.
91. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 971.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 979.
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In challenging the statistical evidence presented by Denver, CWC
highlighted one study in particular that failed to control for firm size and
experience.94 CWC asserted that the disparities shown in the studies
could be attributable to firm size and lack of experience, rather than dis-
crimination.95 Thus, CWC argued, the disparities were inflated because
the studies did not reflect MBEs that were actually "qualified, willing,
and able to work on City projects., 96 The court rejected CWC's argu-
ments that failure to control for firm size and experience invalidated
Denver's statistical evidence.97 The court reasoned that statistical evi-
dence indicated that MBEs experienced lending discrimination and faced
difficulties forming businesses.98 Consequently, such discrimination
caused MBEs to be smaller and less experienced. 99 Moreover, CWC did
not conduct its own disparity study to rebut Denver's statistical find-
ings.' 0 Therefore, the court held that CWC did not meet its burden to
discredit the evidence Denver presented.' 0 '
c. Anecdotal Evidence
Denver produced considerable anecdotal evidence that supported
the claim that racial discrimination existed in the construction industry. 02
The evidence included testimony of an executive of a large non-minority
owned construction firm, who stated that "he received credible com-
plaints from minority and women-owned construction firms that they
were subject to different work rules than majority-owned firms. 0 3 The
executive also stated that he witnessed racial-based graffiti on job sites in
the local area.' °4 MBEs testified that they had difficulty in pre-qualifying
for private sector projects and that their bids were rejected even when
they were the lowest bidder. 1
05
One study indicated that some Denver employees and private con-
tractors attempted to circumvent the Ordinance goals. 0 6 Denver employ-
ees would create a "change order" to an existing contract, rather than
create a new bid for work. 10 7 Employees also characterized some projects
as "remodeling" instead of a construction project because remodels were
not subject to the participation goals. 0 8 Finally, anecdotal evidence indi-
94. Id. at 980.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 981.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 982.
101. Id.








DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
cated that contractors would call WBEs that were out of business in an
attempt to meet the good faith requirements."°
The court found that Denver's anecdotal evidence included "several
incidents involving profoundly disturbing behavior," and that it revealed
"behavior that was not merely sophomoric or insensitive, but which re-
sulted in real economic or physical harm." 110 The court concluded that
the anecdotal evidence provided "persuasive, unrebutted support for
Denver's initial burden.""'
When the Tenth Circuit weighed both the statistical and anecdotal
evidence, it held that Denver had a compelling governmental interest in
remedying racial discrimination in the construction industry." 2 In addi-
tion, CWC failed to rebut Denver's evidentiary showing. Thus, the court
held that the Ordinance was constitutional and did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 13
II. How OTHER CIRCUITS HAVE APPLIED CROSON'S STRICT SCRUTINY
STANDARD




The City of Philadelphia implemented an affirmative action pro-
gram that sought to increase participation of "disadvantaged business
enterprises" (DBEs) in city construction contracts. 15 DBEs were defined
as businesses "at least 51% owned by 'socially and economically disad-
vantaged' persons." '" 6 Racial minorities were included in the DBE cate-
109. Id. No anecdotal evidence was introduced that the same conduct took place with MBEs:
the evidence indicated that only out-of-business WBEs were called in attempt to meet the good faith
requirements. Id.
110. Id. at 989.
Ill. Id. at 990.
112. Id. at 992.
113. See id. at 994. The Tenth Circuit did not discuss the second prong of strict scrutiny: nar-
row tailoring. Shortly after CWC brought suit in 1992, Denver moved for summary judgment. Id. at
992. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted Denver's motion for sum-
mary judgment. Id. The court concluded that Denver established a compelling interest and that
Denver's program was narrowly tailored. Id. The Tenth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judg-
ment on the compelling interest issue and concluded that CWC had waived any challenge to the
narrow tailoring decision reached by the district court. Id. Because CWC did not challenge the
district court's conclusion with respect to narrow tailoring, the Tenth Circuit did not address the
issue. Id.
114. 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996).
115. Contractors Ass'n, 91 F.3d at 591.
116. Id.
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gory and participation goals for MBEs were set at 15% of the total dollar
amount spent by Philadelphia on construction-related projects.'17
At trial, Philadelphia presented disparity indices that calculated the
utilization of black construction firms.' 8 Philadelphia's expert, Dr. An-
drew F. Brimmer, calculated the "participation rate" by dividing the
number of prime contracts awarded to MBEs by the total number of pub-
lic contracts awarded. 1 9 Brimmer then calculated the "availability rate"
by dividing the number of black construction firms in the Philadelphia
metro area by the total number of black construction firms in the Phila-
delphia metro area. 120 Based on Brimmer's calculations, the disparity
index of 22.5 indicated racial discrimination in the construction indus-
try.
121
In addition to the statistical analysis, Philadelphia produced a report
from a former Philadelphia employee concerning the participation of
MBEs on public works projects.122 The employee, John Macklin, testi-
fied that he reviewed 25 to 30 percent of the project engineer logs, which
tracked firm names that had participated in city projects. 123 Macklin re-
lied on his personal memory to determine whether a firm in the log was
an MBE.124 When questioned whether it was possible that MBEs had
participated in city construction projects, Macklin responded, "it is a very
good possibility."'
' 25
Another witness introduced by Philadelphia testified that, in his
opinion, black contractors were subject to racial discrimination in the
construction industry. 26 However, the witness was unable to identify a
specific instance of discriminatory conduct.1
27
2. Decision
The district court found that Brimmer's analysis, coupled with the
anecdotal evidence, failed to demonstrate a compelling governmental
interest.2 8 Philadelphia demonstrated nothing more than a "generalized
assertion" that discrimination in the construction industry occurred.
129
117. Id. at 591-92. The Third Circuit declared that portions of the program which required set-
asides for women and non-black minority contractors were unconstitutional. Id. at 593-94. Thus, the
focus of this case is on the constitutionality of the program as applied to black contractors. Id. at 594.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 595 n.9.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 594-95.





127. Id. at 600-01.
128. Id. at 601-02.
129. Id. at 609 (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989)).
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Moreover, Philadelphia failed to provide an evidentiary basis on which
to infer that a program was required to redress racial discrimination. 30
Brimmer's study did not take into account whether black construc-
tion firms were "qualified and willing" to perform city construction pro-
jects.1 3' Additionally, the statistics in the study were derived from vary-
ing sources, and the study did not account for a neutral explanation for
low utilization of MBEs.
132
The court reasoned that, when a strong evidentiary basis is lacking,
racial classifications are a form of racial politics. 133 Ultimately, however,
the court said that the question of whether a strong basis in evidence ex-
isted was "a close call" and did not rule on the issue. 134 Instead, the court
decided that the program did not satisfy the narrow tailoring prong and,
thus, invalidated Philadelphia's race-based preference program for
violating the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 135
B. Eleventh Circuit: Engineering Contractors Ass'n of South Florida,
Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County
136
1. Facts
The Eleventh Circuit used disparity studies to determine the consti-
tutionality of Dade County's ("County") MBE program. 137 The program
established set-aside requirements and participation goals for MBEs.138
At trial, the County presented statistical studies that compared (1) the
percentage of bidders that were MBEs; (2) the percentage of awardees
that were MBEs; and (3) the proportion of County contract dollars that
were awarded to MBEs. 139 The disparity index indicated an underutiliza-
tion of MBEs in County construction contracts. 140 However, when the
study controlled for firm size, most of the disparities were insignifi-
cant. 14 In other words, the disparities were explained by small firm size
rather than by discriminatory conduct. 142
In addition to insignificant disparities, the methodology used to cal-
culate MBE participation was seriously flawed. 143 The County calculated
MBE participation rates by dividing the dollar amount received by
130. Id.
131. Id. at 602-03.
132. Id. at 603.
133. Id. at 610.
134. Id. at 605.
135. Id. at 602.
136. 122 F.3d 895 (1lth Cir. 1997).
137. Eng'g Contractors Ass'n, 122 F.3d at 911-24.
138. Id. at 901.
139. ld. at 912.
140. Id. at 916.
141. Id. at 917.
142. Id. at 918.
143. Id. at 920.
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MBEs, by the total dollar amount received by construction companies,
regardless of where the work occurred. 44 This calculation method would
substantially decrease MBE participation rates.
45
The County commissioned another study that "(1) compared con-
struction business ownership rates of [MBEs] to those of [non-MBEs]
and (2) analyzed disparities in personal income between [MBE and non-
MBE] business owners." 146 The study found that minorities are less
likely to own their own businesses than white males, and that MBEs in
the construction industry earned less money than non-MBEs.147 The
study concluded that current and past discrimination caused disparities in
construction business entry rates and caused the differential in income.
48
Despite the study's results, the court rejected the study's validity, citing
the rationale in Croson that a disproportionate entrance of minorities to
the construction industry does not conclusively mean that discrimination
exists. 149 Furthermore, the study failed to consider firm size, which dis-
credited the results.150
In addition to statistical evidence, the County introduced significant
anecdotal evidence that revealed discrimination in County construction
projects. 51 County employees testified concerning incidents that required
MBEs to complete lengthy punch lists (lists that required work to be re-
done), when non-MBEs were not required to complete punch lists.152 The
employees also testified that MBEs had difficulty obtaining bonding and
financing.1 53 Additionally, MBEs testified regarding numerous incidents
of discrimination while bidding for jobs and when dealing with project
foremen. 54 Other MBEs that responded to a survey claimed that they
faced countless instances of discrimination including difficulty obtaining
financing and unfair performance evaluations.1
55
2. Decision
The court found that the anecdotal evidence painted a grim picture
of racial discrimination in the construction industry. 156 However, anecdo-
tal evidence is only persuasive if it is "combined with and reinforced by
sufficiently probative statistical evidence."'' 57 The court conceded that
144. Id. at 919-20.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 921.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 922.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 923.
151. Id. at 924.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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anecdotal evidence can show the perception of discrimination and can
bolster statistical evidence. 58 The court further acknowledged that it
could support a local government's determination that remedial relief in
the form of a race-based program is warranted. 59 However, "[w]ithout
the requisite statistical foundation for the anecdotal evidence to reinforce,
supplement, support, and bolster.. ." no firm evidentiary basis existed to
justify an MBE program. t6° Because the County's statistical foundation
failed to show a strong basis in evidence, the anecdotal evidence was
insufficient to meet the compelling governmental interest requirement.
16'
Thus, the County's MBE program was unconstitutional as violating the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
62
III. JUSTICE SCALIA RESPONDS TO CONCRETE WORKS AND CLARIFIES
THE STRICT SCRUTINY TEST
The Supreme Court denied the Tenth Circuit's petition for writ of
163certiorari. Justice Scalia dissented from the denial of certiorari and
attacked the Tenth Circuit's decision without constraint.'t64 Scalia's ar-
guments that criticize the Tenth Circuit are first, that the Tenth Circuit
incorrectly allocated the burden of proof, and second, the statistics pre-
sented by Denver do not meet Croson's strong basis in evidence stan-
dard.
1 65
A. Burden of Proof
Scalia argues that the Tenth Circuit erroneously applied Croson's
burden of proof standard: "a proper plaintiff challenging governmental
use of [affirmative action programs] can state a prima facie case simply
by pointing to this practice and showing that he or she was treated un-
equally because of his or her race."' 166 The burden of defending an af-
firmative action program then falls to the government, which must estab-
lish that it is remedying "identified discrimination" and that it "had a
strong basis in evidence" to take remedial action.1 67 However, the Tenth
Circuit only required Denver to demonstrate "strong evidence from
which an inference of past or present discrimination could be drawn."
' 68
The court then required CWC to "introduce credible, particularized evi-
158. Id. at 925-26.
159. Id. at 925.
160. Id. at 926.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 929. Although the County failed to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest,
the court proceeded with a narrow tailoring discussion in an effort to complete the analysis of strict
scrutiny. Id. at 926-29. The court found that the County's MBE program was not narrowly tailored
and, thus, confirmed the district court's decision in finding the program unconstitutional. Id. at 929.
163. Concrete Works of Colo. v. City & County of Denver, 124 S. Ct. 556, 556 (2003).
164. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. at 556.
165. Id. at 557.
166. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
167. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
168. Id. at 558 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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dence to rebut Denver's initial showing of the existence of a compelling
interest."1 69 Scalia argues that Denver's burden was easily met, while
CWC faced a "daunting task."'' 70 According to Scalia, "the Tenth Circuit
got it exactly backwards."' 7' When a contractor establishes that a gov-
ernment uses racial preferences, the government's conduct is presumed
unconstitutional. 172 Thus, the government bears the burden to prove that
"it is acting on the basis of a compelling interest in remedying racial dis-
crimination."'' 73 Consequently, according to Scalia, the Tenth Circuit's
erroneous burden of proof allocation had an outcome-determinative ef-
fect on Concrete Works. 1
74
B. Statistical Evidence
Croson states that a government must show a "significant statistical
disparity" between the number of contractors hired and "the number of
qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform a particular
service . . . .""' Scalia contends that Denver's statistical studies were
inadequate because they failed to use actual bidding data.176 In addition,
the studies did not control for MBE qualifications, willingness, and
availability. 177 Rather, Denver assumed that MBEs were as qualified,
willing, and able as non-MBEs. 178 Scalia argues that Denver's studies
incorrectly compared all MBEs, instead of actual MBEs who were
"qualified, willing, and able."' 179 Furthermore, Scalia argues that Cro-
son's standards should be fatal to affirmative action programs when a
government's statistical evidence, such as Denver's, does not support its
claim that the program is remedial in nature.
80
Another significant flaw to Denver's statistical studies was the fail-
ure to control for firm size. Even if it was correct to assume that all
MBEs were qualified, willing, and able, it was not proper to assume that
all MBEs had an equal opportunity in obtaining city contracts as non-
MBEs. l8 1 Scalia asserts that large construction firms posses a clear ad-
vantage over smaller firms in obtaining projects. 182 The evidence pre-
sented by Denver revealed that MBEs were, on average, smaller and less





174. See id. at 558 ("Since Denver had to establish nothing more than the possibility of prior
discrimination... the injured contractor was required to rebut the possibility of discrimination in the
Denver construction industry.").
175. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989) (emphasis added).
176. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. at 558-59.
177. Id.
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experienced than non-MBEs. 183 However, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that MBEs were generally smaller and less experienced because of dis-
crimination.184 According to Scalia, "[t]he argument fails because it rests
on nothing but speculation."' 185 Denver's studies did not control for criti-
cal variables that would have provided a neutral explanation for underuti-
lization of MBEs.1
86
Moreover, Denver introduced studies that showed disparities in
MBE business formation rates and in access to capital. 87 Scalia asserts
that disparities in these generalized areas would permit racial preferences
in virtually every field of enterprise. 88 According to Croson, reliance
upon such general societal discrimination "has no logical stopping
point."'189 Race-neutral alternatives exist to combat lending and business
formation barriers such as "prohibiting discrimination in the provision of
credit ... by local suppliers and banks."' 190 Such lending discrimination
does not give rise to a compelling state interest in remedying racial dis-
crimination in the construction industry.
Scalia concluded his dissent by stating:
If the evidence relied upon by governmental units ... can be as in-
conclusive as Denver's evidence in this case, our former insistence
upon a 'strong basis in evidence' has been abandoned, to be replaced
by what amounts to an 'apparent-good-faith' requirement - that is, in
the words of the Tenth Circuit, the existence of 'evidence from which
an inference of past or present discrimination could be drawn.' 191
"[T]he Court's decision to let this plain disregard of Croson stand
invites speculation that that case has effectively been overruled."'
192
183. Concrete Works of Colo. v. City & County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 981 (10th Cir.
2003).
184. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 981.
185. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. at 559.




189. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S 267, 275
(1986)).
190. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. at 560 (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 510).
191. Id. at 560-61.
192. Id. at 556. Scalia's statement that Croson has "effectively been overruled" is derived from
the Court's denial of certiorari in Concrete Works, and the Court's recent decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct 2325 (2003). In Grutter, the Court gave much deference to the University of
Michigan's educational judgment that "diversity is essential to its educational mission." Grutter, 123
S. Ct. at 2339. Scalia criticized the Court's willingness to rely upon good faith when it stated in
Grutter that "[w]e take the Law School at its word that it would like nothing better than to find a
race-neutral admissions formula and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as soon as
practicable." Id. at 2346 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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IV. ANALYSIS
As set forth in Croson, government affirmative action programs are
subject to strict scrutiny analysis. 193 A strong basis in evidence must exist
for a government to show that its program is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.1 94 Justice Scalia criticized the Tenth
Circuit for allocating the burden of proof to the opponent of an affirma-
tive action program. Scalia's other criticisms included the quality of
Denver's statistical evidence and Denver's failure to consider race-
neutral alternatives before implementing the Ordinance. 195 This analysis
section will discuss Justice Scalia's criticisms of the Tenth Circuit's de-
cision. In addition, this section will discuss the quality of statistics re-
quired to show a strong basis in evidence, and the role anecdotal evi-
dence plays in supplementing statistical evidence.
A. Burden of Proof
Although Croson held that accurate statistics could create an infer-
ence of discrimination, the Court in Croson did not give specific guid-
ance on issues such as which party bears the ultimate burden of proof
under strict scrutiny analysis. 196 As such, courts are free to interpret Cro-
son's burden of proof requirement.
1 97
In Concrete Works,198 the Tenth Circuit discussed the burden of
proof that each party was required to meet. The court stated that Denver
could "meet its burden without conclusively proving the existence of past
or present racial discrimination."' 199 An ultimate judicial finding of dis-
crimination was not required before Denver implemented its affirmative
action program. 200 Thus, Denver was only required to present strong evi-
dence from which an inference of past or present discrimination could be
drawn.20 1 The court defined strong evidence as that which "'approach[es]
a prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory violation,' not irrefuta-
ble or definitive proof of discrimination ' 20 2 Once Denver met its burden,
CWC was required to introduce "credible, particularized evidence to
rebut Denver's initial showing of the existence of a compelling inter-
est.' '2°3 The court held "that the burden of proof at all times remain[ed]
193. See generally City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
194. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500, 505-06.
195. See supra notes 163-192 at 20-23 and accompanying text.
196. Docia Rudley & Donna Hubbard, What a Difference a Decade Makes: Judicial Response
to State and Local Minority Business Set-Asides Ten Years After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson,
25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 39, 43 (2000) (discussing the burden of proof in strict scrutiny cases).
197. Id. at 43, 91.
198. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950 (10th Cir.
2003).
199. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 958.
200. Id. at 971.
201. Id.
202. Id. (quoting Croson 488 U.S. at 500).
203. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 959.
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with CWC to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of the ordinances.
Because CWC did not sufficiently rebut Denver's statistical evidence,
the court held that Denver met its burden in defending the constitutional-
ity of its affirmative action program.2 °5
Like the court in Concrete Works, the Third Circuit in Contractors
Ass 'n206 held that the burden of proof rests with an opponent of an af-
firmative action program.2 °7 The court stated that "plaintiffs challenging
[a] program retain the burden of persuading the district court that a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause has occurred. 20 8 Additionally, the
Third Circuit held that when a government produces facts that justify its
affirmative action program, the plaintiff has the burden to show that the
government's facts are inaccurate.2°
Ordinarily, a government bears the burden of proof to show that its
race-conscious program is necessary to achieve a compelling purpose.21°
Justice Scalia supports this proposition in his dissent by stating that it is
"the government's burden to prove that it is acting on the basis of a com-
pelling interest in remedying racial discrimination., 2 1' The distinction in
Justice Scalia's interpretation and the Tenth and Third Circuit's interpre-
tation of burden of proof lies in which party bears the initial, versus the
ultimate, burden. The Tenth and Third Circuit allocated the initial burden
of proof on the government and allocated the ultimate burden of proof on
the challenging party.212 Scalia argues that the ultimate burden of proof
always rests with the government.21 3 Scalia's arguments have merit, yet it
is evident from Croson that a government at least bears the initial bur-
den. In Croson, Justice O'Connor stated that "the purpose of strict scru-
tiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legis-
lative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a
highly suspect tool. '214 Justice O'Connor's statement implies that a court
must ensure that a government is using race-based programs in a legiti-
mate manner. Thus, the Court is suggesting that a government has the
burden of proof to show a strong basis in evidence.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 991-92.
206. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pennsylvania v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1996).
207. Contractors Ass'n, 91 F.3d at 597-98.
208. Id. at 597.
209. Id. at 598.
210. See CHEMER1NSKY, supra note 13, at 520 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 919-21
(1995); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992)). Under rational basis review, the plaintiff has
the burden of proving a program's unconstitutionality. Id. at 530.
211. Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 124 S. Ct. 556, 558 (2003).
212. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 959; Contractors Ass'n, 91 F.3d at 598.
213. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. at 558.
214. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
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B. What Constitutes a "Strong Basis in Evidence?"
Providing that a government bears the burden of proof to show a
strong basis in evidence that an affirmative action program is necessary,
uncertainty exists regarding the adequacy of evidence required to meet
such a burden. Croson held that "where gross statistical disparities can be
shown, they alone in a proper case may constitute prima facie proof of a
pattern or practice of discrimination. 215 Accordingly, one could interpret
Croson as requiring a government to produce prima facie evidence, or
evidence that raises an inference of discrimination as sufficient to meet
the burden of proof requirement. In contrast, Justice Scalia asserted that a
government must "prove that it is acting on the basis of a compelling
interest in remedying racial discrimination. 216 Scalia cites Croson when
he states that a government must identify discrimination "with some
specificity before [it] may use race-conscious relief., 217 Scalia equates
"some specificity" with absolute proof and contends that an inference of
discrimination is inadequate. 218 Although Scalia's arguments have merit,
Croson did not expressly hold that a government must provide conclu-
sive proof of discrimination. 219 Rather, the Croson Court stated that
prima facie proof was sufficient to show a strong basis in evidence.22 °
In Concrete Works, Denver conducted in depth disparity studies in
an effort to show a strong basis in evidence and support its affirmative
action program. 22 1 However, its statistics were flawed, glossing over
variables such as firm availability and firm size that would have invali-
222dated the Ordinance. A variable such as firm availability is crucial to a
good disparity study.223 "If availability is miscalculated, then all subse-
quent interpretations of statistics, including disparity ratios, will be in
error. '224 In effect, an erroneous "availability analysis can make a Croson
disparity study worthless. 225 Denver's studies calculated a disparity in-
dex by dividing the number of MBEs that participated in city projects by
215. Id. at 501. Such statistical disparity, however, would be of no probative value if it com-
pared the number of contracts awarded to MBEs to the general minority population. See id. Instead,
a study must compare the number of contracts awarded to MBEs to a smaller group of MBEs that
possess special qualifications to perform the jobs. See id. at 501-02.
216. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. at 558 (emphasis added).
217. Id. (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 504).
218. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. at 558.
219. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
220. See id. at 500-01. "Where gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone in a proper
case may constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination." Id. at 501. (quoting
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. U.S., 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977)).
221. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 962-69.
222. Id. at 962, 980-82.
223. George R. LaNoue, Standards for the Second Generation of Croson-Inspired Disparity
Studies, 26 URB. LAW. 485, 490 (1994). George LaNoue holds a Ph.D. and M.A from Yale Univer-
sity and is the Director of Policy Sciences at the University of Maryland Graduate School.
224. Id.
225. George R. LaNoue, Who Counts?: Determining the Availability of Minority Businesses
for Public Contracting After Croson, 21 HARv. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 793, 799 (1998).
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the total number of MBEs in the local construction market.226 Such a
"headcount approach" overstated the availability of MBEs because the
studies did not control for MBEs that were "qualified, willing, and able"
to work on city projects.227 MBEs are generally smaller and less experi-
enced than non-MBEs. 228 As a result, MBE participation rates on city
projects would be less than non-MBE participation because they are
typically less qualified and less able to undertake city construction pro-
jects.229
The Tenth Circuit assumed that MBEs were "smaller and less ex-
perienced because of industry discrimination., 230 However, the court did
not support this statement with any statistical evidence. The court as-
serted that small firm size and experience were not race-neutral factors,
as CWC attempted to argue. 231 As discussed supra, an accurate statistical
study "requires careful measurement of appropriate variables. 232 The
Tenth Circuit's assumptions, without underlying statistical support,
scarcely qualify as a careful measurement.233
Denver relied on additional studies showing that MBEs faced dis-
234 Dne
crimination when they sought to obtain credit and financing. Denver
argued that lending discrimination caused MBEs to experience barriers
to business formation from the outset.235 Thus, the studies indicated that
Denver was a passive participant by employing firms that discriminated
against MBEs. 36
Provided that MBEs actually faced lending discrimination as Den-
ver suggested, Croson expressly held that a government must consider
race-neutral means before it may implement an affirmative action pro-
gram.237 The Croson Court offered numerous race-neutral means by
which a government could combat financial discrimination, such as re-
laxed bonding requirements, increased training, and financial assis-
tance.238 The Tenth Circuit assumed that only MBEs faced barriers to
business formation. As stated in Croson, "[m]any of the formal barriers
to new entrants may be the product of bureaucratic inertia., 23 9 Thus, it
226. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 962.
227. LaNoue, supra note 223, at 799-800.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 981.
231. Id.
232. LaNoue, supra note 223, at 795.
233. Id.
234. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 977-78.
235. Id. at 977.
236. Id.
237. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
238. Id. at 509-10. The Court suggested that the city of Richmond should attempt to increase
city contracting opportunities to small businesses of all races by simplifying bidding procedures and
prohibiting discrimination by local banks in their provision of credit and bonding. Id.
239. Id. at 510.
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does not follow that barriers to business formation required Denver to
implement an affirmative action program. Many new businesses, regard-
less of their racial composition, face a multitude of obstacles. As such, an
affirmative action program is unwarranted when barriers to business
formation are experienced by MBEs and non-MBEs alike. Despite the
flaws in Denver's statistical studies, the Tenth Circuit held that Denver
met its initial burden of showing a strong basis in evidence that discrimi-
nation existed in the Denver construction industry.24
In contrast, the Third Circuit in Contractors Ass'n held that Phila-
delphia's evidence failed to meet the strong basis in evidence require-
ment.24' Philadelphia's studies did not take into account whether MBEs
were qualified and willing to perform city construction projects.242 In
addition, the studies did not account for any neutral explanations of low
MBE utilization.243 Accordingly, the court held that there was no strong
basis in evidence to support Philadelphia's affirmative action program.2
The Third Circuit correctly invalidated Philadelphia's affirmative action
program because Croson required that a disparity study should take into
account only firms that were qualified, willing, and able to perform a
245particular service.
Similarly, in Engineering Contractors,246 the Eleventh Circuit in-
validated Dade County's MBE program because a strong basis in evi-
dence did not exist.247 Unlike in Concrete Works, Dade County ac-
counted for MBE size.248 When the study controlled for this variable, the
results indicated that low MBE utilization could be attributed to size,
rather than to discrimination.249 In addition, studies indicating that mi-
norities formed businesses at a lesser rate than non-MBEs did not con-
clusively prove that discrimination existed. The Third Circuit correctly
concluded that Dade County's evidence was insufficient to justify an
affirmative action program.250
The Tenth Circuit relied on statistics that failed to live up to Cro-
son's strong basis in evidence requirement. Denver's studies were seri-
ously flawed because they: (1) failed to control for firm size and experi-
ence; (2) overestimated MBE participation rates by including all MBEs,
240. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 991.
241. Contractors Ass'n, 91 F.3d at 601.
242. Id. at 602-03.
243. Id. at 603.
244. Id. at 609-10.
245. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509.
246. Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of S. Florida Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895 (11th
Cir. 1997).
247. Eng'g Contractors, 122 F.3d at 926.
248. Id. at 917.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 926.
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not just those that were qualified, willing, and able; and (3) made as-
sumptions regarding discrimination in the lending industry z.25
The Third and Eleventh Circuits differed in their outcomes because
they required accurate, reliable statistics to show a strong basis in evi-
dence. Unlike the Tenth Circuit, they did not dismiss variables such as
firm size and experience, simply because such variables would have in-
validated the governments' programs. The Third and Eleventh Circuits
correctly applied Croson's strong basis in evidence requirement to show
a compelling governmental interest. Despite flaws in Denver's statistics
for failing to control for firm size and availability, the Tenth Circuit
found that a strong basis in evidence existed. As Justice Scalia argued,
"[i]f the evidence relied upon by governmental units to justify their use
of racial classifications can be as inconclusive as Denver's evidence in
this case, our former insistence upon a strong basis in evidence has been
abandoned.,
252
C. The Role of Anecdotal Evidence in Finding a Strong Basis in Evi-
dence
The Tenth Circuit, in addition to the Third and Eleventh Circuits,
weighed anecdotal evidence when determining whether a strong basis in
evidence existed. Although the anecdotal evidence presented in Engi-
neering Contractors was disconcerting, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned
that such evidence was persuasive only if combined with sufficiently
probative statistical evidence.153 In contrast, the Tenth Circuit found that
Denver's anecdotal evidence provided "persuasive, unrebutted support
for [its] initial burden., 254 According to Croson, a proper statistical foun-
dation is crucial in meeting the strong basis in evidence requirement.
255
Thus, without an accurate statistical foundation, anecdotal evidence is
ineffective to support a firm evidentiary basis on which to justify an
MBE program.2 5 Because it is difficult to verify whether anecdotal evi-
dence is "remembered, perceived, or reported accurately," such evidence
should be treated cautiously and must be supported by reliable statis-
tics. 257 In Concrete Works, Denver's statistical studies were flawed and
did not provide a strong basis in evidence.2 58 Therefore, a statistical
foundation was lacking in Concrete Works, yet the Tenth Circuit gave
Denver's anecdotal evidence a great deal of deference in concluding that
251. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 962, 977, 982; see also LaNoue, supra note 223, at 799
(stating that "a defective availability analysis can make a Croson disparity study worthless").
252. Concrete Works, 124 S. Ct. 556, 560-61.
253. Eng'g Contractors, 122 F.3d at 925.
254. Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 990.
255. Croson, 488 U.S. at 501.
256. Eng'g Contractors, 122 F.3d at 926. ("Without the requisite statistical foundation for the
anecdotal evidence to reinforce, supplement, support, and bolster," no firm evidentiary basis exists
to justify an MBE program).
257. LaNoue, supra note 223, at 525.
258. See Concrete Works, 321 F.3d at 962, 977, 982.
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Denver had met its burden.25 9 Because Denver's statistical studies did not
meet Croson's rigid standards, the Tenth Circuit's treatment of anecdotal
evidence was unwarranted.
V. CONCLUSION
Government affirmative action programs are subject to strict scru-
tiny analysis, which is the most intensive type of judicial review.260 Strict
scrutiny requires that a government provide a strong basis in evidence to
show that a program is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest. To uphold Croson's rigid standards, courts must require
governments to conduct statistical studies that accurately control for firm
size, experience, and other variables that may provide a race-neutral ex-
planation for disparate statistics. Without such reliable statistical studies,
a government should not be able to satisfy the strong basis in evidence
standard.
The Tenth Circuit attempted to apply Croson's strict scrutiny analy-
sis, but fell short. Denver's statistics were seriously flawed and, thus,
were insufficient to establish a strong basis in evidence. If Denver's stud-
ies controlled for variables such as firm size and experience, its statistics
would have been more convincing. Other circuits, such as the Third and
Eleventh, are upholding the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny standards by
requiring governments to produce accurate, thorough statistics that show
a strong basis in evidence. If strict scrutiny provides a means to "smoke
out" illegitimate uses of racial classifications, decisions such as the Tenth
Circuit's in Concrete Works will hinder the determination of "what clas-
sifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classifications are in fact
motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial
politics."261 The Tenth Circuit buried strict scrutiny analysis in substan-
dard statistical studies, and the search for its appropriate application will
be extremely problematic if such statistics are the basis of future affirma-
tive action programs.
Teresa Lee Brown*
259. Id. at 989-90.
260. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 13, at 519.
261. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Denver College of Law. I would like to thank my
husband, Hoyt, for his infinite patience, support, and love.
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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT AND RESOLVING DISPUTES IN
ARBITRATION VERSUS A COURT PROCEEDING
INTRODUCTION
Almost everyone enters into an agreement to arbitrate, whether
aware of it or not. Arbitration clauses are now the standard method for
resolving disputes in many consumer contracts, such as insurance, medi-
cal, and broker contracts. Standard arbitration agreements pose the quin-
tessential question: when a dispute arises, and a person's competency to
enter into the contract as a whole is challenged, is the arbitration agree-
ment embedded within the contract enforceable?
With the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA" or "Act")
in 1925,1 along with the federal government's power and authority to
enforce the FAA, comes an emergent issue of determining when arbitra-
tion, rather than a court proceeding, must be used to resolve a dispute.2
Due to arbitration provisions becoming more common in consumer con-
tracts, many contract disputes, and accordingly many court opinions, will
be based on the enforceability of arbitration agreements in years to
come. 3 In fact, conflicting court decisions resolving arbitration agree-
ments have been abundant since the enactment of the Act, and courts are
still trying to reach a consistent pattern of uniformity to enforce arbitra-
tion provisions.4
The FAA establishes in Title 9 of the United States Code, Section 2,
that "[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evi-
dencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a con-
troversy thereafter arising .. .shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforce-
1 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883, 883-86 (1925) (currently codified
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)). Congress later renamed the United States Arbitration Act the Federal
Arbitration Act and enacted it into law on July 30, 1947, ch. 392, § 1, 61 Stat. 674.
2. See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 1-3 (1995) (discussing the widespread use of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") in
resolving contract disputes and problems that arise); see also Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1273
(10th Cir. 2003) (holding the plaintiffs mental incapacity invalidated the entire contract as well as
the embedded arbitration clause); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 406-07
(1967) (holding that a claim of fraud in the inducement of the entire contract is a matter for arbitra-
tion, and not the court, when the contract contains a valid arbitration clause).
3. See Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconcil-
ing the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND.
L.J. 591, 593-97 (2001) (discussing the widespread use of arbitration clauses in consumer and em-
ployment contracts and the potential for misconduct and abuse in the ADR process because of the
participants' lack of good faith and the absence of judicial oversight or regulation).
4. David P. Pierce, The Federal Arbitration Act: Conflicting Interpretations of Its Scope, 61
U. CIN. L. REV. 623, 623-24 (1992) (discussing conflicting interpretations of the FAA in various
state decisions).
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able, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revoca-
tion of any contract. '" 5 Additionally, Section 4 states that if a contract
with an arbitration provision has been entered into, and the "making" of
the arbitration agreement is not at issue, the court shall order the parties
to proceed to arbitration.6 Thus, many issues arise when an arbitration
provision is placed in a contract because the agreement to arbitrate is
made "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable," by federal statute, which can
only become unenforceable under the same theories as a contract may
become unenforceable under contract law.7 Since the adoption of the
FAA, arbitration agreements are increasingly used in resolving disputes
that arise out of the contract as a whole, which undoubtedly favors busi-
nesses over consumers.
8
This survey paper9 explores the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
opinion in Spahr v. Secco,10 where the court decided that a mental capac-
ity claim challenging the validity of a contract containing an arbitration
agreement should be resolved in a court proceeding instead of arbitra-
tion." Prior to Spahr, the Tenth Circuit had not addressed this 
issue.1
Other circuits, however, have decided cases similar to Spahr.t3 Although
the outcome in Spahr is different from the outcome other circuits reached
in similar cases,1 4 the holding in Spahr is likely to have important impli-
cations on future court decisions because Spahr readily provides a logi-
cal, fair, and rational method of evaluating the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements.
If Spahr is appealed to the United States Supreme Court, however,
the Tenth Circuit's holding in Spahr may be reversed because the Su-
preme Court will likely want to maintain uniformity in court decisions




8. Edward A. Dauer, Judicial Policing of Consumer Arbitration, I PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
91, 94-96 (2000) (discussing the widespread use of ADR and the asymmetries of arbitration that
favors businesses over consumers).
9. The survey period runs from September 1, 2002, to August 31, 2003.
10. 330 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2003).
11. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1273.
12. Id. at 1267-68.
13. See Primerica Life Ins. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that a mental
capacity claim challenging a contract containing an arbitration clause should be decided in arbitra-
tion); Jeske v. Brooks, 875 F.2d 71, 75 (4th Cir. 1989) (concluding that claims of unconscionability
and lack of consideration challenging a contract containing an arbitration clause should be decided in
arbitration); Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Beneficial Life Ins., 774 F.2d 524, 529 (lst
Cir. 1985) (concluding that claims of mutual mistake and frustration of purpose challenging a con-
tract containing an arbitration clause should be decided in arbitration).
14. See Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272-73.
15. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp.
v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). States are also overturning decisions to uphold the
Prima Paint rationale and maintain consistent holdings. See, e.g., Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at
472 (concluding that a challenge to a contract containing an arbitration clause should be decided in
arbitration in accordance with the Prima Paint rationale).
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sufficient public policy reasons to support Spahr,16 the Court may alter
their Prima Paint decision and create a new standard for arbitration
agreements that combine the Prima Paint and Spahr rationales. Should
this occur, arbitration will undergo a change for the better because the
decision in Spahr adds a logical and fair method of interpreting the FAA
that gives arbitration agreements their intended effect.17 Thus, combining
the Prima Paint and Spahr rationale will provide an enhanced method of
evaluating arbitration agreements that is both rational and maintains the
national legislative goals of favoring arbitration.
Part I of this survey examines the background of the FAA by look-
ing at its history and formation, as well as relevant FAA provisions. Part
II of this survey analyzes the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Spahr v.
U.S. Bancorp Investments, Inc., where the Tenth Circuit held the arbitra-
tion provision unenforceable. Part I of this survey examines other re-
cent circuit court rulings in similar arbitration cases. Finally, this paper
takes the position that Spahr properly held a mental capacity challenge to
a contract containing an arbitration agreement goes to the "making" of




A. History and Formation of the FAA
With the number of cases being litigated on the rise, Congress
passed the FAA in 1925 to make arbitration an equitable alternative to
litigation that would reduce the number of cases in the court system.19 As
a result of increasing national hostility towards arbitration and courts'
refusal to enforce arbitration agreements in contracts, Congress codified
the FAA in Title 9 of the United States Code in 1947 to underscore the
fact that federal policy favors arbitration agreements. 20 This codification
aimed to place arbitration provisions "'upon the same footing as other
16. See Weston, supra note 3, at 593-97; Dauer, supra note 8, at 95-96. Arguably public
policy warrants changing the current rationale regarding consumer arbitration agreements because
they asymmetrically favor businesses and do not provide a fair outcome for consumers; consumers
are forced into arbitration agreements for which they have not bargained, and are denied their right
to a jury trial.
17. See Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court's Erroneous Statu-
tory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 791-92, 806-
11, 889-90 (2002) (discussing the problems with the Court's current statutory interpretation of the
FAA and how changing to an originalist mode of statutory interpretation would better suit legislative
intent).
18. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1273.
19. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1984); see also Richard C. Reuben,
Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV.
577, 601 (1997) (discussing the history of arbitration in the United States in the early twentieth
century).
20. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24-25 (1991) (quoting Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
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contracts'" by allowing courts to invalidate arbitration agreements only
for the same reasons that other contracts could be invalidated.2'
Additionally, Congress intended the FAA to be applicable in federal
courts and state courts, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.22 In Southland
Corp. v. Keating and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp., the Supreme Court took the position that the FAA
trumped state statutes regulating arbitration agreements, thereby invali-
dating conflicting state laws.23 The Supreme Court, however, held that
"state law may be applied 'if that law arose to govern issues concerning
the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally."
24
The Supreme Court has often reversed state court decisions that
failed to enforce arbitration provisions in the same manner other contract
provisions are enforced. In doing so, the Supreme Court has emphasized
that they favor arbitration, pursuant to the legislative intent behind the
Act.2 5 By allowing state law to govern contracts generally, arbitration
agreements are given the same standing and enforceability as other con-
tracts because arbitration agreements are enforceable on the same
grounds as any other contract.
26
Arbitration is not inferior to litigation, but is simply a different
method of resolving a dispute arising as "'a matter of contract,' 27 in
which a party is not required to arbitrate any dispute to which he has not
agreed.28 The Supreme Court has invalidated decisions where individual
states refused to enforce arbitration provisions to the extent necessary to
give those arbitration provisions the same enforceability as other con-
tracts.
29
The leading decision on the arbitrability of claims is Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.30 In Prima Paint, the Supreme Court held
that a claim for fraud in the inducement of the contract, which can in-
validate the entire contract, instead of just the arbitration clause itself,
should be resolved in arbitration. 31 The Court explained that unless there
is concern that the claim involves the "making" of the arbitration provi-
21. Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (citation omitted)).
22. Southland, 465 U.S. at 16.
23. See id.; Moses H. Cone Mem 'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25.
24. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686-87 (quoting Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,492 n.9 (1987)).
25. See id. at 687-88; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-26; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at
24-25.
26. Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 686-87.
27. AT&T Techs. Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (quot-
ing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)).
28. See Reuben, supra note 19, at 605-07.
29. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
275 (1995).
30. 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
31. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 406-07.
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sion, Section 4 of the Act mandates the claim should be resolved by arbi-
32tration.
Prima Paint also established the "separability doctrine," which sev-
ers arbitration clauses from the rest of the contract.33 Where a claim does
not attack the arbitration clause itself, but rather the entire contract, that
claim must be resolved through arbitration.34 This holding in Prima Paint
may seem counterintuitive because a claim challenging the entire con-
tract, including the making of the arbitration agreement, is subject to
arbitration while a claim challenging only the arbitration agreement and
not the entire contract may be resolved by the courts. Although it may
seem counterintuitive, Prima Paint established a rational and consistent
pattern to determine which cases must be resolved by arbitration instead
of by a court proceeding. Nonetheless, the Prima Paint rationale has
been questioned because the holding reached by the Court arguably
strayed from the FAA's language and legislative intent.36 In so doing, the
Court extended the FAA beyond cases involving interstate commerce
and made arbitration agreements separable from the rest of the contract.
37
Spahr v. Secco is a case of first impression in the Tenth Circuit 38
and will likely have a significant impact in determining when to mandate
the arbitration of claims because Spahr adds a logical and fair method of
interpreting the Act, even though it departs from Prima Paint. In sum,
arbitration plays an important role in the litigation of consumer contracts.
Moreover, conforming to uniform interpretations of the FAA is of great
importance in future cases because uniformity will provide courts and
consumers guidance in deciding whether to enter into or enforce con-
tracts that contain arbitration agreements.
B. Relevant FAA Provisions
The key statutory provisions in the Act are Title 9 of the United
States Code, Sections 2 through 4. Section 2 of the Act establishes that
an arbitration provision is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, but con-
tains a "saving clause" allowing for an arbitration provision to be invali-
32. Id. at 403-04.
33. Id. at 402-04.
34. Id. at 403-04; see also Tanya J. Monestier, "Nothing Comes of Nothing" ... Or Does
It??? A Critical Re-Examination of the Doctrine of Separability in American Arbitration, 12 AM.
REV. INT'L ARB. 223, 224-27 (2001) (discussing the consistency with which U.S. case law has
applied the Prima Paint severability doctrine to differentiate between contracts that are void and
contracts that are voidable); Alan Scott Rau, "The Arbitrability Question Itself," 10 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 287, 331-36 (1999) (discussing misapplications of the Prima Paint doctrine).
35. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04; see also Donald E. Johnson, Has Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos. v. Dobson Exterminated Alabama's Anti-Arbitration Rule?, 47 ALA. L. REV. 577, 609-10
(1996) (noting that although the rule in Prima Paint seems counterintuitive, it comports with the
FAA).
36. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 407-08 (Black, J., dissenting). For further information on the
legislative history of the FAA see the dissenting opinion.
37. Id. at 409-11 (Black, J., dissenting).
38. Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1267-68 (10th Cir. 2003).
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dated under the standard contract defenses,39 such as duress, fraud and
unconscionability.4 ° Section 3 of the FAA establishes that a court shall
stay proceedings where the issue should be resolved in arbitration, !
thereby limiting the court's authority to resolve disputes where the con-
tract contains an arbitration provision.42 Section 4 of the Act dictates
when a court shall resolve a claim rather than requiring arbitration. This
depends on whether the court is satisfied that the "making" of the agree-
43ment is not at issue.
Section 2 of the FAA has been expanded to apply to state substan-
tive and procedural policies in order to comply with the national policy
favoring arbitration. 44 The Supreme Court progressively broadened the
scope of cases to which the FAA extends by including contracts with
arbitration agreements that do not involve interstate commerce.45 The
Supreme Court likewise interpreted Section 4 of the FAA to require that
claims be arbitrated if the making of the arbitration agreement is not at
issue.46
Section 4 of the Act is the key provision in many federal circuit
cases because it allows a court to compel arbitration.4 7 Section 4 of the
FAA gives courts an opportunity to decide whether the claim goes to the
39. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. Section 2 states in relevant part: "A written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id.
40. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687.
41. 9 U.S.C. § 3. Section 3 states:
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon any is-
sue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration, the court in
which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement, shall on application of one
of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance
with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in
proceeding with such arbitration.
Id.
42. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26 (stating that both state and federal
courts are obligated to stay litigation under Section 3).
43. 9 U.S.C. § 4. Section 4 in part states:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a
written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save
for such agreement, would have jurisdiction ... for an order directing that such arbitra-
tion proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.... The court shall hear the
parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the
failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the par-
ties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement .... If the
making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same
be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.
Id.
44. Southland, 465 U.S. at 10-16; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24; see Prima
Paint, 388 U.S. at 404-05.
45. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 401.
46. See id. at 402-04.
47. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403; Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1270; Primerica Life Ins. v. Brown,
304 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2002).
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"making" of the arbitration agreement, and if so, that claim may be de-
cided by the court instead of through arbitration. 48 By interpreting Sec-
tion 4 of the FAA in a manner requiring arbitration of almost all claims
brought under a contract containing an arbitration agreement, courts pro-
gressively broadened the scope of cases subject to the FAA. In doing so,
these courts arguably exceeded the legislative intent because arbitration
agreements have been given more influence and effect than other con-
tracts.49
II. UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS DECISIONS
A. The Tenth Circuit
1. Spahr v. Secco
50
In a case of first impression, the Tenth Circuit decided in Spahr
whether parties raising a mental capacity challenge to the validity of an
entire contract should be required to arbitrate according to the contract,
or instead go to a court proceeding. 5' This section of the paper discusses
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Spahr.
a. Facts
In Spahr v. Secco, Spahr, an elderly man affected by Alzheimer's
and dementia opened an investment account with U.S. Bancorp Invest-
ments, Inc. (U.S. Bancorp), whereby Spahr signed an agreement "prom-
ising to submit any controversy arising out of the account to arbitration
,,52. ... 5lSecco was a female employee working for U.S. Bancorp as
Spahr's broker, investment advisor, and trustee.53 Secco allegedly ex-
ploited Spahr by using sex to finagle him "out of large sums of money
and real estate., 54 When Spahr's estate filed claims against U.S. Bancorp
and Secco to seek recovery, U.S. Bancorp filed a motion to compel arbi-
tration, pursuant to the agreement Spahr signed.55
48. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04; Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1269-70; Primerica Life Ins. Co.,
304 F.3d at 472.
49. For a detailed examination of the legislative history of the FAA, see IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 83-121 (Oxford University Press 1992).
50. 330 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2003).
51. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1267-68.
52. Id. at 1268. The agreement in this case involves a Cash Account Agreement that stated:
I agree that any controversy arising out of or relating to my account, to transactions with or for me or
to this agreement or the breach thereof, whether executed or to be executed within or outside of the
United States, and whether asserted against broker-dealer and/or its present or former agents or
employees, will be settled by arbitration before and in accordance with the then current rules of the
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The district court denied U.S. Bancorp's motion to compel arbitra-
tion, holding the agreement to arbitrate between Spahr and U.S. Bancorp
was unenforceable because Spahr lacked the requisite mental capacity to
comprehend the nature and effect of the contract.56 U.S. Bancorp and
Secco appealed the district court's decision, claiming Spahr's mental
incompetence challenge to the agreement should never have been heard
by the court and instead should have been resolved in arbitration.57
b. Decision
In Spahr, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's ruling that the agreement is not subject to the arbitration provi-
sion.58 The Tenth Circuit explained that because Spahr lacked the mental
capacity to contract, the claim was not subject to arbitration because the
entire contract was void.59
The Tenth Circuit considered whether parties raising mental capac-
ity claims challenging the validity of an entire contract should be re-
quired to arbitrate pursuant to the contract.60 The court reviewed whether
language in Section 4 of the FAA provides judicial relief to cases where
the entire contract, including the arbitration agreement, is challenged.6'
In cases such as Spahr, where the making of the arbitration agreement is
at issue, the court retains the power to determine whether the arbitration
agreement is valid.62 In reaching this decision, the Tenth Circuit appel-
late court distinguished other circuit decisions from Spahr,63 therein pro-
viding a logical and useful analysis. Spahr reached a different outcome
than other circuits have reached in similar cases because the Tenth Cir-
cuit interpreted Section 4 of the Act as distinguishing between contract
claims that make a contract void, which should be heard by a court, and
contract claims that make the contract voidable, which should be re-
solved in arbitration. 64 Therefore, if a contract claim would risk making
the entire agreement void, including the arbitration agreement, a court
should hear that claim; whereas a contract claim merely making the con-
tract voidable that does not place the "making" of the arbitration agree-
65ment at issue should be resolved in arbitration.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1269.
58. Id. at 1267-68.
59. Id. at 1273.
60. Id. at 1272-73.
61. Id. at1271.
62. Id. at 1269.





c. Analysis of the Tenth Circuit's Holding in Spahr v. Secco
In Spahr, the Court began by applying Title 9 of the United States
Code, Section 4, holding that "[i]t has long been a tenet of federal arbi-
tration law that 'arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so
to submit.' ' 66 Thus, when a dispute arises that relates to the contract as a
whole, and includes a broad arbitration agreement, there is not "the req-
uisite clear and unmistakable evidence 'within the four corners of the...
[a]greement that the parties intended to submit the question of whether
an agreement to arbitrate exists to an arbitrator.'
', 67
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit held in Spahr that the Prima Paint
holding did not apply to the facts in Spahr because "[u]nlike a claim of
fraud in the inducement, which can be directed at individual provisions
in a contract, a mental capacity challenge can logically be directed only
at the entire contract" and thus goes to the making of the contract and
should be decided in a court proceeding pursuant to Section 4.68 The
Tenth Circuit then applied Section 4, determining that a mental capacity
claim does go to the making of the contract, and thus should be decided
by a court rather than an arbitrator.69
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Spahr, that the mental capacity chal-
lenge goes to the "making" of the contract and thus should be decided by
a court instead of an arbitrator, is likely to be criticized for departing
from the position of the Supreme Court and other circuits in similar cases
following Prima Paint.70 The determination that a claim goes to the
"making" of the contract and thus may be decided by a court pursuant to
Section 4 will likely be used in rare circumstances because of the court's
strong favor for arbitration, which is shown in court decisions that con-
sistently uphold the FAA.7' The Supreme Court is likely to hold that a
case involving a mental capacity challenge is analogous to a claim of
fraud in the inducement, in that both challenge the validity of the entire
contract without questioning the "making" of the arbitration provision
66. Id. at 1269 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am. 475 U.S.
643, 648 (1986)).
67. Id. at 1270 (quoting Riley Mfg. v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 157 F.3d 775, 780 (10th
Cir. 1998)).
68. Id. at 1273.
69. Id.
70. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967); Primerica
Life Ins. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 2002); Jeske v. Brooks, 875 F.2d 71, 72 (4th Cir.
1989); Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Beneficial Life Ins., 774 F.2d 524, 528-29 (1st
Cir. 1985).
71. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402; Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683
(1996); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23-26 (1991); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17 (1984).
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itself, and therefore both should be submitted to arbitration according to
the agreement.72
To maintain consistency in their decisions, the Court may decide to
reverse the decision in Spahr.73 This may occur because after the Su-
preme Court made its decision in Prima Paint, other courts have consis-
tently upheld the Prima Paint rationale by reversing inconsistent cases
and setting a uniform standard of review for courts on every level.74
There are compelling public policy reasons, however, for the Supreme
Court to alter its decision in Prima Paint by incorporating the Spahr
holding in deciding the arbitrability of claims that challenge contracts
containing arbitration agreements. The primary public policy reasons
include the fact that Prima Paint favors businesses over consumers,
forces consumers into agreements they have not bargained for, and de-
nies individuals their constitutional right to a jury trial. 5
Although legislative intent stresses a national policy favoring arbi-
tration, Congress has not displayed such favor towards businesses. 76 Re-
gardless, the outcome of many arbitration disputes resulted in decisions
unquestionably favoring businesses, leaving consumers in a position for
which they never bargained.77 Prima Paint and other decisions following
its rationale do this very thing by favoring businesses and their adhesive
agreements that unfairly bind consumers.7 8 The challenge of enforcing
arbitration agreements while not overstepping legislative intent is an
obstacle courts will face in years to come. Arguably this challenge could
best be overcome by adopting Spahr because Spahr reasonably and logi-
cally applies the Act without enforcing adhesive contracts that favor
businesses.
Additionally, the constitutional right to a jury trial should not be
overcome by an arbitration provision within a contract, when a party is
challenging the validity of that entire contract, as this deprives the indi-
vidual of the right to a jury trial and contravenes the legislative intent.79
With these public policy reasons in mind, the Supreme Court would be
reasonable and correct in adopting the Spahr decision as part of the stan-
dard in determining whether a claim challenging a contract containing an
arbitration agreement should be resolved in a court proceeding rather
than arbitration.
72. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402; Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-26;
Southland, 465 U.S. at 17.
73. See Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472.
74. Id.
75. See Dauer, supra note 8, 94-96; Weston, supra note 3, at 600-01.
76. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
77. See supra note 13; Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683.
78. Arguably, enforcing arbitration agreements against consumers favors businesses. See
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 400-06.




The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Spahr, which holds that a mental ca-
pacity claim goes to the "making" of the contract and should be heard by
a court instead of an arbitrator, appears to subject contracts with or
without arbitration provisions to the same requirements. The trend of
federal courts to enforce arbitration provisions in the manner Congress
intended81 at times gives contracts containing arbitration provisions more
obstacles than those without arbitration provisions.82 Consumers entering
into such agreements are experiencing outcomes they might not logically
expect, especially in cases where an arbitrator, rather than a judge, de-
cides if an arbitration provision within a contract is enforceable.83 The
issue raises a serious problem in consumer contracts, because if a party is
fraudulently induced into entering a contract, and the subsequent claims
are then subjected to arbitration, that party arguably never entered into
any valid agreement, let alone an agreement to arbitrate.84 This contra-
diction produces unpredictable and illogical outcomes because contracts
without an arbitration clause are held to a different standard than con-
tracts containing them.
85
Although the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Spahr departs from the
Prima Paint rationale,86 Spahr is nonetheless logical, fair, and provides a
rational method of evaluating arbitration agreements. The main distinc-
tion between Spahr and Prima Paint is how and where these two courts
draw the line in determining whether the "making" of the agreement to
arbitrate shall be resolved by a court rather than arbitration.
The Prima Paint rationale focused on whether the challenge to the
agreement goes to the "making" of the entire contract, versus the "mak-
ing" of the arbitration provision, to determine whether the dispute should
be resolved in a court rather than arbitration.87 Prima Paint held that if a
contract defense challenges the contract as a whole, it should be resolved
80. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272-73.
81. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 682-89; Southland, 465 U.S. at 5-7.
82. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681-86; Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24-26; Southland, 465 U.S. at 5-6;
Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402; Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472; Jeske, 875 F.2d at 75; Unionmu-
tual Stock Life Ins., 774 F.2d at 529. See generally Edward A. Dauer, Contracts of Adhesion in Light
of the Bargain Hypothesis: An Introduction, 5 AKRON L. REV. 1 (1972) (analyzing the pros and cons
of arbitration provisions); Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer
Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REV. 1237 (2001) (discussing the shortcomings of arbi-
tration provisions).
83. Rau, supra note 34, at 303-06; see also Alderman, supra note 82, at 1242.
84. See Pittman, supra note 17, at 790-93 (discussing adhesion contracts and the their nega-
tive effect on consumer contracts in stating, "there has been, and currently is, a legitimate concern
over the use of adhesion contracts that force consumers to accept arbitration to resolve future dis-
putes, including personal injury claims as well as contractual claims, arising out of their purchases of
consumer goods.").
85. Rau, supra note 34, at 293.
86. Compare Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-04, with Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1270-75.
87. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 403-04.
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in arbitration; whereas if the contract defense challenges the arbitration
provision alone, a court should resolve the claim.
88
Spahr, on the other hand, focused on what contract defenses chal-
lenge the "making" of the agreement to arbitrate, without limiting the
defenses to those challenging the arbitration agreement itself.89 Spahr
determined contract defenses making the entire contract void should be
resolved by a court instead of through arbitration.90 Contract defenses
making the contract voidable, however, do not specifically challenge the
"making" of the arbitration agreement and should be resolved in arbitra-
tion.9' The Tenth Circuit in Spahr did not contradict the Prima Paint
rationale. Instead, Spahr chose a different method of analyzing the word
"making," as set out in Section 4 of the Act.92
Overall, it appears that when a party is using a contract defense to
invalidate a contract, the court's goal is to determine whether the "mak-
ing of the agreement for arbitration.., is not in issue" before compelling
arbitration.93 At this point the court will determine whether the contract
defense should be reserved for courts to decide, which inevitably creates
a potential conflict between Congress's intention to favor arbitration of
claims, and an individual's right to not be obligated to arbitrate an
agreement considered void pursuant to contract law. The courts then
must decide which claims they will hear and which claims must proceed
to arbitration, according to the agreement, in a realistic manner so that all
claims alleging a contract defense will not end up in court. Giving every
claim a court date would defeat the purpose of the FAA in trying to en-
force arbitration provisions in order to reduce "costliness and delays of
litigation."94
Both Prima Paint and Spahr attempt to find the appropriate place to
draw the line in allowing certain cases to be heard by a court instead of
requiring arbitration. Although Prima Paint and Spahr arrive at different
outcomes in distinguishing between cases that must go to arbitration ver-
sus a court proceeding, both approaches are useful in trying to establish a
workable rationale. Although Prima Paint and Spahr are not without
95their drawbacks in achieving logical and realistic outcomes, a common
88. Id.
89. See Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1271-73.
90. Id. at 1273.
91. See id. at 1271-73.
92. See id.
93. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
94. Hai Jiang, Do We Allow Contract Law to Administer Civil Rights Remedies?, 2003
DETROIT COLL. L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 273.
95. See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 395-407; Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1266-75. Arguably there are
downfalls in the Prima Paint decision because although Prima Paint offers a reasonable analysis of
when to send a case to arbitration instead of a court proceeding, subsequent outcomes achieved from
Prima Paint's rationale at times do not seem logical and may not fully withstand the analytical
scrutiny of other courts. Additionally in Spahr, there are downfalls as well because in separating out
contract defenses that make a contract void, and then allowing those cases to be heard in court could
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middle ground between the Prima Paint and Spahr opinions might allow
arbitration provisions to receive the same "footing" as other contract
provisions, yet loosen the adhesion many consumer arbitration provi-
sions currently face.
96
Other circuits have considered whether a contract defense invalidat-
ing an arbitration agreement should be resolved by arbitration rather than
a court proceeding.97 This paper now examines how these circuits resolve
the arbitration dilemma.
B. Fifth Circuit
1. Primerica Life Ins. v. Brown
98
a. Facts
Brown executed an agreement with CitiFinancial's affiliate,
Primerica Life Insurance Co., which contained "an arbitration clause
requiring arbitration of [Brown's] claims." 99 When a claim arose, Brown
alleged he lacked the mental capacity to enter into the contract and there-
fore was not bound to the arbitration agreement because the contract was
invalid. 00 The district court agreed, holding the arbitration provision
unenforceable because Brown lacked the mental capacity to contract.
10
b. Decision
In Primerica, the Fifth Circuit appellate court reversed the district
court, holding that a mental capacity challenge to the entire contract must
go to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause. 0 2 Relying on Prima
Paint, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that pursuant to Section 4 of the FAA,
federal courts may only consider "issues relating to the making and per-
formance of the agreement to arbitrate."' 1 3 The court explained that
Brown's mental capacity claim challenged the entire contract without
specifically challenging the arbitration clause, and thus issues relating to
arbitration agreements were never disputed. 1°4 Without any issues relat-
ing to the arbitration agreement in controversy, the court determined it
lead to the same problem that the FAA wanted to prevent; which includes reducing cases in the
courts and not allowing the courts to give arbitration provisions less "footing" than other contract
provisions.
96. See, e.g., Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 423 (Black, J., dissenting) (recognizing the "purpose of
the Act was to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts" (internal
quotations omitted)); Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 682 (recognizing and applying same principal); Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 24 (same); Southland, 465 U.S. at 15-16 (same).
97. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272.
98. 304 F.3d 469 (5th Cir. 2002).
99. Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 470.
100. Id. at 471.
101. Id.
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lacked authority to hear Brown's contract defense and submitted the
claim to arbitration. 10
5
C. Fourth Circuit
1. Jeske v. Brooks
10 6
a. Facts
Jeske, an investor, sought investment advice from Brooks, an em-
ployee at an investment firm. 107 When Jeske entered into an investor rela-
tionship with Brooks, he signed an agreement that "contained an arbitra-
tion clause covering all disputes over matters relating to the agree-
ment." °8 After suffering losses stemming from Brook's investment ad-
vice, Jeske filed claims against Brooks and Brooks' investment firm.' 9
When Brooks asked the court to stay the proceedings and compel arbitra-
tion pursuant to the agreement, the district court compelled arbitration of
the state law claims, but refused to require arbitration of the federal
claims. 110
b. Decision
In Jeske, the Fourth Circuit held that claims of unconscionability
and lack of consideration challenge the entire contract's formation and as
such should be decided by arbitration. 1' Relying on Prima Paint, the
Fourth Circuit determined that when a claim challenges the validity of an
entire contract, and the arbitration provision within the contract is not
specifically challenged, the question regarding the contract's validity is
within the scope of arbitration. 12 The court ignored the potential conflict
that may exist when an entire contract is invalid as a matter of law, and
thus the embedded arbitration clause is inapplicable, yet the claim must
first go to arbitration to determine whether or not the contract is valid."
3
105. Id.
106. 875 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. 1989).
107. Jeske, 875 F.2d at 72.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 72-73.










Unionmutual and Beneficial, both insurance companies, entered
into a "Portfolio Indemnification Reinsurance Agreement" which in-
cluded an arbitration clause requiring any dispute arising from the in-
demnification agreement to be arbitrated in Portland, Maine.!15 After
forming the agreement, Beneficial contacted Unionmutual to rescind the
indemnification agreement, stating that the recent passage of the Deficit
Reduction Tax Act "frustrated the purpose of the contract."'" 6 The dis-
trict court granted Unionmutual's motion to compel arbitration of Bene-
ficial's dispute.17
b. Decision
On appeal, the First Circuit appellate court affirmed, holding that
claims of mutual mistake and frustration of purpose challenging the mak-
ing of the entire contract should be decided by an arbitrator. 18 Relying
on the severability doctrine discussed in Prima Paint, the court took the
position that arbitration clauses .'are 'separable' from the contracts in
which they are embedded, and that where no claim is made that fraud
was directed at the arbitration clause itself, a broad arbitration clause will
be held to encompass arbitration of the claim that the contract itself was
induced by fraud.""' 9 The First Circuit court reasoned that Beneficial's
attempt to invalidate the entire contract lacked an independent challenge
to the validity of the arbitration agreement. 20 Without an independent
challenge separating the arbitration agreement from the rest of the con-
tract, the court determined arbitration was the appropriate forum to de-
cide the validity of the contract.1
21
III. ANALYSIS
Several federal circuit courts of appeal reviewed cases involving
contract defenses as applied to arbitration agreements.122 Among the de-
114. 774 F.2d 524 (lst Cir. 1985).
115. Unionmutual Stock Life Ins., 774 F.2d at 525.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 529.
119. Id. at 528 (quoting Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 402
(1967)).
120. Id. at 529.
121. Id.
122. See Primerica Life Ins. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2002); Jeske v. Brooks, 875
F.2d 71, 75 (4th Cir. 1989); Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Beneficial Life Ins., 774
F.2d 524, 529 (1st Cir. 1985).
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cisions discussed above, these courts all relied on the Prima Paint ration-
ale in their decisions.123 Primerica, Jeske, and Unionmutual, each held
the contact claims in these cases were subject to arbitration, pursuant to
the arbitration agreement in the contract, because the contract defenses
challenged the overall contract and not the making of the arbitration
agreement itself. 12 4 In each of these cases, the respective court applied
the Prima Paint rationale in questioning whether the claim challenged
the contract as a whole or just the arbitration agreement, to determine
that each claim was subject to arbitration because each challenged the
entire contract. 1
25
The Prima Paint doctrine these circuits apply seems easily over-
come if a party simply challenges the "making" of the arbitration agree-
ment, in which case the party will receive a court hearing. 126 Otherwise,
if the party challenges the contract as a whole, the party is subject to ar-
bitration. 27 Therefore, to receive a court hearing and not be subject to
arbitration, a party need only assert a claim challenging the arbitration
agreement itself, instead of the entire contract. 128 This seems unreason-
able and against the clear legislative intent behind the FAA.
129
In Spahr v. Secco, the Tenth Circuit court interpreted Section 4 of
the Act, holding that claims making a contract void, rather than voidable
bring the "making" of the entire agreement, including the agreement to
arbitrate, into issue and should be resolved in a court proceeding.
30
Spahr would likely reach a different outcome than the First, Fourth, and
Fifth Circuits reached in similar cases because Spahr held contract de-
fenses making the entire contract void also challenge the "making" of the
arbitration agreement and should be resolved by a court.' 3' Spahr draws
the line between contract defenses challenging the "making" of an arbi-
tration agreement, even if the defense challenges the entire contract as
well, and contract defenses that do not. 132 According to Spahr, if a claim
challenges the "making" of the arbitration agreement, a court should
123. Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472; Jeske, 875 F.2d at 75; Unionmutual Stock Life Ins.,
774 F.2d at 529.
124. Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472; Jeske, 875 F.2d at 75; Unionmutual Stock Life Ins.,
774 F.2d at 529.
125. Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472; Jeske, 875 F.2d at 75; Unionmutual Stock Life Ins.,
774 F.2d at 529.
126. Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472; Jeske, 875 F.2d at 75; Unionmutual Stock Life Ins.,
774 F.2d at 529.
127. Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472; Jeske, 875 F.2d at 75; Unionmutual Stock Life Ins.,
774 F.2d at 529.
128. Primerica Life Ins., 304 F.3d at 472; Jeske, 875 F.2d at 75; Unionmutual Stock Life Ins.,
774 F.2d at 529.
129. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395. 407-12 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (citing to specific legislative history for enacting the FAA); MACNEIL, supra note 49, at
83-121.
130. Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1267-68 (10th Cir. 2003).




resolve that claim, regardless of the fact that the claim challenges the
entire contract instead of just the arbitration agreement. 133 Spahr's rea-
soning not only takes into account whether the arbitration provision or
the entire contract was being challenged, but whether the "making" of
the arbitration agreement is at issue.
34
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Spahr contributed to a split among
the circuit courts 135 regarding different applications of Section 4 of the
Act. 36 The Tenth Circuit explicitly disagreed with the Fifth Circuit in
Primerica Life Ins. v. Brown,137 holding that where a party claims a lack
of mental capacity to enter into a contract, a court rather than an arbitra-
tor should decide the claim. 
38
As Spahr reasoned, a person should not be subject to arbitration
when he or she has not so agreed. 39 Therefore, when the "making" of a
contract containing an arbitration agreement is at issue, it seems implicit
that the person never agreed to arbitrate. The Spahr rationale takes into
account the "tenet of federal arbitration law" in holding that regardless of
whether the challenge goes to the "making" of the entire contract or the
"making" of the arbitration agreement, a party should not be forced to
submit a dispute to arbitration unless there was consent. 40 Spahr is dif-
ferent from Prima Paint because the latter distinguishes between whether
the claim challenges the entire contract or the arbitration provision within
the contract, and then resolves the claims that challenge the entire con-
tract through arbitration. 14 Although the Spahr and Prima Paint ration-
ales are not contradictory because they both apply similar interpretations
of Section 4, their rationales do produce dissimilar results because of the
different interpretations of the word "making."' 142 As such, the Tenth
Circuit's reasoning in Spahr is arguably the better approach in determin-
ing what cases should be heard by a court because the Spahr analysis
truly questions whether the claim goes to the "making" of the agreement
to arbitrate, rather than looking at whether the claim challenges the entire
contract or the arbitration agreement alone. 43 Spahr's approach main-
tains a logical, fair, and rational method of evaluating arbitration agree-






137. 304 F.3d at 472 (holding a mental capacity defense that goes to the making of the entire
contract must be arbitrated).
138. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272.
139. Id. at 1268.
140. Id. at 1269-75.
141. See id.; Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-07.
142. Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 402-07; Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1269-70.
143. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1271-73.
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Should the U.S. Supreme Court hear Spahr, its decision will affect
not only the future of arbitration agreement enforceability, but also the
fundamental procedural fairness for those entering into contracts contain-
ing them. Although Spahr reaches a different outcome from other circuit
courts in cases with similar facts,144 the Court will have the opportunity
to create a fairer standard in arbitration agreement enforceability that is
based on public policy concerns. The primary policy reasons for adopt-
ing Spahr's rationale is the promotion of fairness in the legal system by
giving consumers the same treatment and protection businesses receive
under the law, enforcing contracts consumers have freely bargained for,
and affording individuals their constitutional right to a jury trial. 145 These
are all important public policy reasons because the legal system is based
in large measure on principles of equity, and currently the Court's stance
on arbitration agreements strongly favors businesses, and unfairly binds
consumers. 146 By adopting the Tenth Circuit's decision in Spahr, the
Court better promote the goals of the Federal Arbitration Act.
CONCLUSION
With Congress passing the FAA in 1925 and the United States Su-
preme Court holding arbitration as a comparable means to litigation,
deserving of the same "footing" as other contract provisions,147 it is ap-
parent the use of arbitration agreements will continue to grow consumer
contracts. Arbitration is likely to play an important role in many future
contract cases in the Tenth and other circuits, which is why it is so im-
portant to understand the opinion in Spahr.
When the Tenth Circuit in Spahr stated that a court should hear a
case involving a mental capacity claim that challenges the validity of the
entire contract, it effectively established a new method of analyzing
contract defenses that attack the validity of arbitration clauses. Spahr
thus established a useful alternative to the Prima Paint rationale in de-
termining whether a court shall hear a case or compel arbitration. 149 The
rationale in Spahr may initially create confusion when compared to
Prima Paint because Spahr seemingly reaches the opposite outcome
from Prima Paint in cases with similar facts. 150 Spahr, however, does
give an applicable interpretation of the word "making,"1 5 1 as set forth in
the Section 4 of the Act. This interpretation will likely aid courts in de-
144. See supra note 13.
145. See Dauer, supra note 8, 94-96; Weston, supra note 3, at 600-01.
146. See Dauer, supra note 8, 94-96; Weston, supra note 3, at 600-01.
147. See Doctor's Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7-18 (1984).
148. See Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 2003).
149. Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272-75.
150. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967); Spahr, 330
F.3d at 1272.
151. See Spahr, 330 F.3d at 1272.
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ciding cases while sustaining the intended purpose of the FAA. Impor-
tantly, the Spahr holding is critical in achieving outcomes that truly place




152. See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681-86.
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Denver College of Law.
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IN RE PARKER: THE TENTH CIRCUIT CHOOSES Two PATHS
OF ANALYSIS FOR THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
INTRODUCTION
On December 23, 2002, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re
Parker II,l resolved the ambiguity of two important bankruptcy issues.2
First, the Tenth Circuit adopted a mechanical analysis for determining
whether to reopen a no asset, no bar date case, for use in deciding
whether the claim is discharged according to section 523(a)(3)(A) 3 of the
Bankruptcy Code.4 The mechanical approach does not allow equitable
considerations to intrude into a court's decision of whether to reopen a
no asset case with no bar date.5 Second, the Tenth Circuit adopted the
conduct approach to determine the date a claim arises for purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision.6 Under the conduct ap-
proach, a claim arises on the date when the conduct causing the claim
actually occurs, as opposed to when state law allows a claim to be com-
menced in court.' The Tenth Circuit's holdings regarding both the me-
chanical approach and conduct approach show the court's desire to pro-
tect the debtor and preserve the "fresh start" philosophy of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.8
A no asset, no bar date case is a case in which it appears from the
bankruptcy schedules that the debtor has no unencumbered assets that
could result in a distribution to creditors through liquidation.9 If a debtor
has no assets to liquidate, the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure likely will
1. Watson v. Parker (In re Parker I) 313 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
429 (2003).
2. See In re Parker H, 313 F.3d at 1268.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A) (2000). This survey deals exclusively with Bankruptcy issues
under the Bankruptcy Code. Whenever a code section is referenced in the main text, that code sec-
tion will fall within II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000).
4. See In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1268-69.
5. Id. at 1269 (quoting Watson v. Parker (In re Parker 1), 264 B.R. 685, 695 (B.A.P. 10th
Cir. 2001), aff'd, 313 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2002)).
6. Id. at 1269-70. The automatic stay provision is located in section 362(a)(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000). The statute identifies those situations in which a stay of judi-
cial action against a debtor is imposed. See id.
7. In re Parker II, 313 F.3d at 1269. But see Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M.
Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[W]hile federal law controls which claims are
cognizable under the Code, the threshold question of when a right to payment arises, absent overrid-
ing federal law, 'is to be determined by reference to state law."' (quoting Vanston Bondholders
Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 161 (1946))).
8. The "fresh start" philosophy of the Bankruptcy Code is the philosophy that "all legal
obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in bank-
ruptcy." Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 202 (4th Cir. 1988). Further, the automatic stay
provision provides "a breathing spell to the debtor to restructure his affairs .... " Grady, 839 F.2d at
202.
9. See Dawson v. Unruh (In re Dawson), 209 B.R. 246, 248 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997); see
also FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(e) (Notice of No Dividend).
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not impose a bar date because, with no assets to distribute, it is irrelevant
whether creditors file a claim.' When the debtor files for bankruptcy, in
the spirit of the Bankruptcy Code's fresh start philosophy, the debtor is
seeking the discharge of all her outstanding debts." In the debtor's peti-
tion for bankruptcy, she is required to name all of her outstanding debts
as well as the creditors to whom those debts are owed.
12
The mechanical approach applies in situations where, after the
debtor has received her discharge from the bankruptcy court, she re-
members that she omitted a creditor from her schedule of creditors.' 3 The
debtor wonders whether she must petition to reopen her Chapter 7 no
asset, no bar date case to receive a discharge from the omitted debt.'
4
Additionally, the debtor worries whether section 523(a)(3)(A), which
excepts a claim from discharge "if it was neither listed nor scheduled and
the creditor did not have notice or actual knowledge of the case so that
the creditor could timely file a claim," will apply to the omitted debt.
1 5
The debtor also worries whether the court will inquire into her intent
behind the omission of the creditor. 6 Under the mechanical approach
that the Tenth Circuit adopted in In re Parker II, the debtor will be able
to remedy her forgetfulness and receive a discharge without reopening
her bankruptcy case. 7 Consequently, the debtor will no longer need to
worry about the court inquiring into the circumstances around her forget-
fulness, nor need she worry about whether section 523(a)(3)(A) will bar
the dischargeability of her debt. 18 This result, however, would be differ-
ent if the debtor's court was on the other side of the circuit split which
adopts the equitable approach.' 9
The Federal circuits are split regarding whether a debtor must re-
open a bankruptcy case to receive a discharge from an omitted claim, and
whether the bankruptcy court should look into the debtor's intent behind
failing to originally file the claim before allowing it to be reopened.20
Section 350(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a bankruptcy case to be
10. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002(a). A bar date pursuant to Rule 3002(c) of the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure is a date that serves as a deadline for creditors to file a proof of claim in
which to receive a dividend or participate in the debtor's bankruptcy proceedings. See FED. R.
BANKR. P. 3002(c); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 2002(e). Rules 3002(a) and 2002(e) are used in the
context of this Survey to illuminate the effect of a debtor's absolute lack of assets on the procedures
of a bankruptcy case.
11. See In re Parker1, 264 B.R. at 694.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (2000).
13. See Alexander L. Edgar, The Law of Reopening - Revisited, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb.
2001, at 8, 8.
14. See In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 693.
15. Id. at 695.
16. See id. at 693-94. Courts that apply the equitable, rather than conduct, approach reason
that "the intent of the Debtor at the time of the omission is relevant to the inquiry." Id. at 694 (dis-
cussing e.g., Stark v. St. Mary's Hosp. (In re Stark), 717 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1983)).
17. In re Parker I, 313 F.3d at 1269 (quoting In re Parker , 264 B.R. at 695).
18. See id.
19. E.g., In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.3d 332.
20. In re Parker , 264 B.R. at 693.
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reopened in the same court in which it was closed.2' The federal courts
that adopt the equitable approach hold that the debtor's intent behind
failing to list the omitted claim is relevant when deciding whether to re-
open a bankruptcy case. 22 These courts view the reopening of the bank-
ruptcy case as a necessary step before discharging an omitted debt under
section 523(a)(3)(A).23 The circuits that use the mechanical approach
hold that the reopening of a bankruptcy case has no effect on the dis-
chargeability of a debt.24 The mechanical approach is based on the notion
that the discharge of a debt is done by operation of law under section 727
of the Code, and that section 523(a)(3)(A) does not apply to a no asset,
no bar date case. 25 The debtor's intent behind not filing the claim origi-
nally is irrelevant under the mechanical approach.26 In In re Parker H,
the Tenth Circuit adopted the mechanical approach.27
In re Parker H also decided another important bankruptcy issue re-
garding the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision.
28 Section
362(a)(1) sets forth "an automatic stay of, among other things, judicial
action against the debtor 'to recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title."' 29 For purposes of
the automatic stay provision, federal courts have taken two approaches to
the method of determining whether a claim arose before or after the
bankruptcy proceedings were filed.30 The first approach used by the
courts is the conduct theory, in which the date the claim arises is deter-
mined by the date in which the conduct "giving rise to the claim" oc-
curs.31 The second approach, the accrual theory, "determines the date of
a claim pursuant to the state law under which liability for the claim
arose. '32 In In re Parker II, the Tenth Circuit adopted the conduct the-
ory.
33
21. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2000).
22. See In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 693-94.
23. Id.; see also In re Stark, 717 F.2d at 324.
24. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694.
25. See id.; see also Zimhelt v. Madaj (In re Madaj), 149 F.3d 467, 472 (6th Cir. 1998).
26. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694.
27. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1268.
28. See id. at 1269 ("The second issue concerns determination of the date on which a claim
arose for purposes of classifying it as a pre-or post-petition claim.").
29. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1270 (citing Grady, 839 F.2d at 202 (quoting 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)(1) (2000)) (emphasis added). Claims arising pre-petition are claims made by creditors,
against the debtor, before the debtor files for bankruptcy. See generally Robert J. Scott, When a
Claim Arises Under the Bankruptcy Code, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 253 (1995). Claims that arise post-
petition are those where the creditor seeks collection of a debt owed after the debtor has filed for
bankruptcy. See generally id.
30. See In re Parker H, 313 F.3d at 1269.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. ("We now adopt the conduct theory as the one more in tune with the plain language
and the policy underlying the Bankruptcy Code.").
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I. BACKGROUND OF CIRCUIT SPLITS
In 1904, the Supreme Court decided Birkett v. Columbia Bank.34 In
Birkett, the Supreme Court strictly interpreted bankruptcy law to protect
the creditor from the debtor "experimenting" with the law and to allow
the creditor the "natural" rights of the law.35 Interpreting the bankruptcy
law at the time, the Supreme Court discussed the importance of a debtor
scheduling a debt and listing creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding. 36 Re-
ferring to Section 17 of the Bankrupt Law of 1898, a predecessor to sec-
tion 523(a)(3)(A) of the current code, the Supreme Court held that actual
knowledge of a bankruptcy proceeding was knowledge that allowed the
creditor to timely avail himself of the benefits of law.37 The Court re-
jected the notion that actual knowledge included any knowledge of the
bankruptcy proceedings regardless of the timing.38 The Court held that
bankruptcy law would be defective if it did not allow the creditor reme-
dies against the debtor.39 Thus, the Court in Birkett held that debts
scheduled after the original petition, "omitted debts," would not be dis-
charged in bankruptcy because of the prejudice against the creditor.4°
In 1978, Congress adopted the Bankruptcy Reform Act.4' The
Bankruptcy Reform Act created the present Bankruptcy Code.42 Con-
gress's enactment of the Code was intended to overrule Birkett.43 The
Code was enacted as "a significant departure from present law.... [T]he
bill contemplates that all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how
remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with in the bankruptcy
34. 195 U.S. 345 (1904).
35. Birkett, 195 U.S. at 350-51; see also Bruce White & Maria H. Belfield, Is the Debtor's
Failure to List Claims Fatal?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 1998, at 40, 40. Birkett was interpreting
the Bankrupt Law of 1898, the existing bankruptcy law at the time. See Birkett, 195 U.S. at 349.
36. Birket, 195 U.S. at 349.
37. Id. at 350 (discussing § 17 of the Bankrupt Law of 1898, repealed by the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-958, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330)). Sec-
tion 17 of the Bankrupt Law of 1898 provided:
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt of all of his provable debts, except
such as... have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance, with the name
of the creditor if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowl-
edge of the proceedings in bankruptcy ....
Id. at 349 (quoting § 17 of the Bankrupt Law of 1898).
38. See id. at 350.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 350-5 1; see also White & Belfield, supra note 35, at 40 (citing Birkett, 195 U.S.
at 350).
41. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-958, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330).
42. See White & Belfield, supra note 35, at 40-41.
43. Beezley v. Cal. Land Title Co. (In re Beezley), 994 F.2d 1433, 1439 (9th Cir. 1993)
(O'Scannlain, J., concurring) ("The legislative history of section 523(a)(3) declares unambiguously
that Birkett was intended to be overruled.").
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case." 44 Congress's 1978 enactment of the Bankruptcy Code was in-
tended to allow the debtor a fresh start.45
Two parts of the 1978 Code are relevant to In re Parker II: section
523 and section 362.46 Section 523 states, in pertinent part:
(a) A discharge under section 727 . . . of this title does not dis-
charge an individual debtor from any debt--
(3) neither listed nor scheduled ... in time to permit--
(A) if such debt is not of a kind specified in paragraph (2),
(4), or (6) of this subsection, timely filing of a proof of
claim, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge
47of the case in time for such timely filing; ....
In re Parker H also addresses section 362 of the Code, known as the
automatic stay provision.48 The automatic stay provision provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition
filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title ... operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities, of--
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issu-
ance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative,
or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or
could have been commenced before the commencement of
the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case un-
49der this title; ....
A. The History of Circuit Splits Regarding Section 523
The circuit courts are split regarding how section 523 of the Code
affects the dischargeability of an omitted claim in a no asset, no bar date
bankruptcy, and the analysis the court should use in determining whether
to reopen a case. 50 The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that a
debtor's intent "is irrelevant to the bankruptcy court's decision to re-
open" a case.51 Since a debtor is required to list all creditors and debts
44. Watson v. Parker (In re Parker 1), 264 B.R. 685, 697 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001), affd, Wat-
son v. Parker (In re Parker 1), 313 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting S. REP. No. 95-989, at 21-22
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787).
45. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 697-98.
46. See In re Parker 1I, 313 F.3d 1267, 1269-70 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(1), 523(a)(3)(A)
(2000)).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A).
48. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1270.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
50. See In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1268.
51. Id. at 1268-69 (citing Zimhelt v. Madaj (In re Madaj), 149 F.3d 467, 471 (6th Cir. 1998);
Judd v. Wolfe (In re Judd), 78 F.3d 110, 115-16 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Beezley, 994 F.2d at 1439).
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owed to each creditor upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition,52 these
courts do not look to the debtor's intent behind omitting a creditor or
debt from the original bankruptcy petition.53 This approach is known as
the mechanical approach.54 The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
have held that a court must look to the debtor's intent for omitting the
claim to determine whether or not to reopen a bankruptcy case. These
circuits adopt the equitable approach.56
The Third Circuit adopted the mechanical approach in In re Judd.
57
There, the Third Circuit held that the scheduling of a debt, or lack of
scheduling, does not affect the debt's dischargeability.5s The Third Cir-
cuit holds that it is therefore unnecessary to reopen a bankruptcy claim to
receive a discharge. 59 The Sixth Circuit in In re Mada] adopted the me-
chanical approach, calling the reopening of a no asset bankruptcy case to
schedule an omitted debt a "useless gesture." 6° Finally, the Ninth Circuit
also adopted the mechanical analysis in In re Beezley.6'
The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the
debtor's intent is relevant when deciding whether or not to reopen a
bankruptcy case.62 The Seventh Circuit was the first to adopt this ap-
proach in In re Stark. There, the Seventh Circuit held that "a debtor may
reopen the estate to add an omitted creditor where there is no evidence of
,,63fraud or intentional design. With this holding, the Seventh Circuit
opened the door to the inference that the reopening of a debtor's chapter
7 no asset case is relevant to the dischargeability of a claim.
64
In In re Faden, the Fifth Circuit held that the debtor's intent for fail-
ing to schedule a creditor is relevant to the dischargeability of a debt
under section 523(a)(3)(A).65 The Fifth Circuit went beyond In re Stark's
analysis and adopted three factors relevant to evaluate
52. 11 U.S.C. § 521(1).
53. In re Parker 1, 264 BR. at 694; see also infra notes 132-62 and accompanying text.
54. See In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694.
55. Id. at 693-94 (citing Faden v. Ins. Co. of N. Am. (In re Faden), 96 F.3d 792, 797 (5th Cir.
1996); Stark v. St. Mary's Hosp. (In re Stark), 717 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1983); Samuel v. Baitcher (In
re Baitcher), 781 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11 th Cir. 1986)).
56. See id. at 693 (citing In re Faden, 96 F.3d at 797. In re Stark, 717 F.2d 322: In re
Baitcher, 781 F.2d at 1534).
57. See In re Judd, 78 F.3d at 115.
58. Id. at Ill.
59. Id.
60. In re Madaj, 149 F.3d at 468.
61. In re Beezley, 994 F.2d at 1434.
62. See In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 693-94 (citing In re Faden, 96 F.3d at 797; In re Stark, 717
F.2d 322; In re Baitcher, 781 F.2d at 1534).
63. In re Stark, 717 F.2d at 324.
64. See Edgar, supra note 13, at 8.
65. See In re Faden, 96 F.3d at 796 (citing Robinson v. Mann, 339 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir.
1964) (reasoning that a court should not discharge a debt under section 523(a) if the debtor's failure
was due to intentional design, fraud, or improper motive)).
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whether a debtor's failure to list a creditor properly will prevent dis-
charge of the unscheduled debt: (1) the reasons the debtor failed to
list the creditor; (2) the amount of disruption that would likely occur;
and (3) the prejudice suffered by the listed creditors and the unlisted
creditor in question.
66
The Fifth Circuit also places the burden on the debtor to show that the
failure to schedule the creditor was not motivated by fraud or intentional
design. 67 Thus, the Fifth Circuit adopted an equitable approach to deter-
mining whether or not an omitted debt should be discharged pursuant to
section 523(a)(3)(A).6s
The Eleventh Circuit held the debtor's intent to be relevant for pur-
poses of discharge under section 523(a)(3)(A) of the Code in In re
Baitcher.69 Following the Seventh Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit held that
fraud or intentional design must be absent for a debtor to receive a dis-
charge for an unscheduled debt under section 523(a)(3)(A) of the Code.7 °
The Tenth Circuit was undecided on the proper approach to reopen-
ing a no asset, no bar date case until In re Parker 11.71 Prior to In re
Parker II, the Tenth Circuit, in In re Dawson,72 held that equitable con-
siderations could not override section 523(a)(3)(A) in a no asset case, but
did not address whether equitable considerations would apply in a no
asset case with no set bar date.73 Additionally, the Tenth Circuit did not
address whether the court should consider the debtor's intent for failing
to schedule a claim when determining whether to reopen a no asset, no
bar date case. 74 In In re Dawson, the Tenth Circuit referred to its adher-
ence to a "stricter construction" of the Code and desire to follow the
"clear language of the statute. 75 The Tenth Circuit, however, remained
undecided on both of these issues regarding a no asset, no bar date case
until In re Parker 11.76
66. Id. The Fifth Circuit finds the three relevant factors from an earlier case, Robinson. Id.
(citing Robinson, 339 F.2d at 550). Robinson was decided prior to the enactment of the modern
Bankruptcy Code in 1978. See id. Thus, in In re Faden, the Fifth Circuit is adopting the Robinson
principles for analysis under the new Code. See id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 797 ("Thus, even absent prejudice, equitable action should not be taken in cases
where the debtor's failure to properly schedule a creditor is a result of more than 'mere negligence or
inadvertence."').
69. See In re Baitcher, 781 F.2d at 1534.
70. See id.
71. See In re Parker H, 313 F.3d at 1268.
72. Dawson v. Unruh (In re Dawson), 209 B.R. 246 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997).
73. In re Dawson, 209 B.R. at 250.
74. In re Parker , 264 B.R. at 694 n.8 (discussing In re Dawson decision).
75. In re Dawson, 209 B.R. at 250. The Tenth Circuit refers to two lines of reasoning, the
liberal approach and the stricter approach, which emerged from the predecessor of section 523(a)(3)
under the repealed Bankruptcy Act. Id.
76. See In re Parker HI, 313 F.3d at 1269.
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B. The History of Circuit Splits Regarding Section 362(a)(1)
The circuit courts are split regarding whether to use the conduct ap-
proach or accrual approach for determining the date a claim arises for
purposes of the Code's automatic stay provision.77 The date a claim
arises serves to classify a claim as pre-petition or post-petition with re-
gard to the automatic stay provision under section 362(a)(1). 78 A claim is
a right to payment, made by a creditor, that the debtor desires to be dis-
charged by filing for bankruptcy. 79 If a claim is classified as a post-
petition claim, the debtor will not receive protection under the bank-
ruptcy laws and the claim will not be discharged.80 Thus, a debtor can
only receive relief from the bankruptcy proceedings, the discharge of a
claim against him, if the claim is classified as pre-petition. 81 A creditor
may want a claim to be classified as pre-petition or post-petition depend-
ing on the type of bankruptcy proceeding.82 Most likely, however, a
creditor would prefer a claim to be classified as post-petition, because the
claim will not be discharged in bankruptcy and will be a remaining obli-
gation when the bankruptcy is complete.83
The conduct approach to determining when a claim arose for pur-
poses of classifying it as a pre-petition or post-petition claim is the pre-
dominate approach among the circuit courts.84 The conduct approach
classifies a claim as a pre-petition one if "the acts giving rise to the al-
leged liability were performed" prior to the commencement of bank-
85ruptcy proceedings. The Fourth Circuit adopted the conduct approach
in Grady v. A.H. Robbins Co.86 The Fourth Circuit approach is an exam-
ple of the basic conduct approach, which does not refer to state law to
determine when a claim arises.8 7 Grady held that a claim is classified as
pre-petition if the conduct causing the claim occurs prior to the bank-
ruptcy petition.88 Section V, Part A of this paper, infra, will discuss
Grady's holdings in detail.
Only the Third Circuit adopts the accrual approach. 89 The accrual
approach looks at the law of the state in which the claim arose to deter-
77. Id.
78. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).
79. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 240-41 (7th ed. 1999) ("A right to payment or to an
equitable remedy for breach of performance if the breach gives rise to a right to payment.").
80. See Grady, 839 F.2d at 200-01.
81. Dale Ellen Azaria, When Is a Claim a Claim? A Bankruptcy Code Riddle, 62 TENN. L.
REV. 205, 207-08 (1995).
82. See id. at 208-09 (explaining that a putative creditor may want to participate depending on
the likelihood they will prevail in other forums besides the bankruptcy arena).
83. See id.
84. See In re Parker I, 313 F.3d at 1269.
85. Scott, supra note 29, at 263 (quoting In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 BR. 680, 690
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
86. Grady, 839 F.2d at 201.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 203.
89. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1269 (quoting Grady, 839 F.2d at 201).
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mine the date of the claim.90 The Third Circuit adopted this approach in
In re M. Frenville Co.91 There, the Third Circuit held that the automatic
stay provision is "not all encompassing" and requires a claim, in order to
receive the protection from automatic stay, to have commenced or have
92been able to commence. In determining whether a claim could have
been commenced before the filing of bankruptcy, the Third Circuit fo-
cuses on when a claim's right to payment arose, and inquiry which turns
on state law.93
While the majority of the circuits have adopted the conduct ap-
proach, there is a split between two versions of the conduct approach.94
Courts are split between adopting the basic conduct approach, illustrated
in Grady, or a more narrow conduct theory.95 In re Piper Aircraft Corp.9 6
articulates the narrow conduct approach. This approach, in essence, nar-
rows the definition of a prepetition claim under the conduct theory.97
Under the narrow conduct approach, "a claim arises at the time of the
conduct upon which the debtor's liability is based only if the claimant
had a specific relationship with the debtor at the time the conduct oc-
curred., 98 The Tenth Circuit has not decided whether to adopt the nar-
row version of the conduct approach or to continue with the basic the-
ory.99 Thus, for purposes of this paper, the conduct approach referred to
herein will be the basic conduct approach as articulated by Grady.
Prior to In re Parker II, the Tenth Circuit was undecided as to
which theory to adopt in determining whether to classify a particular
claim as pre-petition or post-petition for the purposes of the automatic
stay provision. °° In In re Grynberg,1°1 the Tenth Circuit avoided taking
sides on the circuit split.10 2 The court stated that "[wihile it is superfi-
cially tempting to analyze this case based on whether the claim can be
categorized as prepetition ... our evaluation persuades us that a different
analysis is required."' 1 3 Similarly, in In re Franklin Savings Ass'n,1°4 the
Tenth Circuit again avoided a definitive decision on which standard to
90. Id.
91. Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332, 334-35 (3d
Cir. 1984).
92. In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d at 334-35.
93. Id. at 337.
94. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1270 n..
95. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 697-98.
96. 162 B.R. 619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994), afTd, 168 B.R. 434 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
97. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 697 n.12.
98. Id. at 697.
99. In re Parker II, 313 F.3d at 1270 n.I.
100. Id. at 1268-69.
101. Grynberg v. Danzig Claimants (In re Grynberg), 966 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1992).
102. See In re Grynberg, 966 F.2d at 572.
103. Id.
104. Franklin Savs. Ass'n v. Office of Thrift Supervision (In re Franklin Savs. Ass'n), 31 F.3d
1020 (10th Cir. 1994).
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adopt. 10 5 The In re Franklin Savings Ass'n court held that it was able to
classify the Director's costs as a pre-petition claim under both the accrual
and conduct theories.' 06 Thus, the court decided it would be superfluous
to make the decision of which theory to adopt at that time.' °7 In In reParker II, the Tenth Circuit finally adopted the conduct approach.'0 8
II. TENTH CIRCUIT: DECIDING ON TWO PATHS OF ANALYSIS FOR THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. In re Parker 1019
1. Facts
In re Parker 1I is an appeal from the United States bankruptcy ap-
pellate panel." 0 Parker, the debtor, was at one time the attorney for Wat-
son, the creditor."' In December of 1995, Parker filed a complaint for
Watson in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
against Watson's former employer. 12 The District Court ordered Parker
to file a motion by May 24, 1996, stating why the case should not be
dismissed for failure to serve the defendant within the required 120
days." 3 Parker neglected to file a timely response and the case was dis-
missed."14 On November 26, 1996, Parker filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy
and failed to list Watson as a creditor." 5 During the pendency of his
bankruptcy, Parker admitted to committing malpractice in Watson's case
and filed a motion on January 23, 1997, to reinstate her case. 116 Subse-
quently, Watson terminated Parker's employment as her attorney."
7
Parker received a discharge from bankruptcy on May 14, 1998.18 Wat-
son filed a malpractice case against Parker in July 1998.119 Parker as-
serted the affirmative defense that Watson's claim had been discharged
by his bankruptcy. 120 On May 6, 2000, Parker filed a motion to reopen
his Chapter 7 case in order to include Watson's claim, and additionally to
receive a discharge from the debt.' 2' Watson opposed the reopening of
105. In re Franklin Says. Ass'n, 31 F.3d at 1022.
106. Id.
107. See id.
108. In re Parker II, 313 F.3d at 1269.
109. Watson v. Parker (In re Parker II), 313 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 U.S.
429 (2003).
110. In re Parker I, 313 F.3d at 1268.
111. Watson v. Parker (In re Parker I), 264 B.R. 685, 689-90 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001), af'd,
313 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2002).












Parker's Chapter 7 case because she believed the reopening would affect
the dischargeability of her claim and equitable principals precluded the
court from reopening the bankruptcy.122 Watson believed that the re-
opening of Parker's bankruptcy should be prevented by the court because
of laches, equitable estoppel, or because she would suffer unfair preju-
dice from the possible reopening.
23
On October 5, 2000, the bankruptcy court permitted Parker's case to
be reopened and Watson's debt discharged.1 24 First, the bankruptcy court
found the reopening of Parker's bankruptcy case would only serve to
determine the dischargeability of Watson's claim. 25 Next, the bank-
ruptcy court looked at two issues that would affect the dischargeability of
Watson's claim: section 523(a)(3)(A) or under section 523(a)(3)(B) that
the debt was nondischargeable under sections 523(a)(2), (4) or (6). 126
Finding that neither of the section 523 nondischargeability requirements
were met, the bankruptcy court granted Parker a discharge of Watson's
claim.1 27 The bankruptcy appellate panel affirmed the decision of the
court and Watson appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.1
28
On appeal, Watson contended that the bankruptcy panel's decision
to reopen and discharge her claim should have been precluded on two
issues. 12 9 First, Watson argued that various equitable principals should
have precluded Parker from reopening her case. 130 Secondly, Watson
argued that the claim is nondischargeable for two reasons: it arose post-
petition and because the claim otherwise met the nondischargeability
requirements of the Code.'3
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Parker 1.132 The Tenth Circuit decided
two issues of first impression. 33 First, the Tenth Circuit adopted the
mechanical approach to determine whether a debtor's claim should be
reopened in a no asset Chapter 7 case with no bar date. 134 Second, the













134. Id. at 1268-69.
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arose pre-petition or post-petition for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code's
automatic stay provision. 135
Under the mechanical approach, a debtor does not need to reopen a
no asset, no bar date case to receive a discharge for an omitted debt be-
cause reopening has no effect on the dischargeability of the omitted
debt.136 By adopting the mechanical approach, the Tenth Circuit joined
the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. 37 When adopting the mechanical
approach, the Tenth Circuit referred to the bankruptcy appellate panel's
explanation that the mechanical approach is "'better reasoned and more
faithful to the language of the Bankruptcy Code.
'" 138
The bankruptcy appellate panel reasoned that under section 727(b)
of the Code, "the Debtor receives a discharge from all debts that arose
before the date of the order for relief ... unless an exception in 523(a)
applies.' 39 Under section 523(a)(3)(A) "a claim will not be discharged
if it was neither listed nor scheduled and the creditor did not have notice
or actual knowledge of the case so that the creditor could timely file a
claim. 1 40  Since Parker's case was a no asset case with no bar date,
"Watson will have an opportunity to file a claim if any assets are discov-
ered." 4  A no asset case is a bankruptcy case "indicating that no assets
were available for liquidation and distribution to creditors.' 42 Because
Watson would have the opportunity to file a claim if any assets were
discovered, the bankruptcy appellate panel found, and Tenth Circuit af-
firmed that Watson would suffer no prejudice. 143  Therefore, because
"equitable considerations do not impact the dischargeability of a debt
under § 523(a)(3)(A)" it is unnecessary to reopen a debtor's Chapter 7
case for determination of equitable principals such as the debtor's intent
for failing to list the omitted creditor.144
Next, the Tenth Circuit adopted the conduct theory for determining
when a claim arises for purposes of the automatic stay provision. 45 The
135. Id. at 1269.
136. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694 ("[Tlhe majority of courts apply the mechanical approach
... that pursuant to the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code the debt is discharged by operation of
law and that to reopen a bankruptcy case to schedule a previously unlisted debt in a no asset, no bar
date case has no effect on the dischargeability of the debt."). The logic of this reasoning is apparent:
a no asset case is one where the debtor has no money, liquidated or otherwise, to distribute to the
creditors. Dawson v. Unruh (In re Dawson), 209 B.R. 246, 248 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1997). If a creditor
is omitted from the schedule it has no impact: there are no assets to distribute, and the creditor has no
relief even if he were on the schedule. There are currently no assets, nor were there assets during the
bankruptcy proceeding, so the unscheduled debt is merely discharged as though it were scheduled.
137. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1269.
138. Id. at 1268 (quoting In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694).
139. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694.
140. Id. at 694-95.
141. Id. at 695.
142. In re Dawson, 209 B.R. at 248.
143. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 695.
144. Id.
145. In re Parker I. 313 F.3d at 1269-70.
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Tenth Circuit adopted the conduct theory, finding that it was "more in
tune with the plain language and the policy underlying the Bankruptcy
Code."
, 146
First, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the appellate panel's consideration
of the language of the Code. 147 The Court looked to the Code's defini-
tion of "claim," which is defined as a "'right to payment, whether or not
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contin-
gent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, se-
cured, or unsecured .... The appellate panel reasoned that the piv-
otal word of the Code's definition of "claim" to be "contingent. ' 149 Ref-
erencing Black's Law Dictionary, the court found the definition of "con-
tingent claim" to be "'one which has not accrued and which is dependant
on some future event that may never happen."",150 The Court determined
that the Code "expressly delineates the boundaries of the term claim."'
' 51
Since the Code gives the boundaries of the word "claim" and the defini-
tion includes "contingent claims," a court must encompass this definition
when determining whether a claim existed before the filing of the bank-
ruptcy, pre-petition.1 52 Thus, the appellate panel found that, when deter-
mining if a claim has arisen, the central issue for the court is whether the
claim existed pre-petition, not whether the claim was valid under state
law. 153
Second, the court looked to the policy behind the Code when decid-
ing to adopt the conduct approach. 154 Finding that legislative history
pointed to an expansive definition of the word "claim," 155 the court de-
termined that the philosophy of the Code was to allow the debtor to
achieve a "fresh start. 156 Included in this fresh start philosophy, the
court found that Congress intended that "all legal obligations of the
debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be dealt with
in the bankruptcy case." 157 Thus, the Tenth Circuit held that the Bank-
ruptcy Code allows the "broadest possible relief' and the conduct theory
best captures this purpose. 1
58
146. Id. at 1269.
147. Id. at 1268 (quoting In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694-95).
148. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 697 (quoting II U.S.C. § 101 (5)(A)).
149. Id.






156. Id. at 698.
157. Id. at 697 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-989, at 21-22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787).
158. Id. at 697-98 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-989, at 21-22 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787).
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Finally, the Tenth Circuit used the conduct theory to determine that
Watson's claim did in fact occur pre-petition, and was thus protected by
the Code's automatic stay provision.159 Since conduct giving rise to
Watson's malpractice claim occurred in May 1996, five months before
Parker's Chapter 7 filing, Watson's claim arose prepetition. 60 Watson's
claim arose on the date Parker committed the malpractice.1 61 Therefore,
the Tenth Circuit upheld the bankruptcy appellate panel's decision that
Watson's claim was a prepetition claim and once again found the claim
to be dischargeable.'
62
1I. OTHER CIRCUIT APPROACHES: MECHANICAL APPROACH VERSUS
LOOKING AT THE DEBTOR'S INTENT
A. The Sixth Circuit: In re Madaj, 163 An Example of the Mechanical Ap-
proach
1. Facts
Two over-generous foster parents ("Creditors") lent their son and
his wife money to cover fire damage.164 While the son may have antici-
pated repaying the loan initially, the son and his wife ("Debtors") filed
Chapter 7 bankruptcy instead. 65 Debtors' petition did not list their par-
ents as creditors, 166 Debtors received a discharge, and the no asset case
was closed. 167 Unaware of Debtors' bankruptcy proceedings, Creditors
repeatedly asked Debtors for repayment. 68 Creditors' fruitless requests
led them to file a state action to recover the loan. 169 Thereafter, Debtors
moved to reopen their Chapter 7 case and include the debt to their par-
ents. 70 Debtors claimed that their initial failure to list the creditors was
unintentional and caused by a memory lapse.17' Creditors opposed the
reopening and filed suit.
72
Arguing that Debtors' forgetfulness was insincere and an attempt to
defraud, Creditors argued that a debt can only be discharged if it is
listed. 173 In essence, Creditors argued that Debtor's failure to list the
debt resulted in the nondischarge of their debt.174 Admittedly, within
159. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1269-70.
160. In re Parkerl, 264 B.R. at 698.
161. Id. at 696, 698.
162. In re Parker H, 313 F.3d at 1270.
163. Zimhelt v. Madaj (In re Madaj), 149 F.3d 467 (6th Cir. 1998).













their argument Creditors agree with Debtors that, had the debt been
originally filed, it would have been discharged.175 Additionally, Creditors
admit that, because this is a no asset case, Creditors would not have re-
ceived payment even if they had filed a claim.176 Thus, Creditors op-




In In re Madaj, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decisions of both the
bankruptcy court and the district court in denying Debtor's motion to
reopen.178 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's hold-
ings that, although debtors cannot reopen their bankruptcy proceeding,
the debt was discharged.179 The Sixth Circuit held that it was unnecessary
for Debtor to reopen a no asset case to receive a discharge from an omit-
ted debt. 80 Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that it is "pointless" to reopen a
no asset case because the scheduling of the debt will have no effect, since
the debt has already been discharged.'
8'
The Sixth Circuit pointed to section 523(a)(3)(A) as the possible
source of the confusion regarding whether it is necessary to reopen a case
for a claim to be discharged. 82 Referring to this confusion surrounding
section 523(a) of the Code, the Sixth Circuit discussed the intricate op-
eration of section 523(a) as it applies to a Chapter 7 proceeding. 83 In its
discussion, the Court found that "even 523(a)(3)(A) does not except an
unscheduled debt from discharge if the creditor had notice or actual
knowledge of the bankruptcy case in time for timely filing of a proof of
claim." 184 The Sixth Circuit further explained that "most of the twists
and turns affecting dischargeability" are accorded to the exceptions for
fraudulent debts in sections 523(a)(2), (4), and (6).185 Reiterating that
section 523(a)(3)(A) does not apply if the creditor had knowledge of the
debtor's bankruptcy proceedings from the scheduling or nontraditional
means, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the exception under section
523(a)(3)(A) revolves around lack of notice, not actual scheduling.
86
Section 523(a)(3)(A) of the Code excepts from discharge a claim
that the debtor did not list, so that the creditor did not receive notice of






180. See id. at 468-72.
181. Id. at 468.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 469.
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the debtor's failure to list the claim.' 87 The Sixth Circuit held that the
purpose of the section 523(a)(3)(A) exception is to prevent the injustice
that would result if a creditor did not have an opportunity to "participate
in the distribution of the assets of the estate" in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing.' 88 In a no asset case, no injustice will result because there are no
assets to distribute.1 89  The purpose of the exception in section
523(a)(3)(A) is not relevant to a no asset case because injustice cannot
result if there are no assets to distribute. 90 The Sixth Circuit recognized
"that creditors may want to add their names to the matrix in the unlikely
event that the case is eventually reopened in order to distribute previ-
ously undiscovered assets of the estate, but the vast majority of no-asset
cases do not involve such plot twists. ' ' 9 Thus, the Sixth Circuit held
that section 523(a)(3)(A) "operates differently" with a no asset case with
no bar date because there is no injustice for lack of notice to the creditor
for an unscheduled debt.
92
The Sixth Circuit found that "there is no effect" in allowing a debtor
to reopen a case to schedule an omitted debt. 93 No effect is caused by
the reopening because "[a] debtor cannot change the nature of the debt
by failing to list it in his petition and schedules."'194 Once a debtor re-
ceives discharge pursuant to section 727, "debts are either discharged or
they are not discharged .... Section 523(a)(3)(A) cannot save a debt
in a no asset case that would have otherwise been dischargeable because
the debtor did not list it for any reason. 196 Therefore, the Sixth Circuit
held that it is unnecessary to reopen a no asset case for a debt to be dis-
charged. 197
B. The Eleventh Circuit: In re Baitcher, 198 An Example of a Court Look-
ing into Debtor's Intent in Failing to Schedule a Claim
1. Facts
Barbara Baitcher and Daniel Baitcher owned a restaurant, The
Flame, Inc. 199 After a series of unfortunate events, The Flame filed a
187. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3)(A) (2000).
188. In re Madaj, 149 F.3d at 470. "Without the exception in § 523(a)(3)(A), the debtor could
simply deny his uninformed creditors the opportunity to recover from the bankruptcy estate by
omitting their debts from the schedule." Id. at 469.
189. See id. at 470.
190. See id.
191. Id. at 470 n.3.
192. Id. at 470.





198. Samuel v. Baitcher (In re Baitcher), 781 F.2d 1529 (11 th Cir. 1986).
199. In re Baitcher, 781 F.2d at 1530.
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petition for bankruptcy. 2°° After the petition in bankruptcy, the Baitchers
were no longer in possession of the restaurant, and a receiver was ap-
pointed. 20 ' After the receiver was appointed, Barbara Baitcher continued
to work at The Flame.2 °2 During this period of time, The Flame's work-
men's compensation insurance lapsed.0 3 Around the same time, Samuel,
a worker, was injured while working at the restaurant. 204 The injuries,
coupled with The Flame's lack of workers' compensation insurance, led
Samuel to file a suit in state court against both Baitchers for liability.
205
In 1979, Barbara Baitcher (Baitcher) petitioned for individual bank-
206ruptcy. 6 The day before Baitcher petitioned for bankruptcy, Samuel's
state action against Baitcher was dismissed.20 7 Samuel was not included
in Baitcher's petition as a creditor.20 8 Baitcher's bankruptcy was dis-
charged in 1980, but Samuel's claim was not discharged because it was
not listed.209 Baitcher's bankruptcy was a no asset case.210
In 1981, Samuel received a judgment against Baitcher from the state
action .21 As a result, Baitcher "moved to reopen her bankruptcy, added
Samuel's name to the list of creditors, and obtained a new discharge ap-
plicable to him., 212 The bankruptcy court allowed Baitcher to reopen the
case.2 13 Consequently, Samuel moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the complaint was nondischargeable.1 4 The bankruptcy
court found the complaint was dischargeable and summary judgment was
granted in favor of Baitcher.1 5 The district court affirmed and Samuel
appealed the decisions of both courts.216
2. Decision
In In re Baitcher, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Code allows a
debtor to reopen a bankruptcy and schedule an omitted debt when the
debtor failed to schedule the debt originally because of an "honest mis-







206. Id. For the remainder of this section, Baitcher will refer only to Barbara Baitcher. Daniel
Baitcher is not included in this action. See id. at 1530-31.
207. Id. at 1530-3 1.
208. Id. at 1530.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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sign. 21 7 In In re Baitcher, the Eleventh Circuit adopted an equitable ap-
proach for deciding whether to reopen a no asset, no bar date bankruptcy
case.21 8 For Baitcher to receive a discharge under this equitable approach,
the Eleventh Circuit found she must show "absence of fraud or inten-
tional design., 219 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that inequity would re-
sult if the court did not consider the debtor's intent behind omitting the
debt.220 Because Baitcher could not demonstrate lack of fraud or inten-
tional design in omitting the debt on summary judgment, the Eleventh
Circuit remanded the case back to the lower courts to decide whether to
221reopen the case and discharge the debt.
The Eleventh Circuit discussed some of the facts the lower court
should look into when analyzing Baitcher's intent for omitting the claim
from the bankruptcy.222 In particular, the Eleventh Circuit pointed to
Baitcher's failure to include Samuel's debt in the original petition in light
of including other debts owed by The Flame.2 3 Another troubling fact to
the court was that Baitcher's lawyer filed the bankruptcy claim and also
defended the Samuel claim in court at the time Baitcher omitted the
claim from list.224 Both of these facts could point to Baitcher's use of
fraud or intentional design in omitting Samuel as a creditor. 22' Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit found many possible issues that may prevent a lower
court from reopening Baitcher's bankruptcy and discharging the debt.226
Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the equitable approach requiring
a court to look into the debtor's intent for failing to list a debt before
reopening the case and discharging the debt.227
217. Id. at 1534 ("[U]nder the new law the old prophylactic rule does not in a no-asset case any
more deny a discharge to one who has failed to schedule for reasons of honest mistake, not fraud or
intentional design." (internal quotations omitted)).
218. See id. at 1533-34.
219. Id. at 1534.
220. See id.
221. Id. at 1535.
222. Id. at 1534.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1530.
225. Id. at 1534.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1533-34.
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IV. OTHER CIRCUITS' APPROACHES: CONDUCT THEORY VERSUS THE
ACCRUAL THEORY
A. The Fourth Circuit. Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc.,
228 An Example of
the Conduct Approach
1. Facts
A.H. Robins Company (Robins) manufactured a contraceptive de-
vice, the Dalkon Shield, from 1971 to 1974. 229 After receiving numerous
complaints regarding health and safety concerns, Robins discontinued
production of the Dalkon Shield in 1974.230 On August 21, 1985, Robins
filed a petition for Chapter 11 reorganization as a result of the "over-
whelming number of claims filed against it because of the Dalkon Shield
.... ,,23 Mrs. Grady was a user of the Dalkon Shield.232 On the same
day, August 21, Grady was admitted to the hospital with numerous com-
plaints including abdominal pain.233 Days later she was diagnosed with
pelvic inflammatory disease, which ultimately caused her to undergo a
234hysterectomy.
Two months later, on October 15, 1985, Grady filed a civil action
against Robins.235 The action was later transferred to the Eastern District
of Virginia.236 Subsequently, Grady filed a motion in the bankruptcy
court.237 In her motion, Grady requested the court to classify her claim as
post-petition.238 If the bankruptcy court determined that Grady's claim
did not arise until after Robins filed the petition, then Grady's claim
would not be stayed by the automatic stay provision.
239
The bankruptcy court rejected the accrual approach and adopted the
conduct approach in determining that Grady's claim was a pre-petition
claim. 240 The court held that "the right to payment under 11 U.S.C. §
101(4)(A) of Mrs. Grady's claim arose when the acts giving rise to the
liability were performed and thus the claim was pre-petition under 11
U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). ' 241 Because Grady's claim would be pre-petition and
228. 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988).










239. Id.; see also I I U.S.C. § 362 (a)(1) (1988).
240. Grady, 839 F.2d at 199.
241. Id.
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The Fourth Circuit adopted the conduct approach in Grady v. A.H.
Robins Co., Inc.243 Grady starts with an analysis of the legislative history
of section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code). 244 The Fourth Circuit
looked to the Congressional history of the Code that relates "[tihe auto-
matic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections .... It gives the
debtor a breathing spell from his creditors., 245 Additionally, the Fourth
Circuit found that Congress intended the "broadest possible relief in the
bankruptcy court.,,246 Finding that the legislative history indicates that a
court should view the automatic stay provision as fundamental to the
Code's broad protection of debtors, the Court found the definition of
"claim" in the automatic stay provision should be defined broadly.247
Grady argued that her suit did not fall within the definition of
"claim" under the automatic stay provision. 248 Grady advocated the defi-
nition of "claim" to be when the right to payment for a claim exists.249
Because state law did not allow her a right to payment until the injury
occurred, Grady argued she did not have a claim until after Robins filed
the petition with the bankruptcy court.250 Thus, Grady's argument was
that the bankruptcy court should look to state law to define when a claim
arises, not federal law. 25 ' The Fourth Circuit rejected Grady's argument,
which would have resulted in the adoption of the accrual approach for
determining when a claim arises for purposes of the automatic stay pro-
252vision.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the accrual approach for several rea-
sons. 25 3 First, bankruptcy courts do not apply state law: they follow theBankruptcy Code.2 54 "[T]he bankruptcy Code is superimposed upon the
242. Id. at 198.
243. Id. at 199.
244. Id. at 200-01.
245. Id. at 200 (quoting S. REP. No. 95-989, at 54-55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5840; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 340-41 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6296-
97).
246. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 95-989, at 21-22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5807-08; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 309 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6266).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 201.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 200-01.
252. See id. at 201.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 201-02.
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law of the State which has created the obligation. 255 Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit found that the automatic stay provision of the Code is the
pertinent law for determining when a claim arises, not the law of the
state.256 Once again, the Court stressed the importance of the automatic
stay provision, stating: "Absent a stay of litigation against the debtor,
dismemberment rather than reorganization would, in many or even most
cases, be the inevitable result. 257 Thus, the Fourth Circuit determined
the Code would be the prevailing law because of the high importance of
protecting the debtor from creditors, which is demonstrated by the auto-
matic stay provision.258
Next, the Fourth Circuit looked to the words of the automatic stay
provision.25 9 "Section 362(a)(1) provides for an automatic stay of, among
other things, judicial action against the debtor ' . . . to recover a claim
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under
this title."'' 260 The Fourth Circuit also looked to Section 101(4)(A) which
"defines a claim to be a 'right to payment whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, ma-
tured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unse-
cured.', 2 61 The court then went through the same definition analysis as
the Tenth Circuit in In re Parker II, discussed above in section II A. 2. of
this survey.262 The Fourth Circuit found that Grady's claim was contin-
gent because it was a claim conditioned upon an uncertain future
263event. Thus, a contingent claim includes a claim in which no right to
264immediate payment exists.
The Fourth Circuit determined that Congress intended to include a
contingent claim as a right to payment within the protection of section
362(a)(1)'s automatic stay.265 A broad definition of "claim" was consis-
tent with the legislative history intending that bankruptcy allow a debtor
broad relief from creditors.266 Finally, the Fourth Circuit considered that
the bankruptcy court probably would have been able to classify Grady's
claim as pre-petition by use of its equitable powers under 11 U.S.C. §
255. Id. at 202 (referring to Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156,
162 (1946) ("In determining what claims are allowable and how a debtor's assets shall be distrib-
uted, a bankruptcy court does not apply the law of the state where it sits.")).
256. See id. at 201-02.
257. Id. at 202.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988)).
261. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (1988) (currently codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A)
(2000)).
262. Id.; see supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
263. Grady, 839 F.2d at 202-03.
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105(a).267 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit found that the conduct approach
268was the proper approach to determine when a claim arose.
B. Third Circuit: In re M. Frenville Co.,2 69 An Example of the Accrual
Approach
1. Facts
A&B was an accounting firm employed by M. Frenville Co.
270
A&B prepared certified financial statements for Frenville during 1978
and 1979.271 In 1980, Frenville filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.2 72 Subse-
quently, bank investors of Frenville filed an action against A&B in 1981
alleging, among other things, that A& B negligently and recklessly pre-
pared Frenville's financial statements. 73 In 1983, as a result of the suit
by the banks, A&B sought to include Frenville as a third-party defen-
dant.274 A&B filed a petition in the bankruptcy court, seeking a declara-
tion that the automatic stay provision of section 362(a)(1) did not bar the
claim. 275 Both the bankruptcy court and the district court held that the
automatic stay provision barred A&B's claim against Frenville.276 A&B
appealed to the Third Circuit.277
2. Decision
The Third Circuit held that A&B's claim was not barred by the
automatic stay provision of section 362(a)(1). 278 The Third Circuit
adopted the accrual approach to determine the date a claim arises for
purposes of the automatic stay provision. 279 The Court held that "[o]nly
proceedings that could have been commenced or claims that arose before
the filing of the bankruptcy petitions are automatically stayed.,,280 Ac-
cording to the Third Circuit, focusing on the harm, not the conduct, was
the Congressional intent behind the automatic stay provision.281 Thus, the
Third Circuit, searching for the date the harm occurred, looked to
267. Id. (referring to 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988)).
268. Id.
269. Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3rd Cir.
1984).




274. Id. at 333-34.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 334.
277. Id. at 333.
278. Id. at 337.
279. Id.




whether A&B could bring a claim prior to when the bankruptcy petitions
were filed.282
To determine whether A&B could bring a claim prior to Frenville's
filing for bankruptcy, the Third Circuit looked to the Code's definition of
"claim. '283 Unlike the Fourth and Tenth Circuits, the Third Circuit de-
termined that the Code's definition of "claim" as a "right to payment"
was the "threshold requirement" for determining when a claim may be
brought for purposes of the automatic stay provision.284 Because the
Code does not define when a right to payment arises, the Third Circuit
determined that, absent "overriding federal law," the court must look to
state law.285
The Third Circuit looked to New York law to determine when A&B
was able to bring a claim for contribution or indemnity against Fren-
ville.286 New York law allows a claim for contribution or indemnity to be
commenced "at the time the defendant... serves his answer in the suit
brought by the plaintiff .. 287 Under New York law, A&B could not
commence its action for indemnity against Frenville until the suit was
instituted by the banks against A&B.288 The banks instituted their suit
against A&B fourteen months after Frenville began bankruptcy proceed-
ings.289 Therefore, the Third Circuit determined the claim arose post-
290petition and was not barred by the automatic stay provision.
V. ANALYSIS
In In re Parker II, the Tenth Circuit decided on two approaches for
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: the mechanical approach for reopen-
ing a case under section 523(a)(3)(A) in a no asset, no bar date Chapter 7
bankruptcy, and the conduct approach for purposes of the automatic stay
provision.291 By adopting both the mechanical and conduct approaches,
the Tenth Circuit is protecting the debtor and promoting the "fresh start"
philosophy of the Bankruptcy Code.292 The mechanical approach towards
reopening a bankruptcy case under section 523(a)(3)(A) protects the
debtor by not requiring the no asset, no bar date bankruptcy to be re-
282. Id.
283. Id. at 336.
284. Id. ("At first glance, A & B might be thought to have had an unliquidated, contingent,
unmatured and disputed claim pre-petition. While all of these adjectives may describe A & B's cause
of action against the Frenvilles, the threshold requirement of a claim must first be met -- there must
be a 'right to payment."' (quoting I 1 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (1982)).
285. Id. at 337.
286. Id. at 335.
287. Id.
288. See id. at 337.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 337-38.
291. Watson v. Parker (In re Parker II), 313 F.3d 1267, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
124 U.S. 429 (2003).
292. See In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1268-69.
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opened for a debtor to receive a discharge from an omitted claim. 293 Con-
sequently, a debtor will not be required to explain why she omitted the
debt from the original bankruptcy schedule.294 Additionally, the me-
chanical approach protects the debtor by holding that a section
523(a)(3)(A) nondischarge exception for lack of timely notice does not
apply in a no asset, no bar date bankruptcy.295 The conduct approach to
the Code's automatic stay provision also protects the debtor, by allowing
an expansive definition of a "pre-petition" claim that reaches to all con-
duct prior to the bankruptcy proceeding, regardless of whether the credi-
tor could have filed the claim prior to the bankruptcy. 296 Thus, in In re
Parker II, the Tenth Circuit's holding regarding approaches to interpret-
ing the Code show the Tenth Circuit's desire to protect the debtor and
promote the Code's fresh start philosophy.297
The mechanical approach allows a debtor in a Chapter 7 no asset,
no bar date bankruptcy to receive a discharge for an omitted debt without
reopening the claim. 298 Because section 523(a)(3)(A) does not apply in a
no asset, no bar date Chapter 7 case, courts using the mechanical ap-
proach hold that reopening the case is not required for a discharge under
section 727 of the Code.299 By not requiring a debtor to reopen the case,
the court does not require the debtor to explain why the debt was origi-
nally omitted from the bankruptcy schedule.30 0 The court will not inquire
into the debtor's intent for failing to schedule the claim. 30 1 When a court
does not inquire into the debtor's intent, it allows a debtor to easily re-
ceive a discharge for an omitted debt that would otherwise not be dis-
chargeable.3 °2 By failing to list a debt in the original schedule, a debtor
does not change the "nature of the debt.' 30 3 Consequently, an omitted
debt will be nondischargeable only if it meets one of the section 523 ex-
ceptions, excluding section 523(a)(3)(A) which holds a debt nondis-
chargeable for lack of notice.304 The mechanical approach thus allows a
favorable result to a debtor that has omitted a creditor.
305
Recall in In re Madaj, the debtors failed to list a debt owed to their
own foster parents.3 6 The debtors claimed this failure to be simply an act
293. See Edgar, supra note 13, at 9-12.
294. See Watson v. Parker (In re Parker I), 264 B.R. 685, 694 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001), affid,
313 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2002).
295. See 4 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE 76.06 (2003).
296. See Azaria, supra note 81, at 213-14.
297. See In re Parker l, 313 F.3d at 1268-69.
298. Id. at 1269 (quoting In re Parker I, 264 B.R. at 695).
299. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694.
300. See id.
301. In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1269.
302. See id. at 1268-69 (quoting In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694).
303. Zirnhelt v. Madaj (In re Madaj), 149 F.3d 467, 472 (6th Cir. 1998).
304. In re Madaj, 149 F.3d at 472.
305. See id.; In re Parker HI, 313 F.3d at 1268-69 (citing In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694-95).
306. In re Madaj, 149 F.3d at 468.
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of a forgetful memory. °7 The parents, the creditors, argued that this
memory failure was not credible because of their persistent reminder to
the debtors of the loan. 308 The Sixth Circuit adopted the mechanical ap-
proach in In re Madaj.309 Applied to the facts of In re Madaj, the me-
chanical approach prevented the court from further inquiring into the
credibility of the debtor's forgetfulness because the debt would have
been discharged if originally listed.310 An inquiry into the debtor's intent
for failing to schedule the creditors may have unveiled just how incredi-
ble a foster son's memory failure of a debt owed to his own parents
would be.31 ' A court, having inquired into these circumstances of the
debtors' forgetfulness, may have found fraud or intentional design and
refused to reopen the bankruptcy and discharge the debt.31 2 Thus, Madaj
illustrates the favorable effect the mechanical approach has toward debt-
ors.
In re Parker II also illustrates the protection the mechanical ap-
313proach offers debtors. In In re Parker II, the debtor attorney was sued
for malpractice by his creditor client.314 During a deposition the debtor
told the creditor he "made the conscious decision" to omit the claim from
his bankruptcy to allow the creditor recourse against him.315 Perhaps
because of a change of heart, the debtor later moved to reopen his chap-
ter 7 no asset, no bar date case to add the omitted debt and receive a dis-
charge.31 6 By adopting the mechanical approach, the Tenth Circuit did
not inquire into whether it was equitable for the debtor to have a change
of heart and schedule the omitted debt.317 Thus, regardless of why the
debtor failed to list the debt originally, the case was reopened and the
debt will be discharged unless an exception other than section
523(a)(3)(A) applies.31 8 Therefore, In re Parker II also illustrates the
protection the mechanical approach offers the debtor.319 In In re Parker
II, the mechanical approach literally protected the debtor from his own
admission that he intentionally "forgot" to list the debt.320
The Tenth Circuit's adoption of the conduct approach to determine
if a claim is pre-petition or post-petition, for purposes of the automatic
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 472.
310. Id.
311. See id. at 468.
312. E.g., Samuel v. Baitcher (In re Baitcher), 781 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11 th Cir. 1986) (finding
"intentional design, if not fraud" upon inquiry into the debtor's forgetfulness in omitting a creditor
from the schedule).
313. See In re Parker 1l, 313 F.3d at 1268-69 (citing In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 694-95).
314. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 690-91.
315. Id. at 691.
316. Id.
317. See In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1269.
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stay provision of the Code, also serves to protect debtors.321 When a
claim is classified as pre-petition, a debtor is afforded relief from credi-
tors under the Code's automatic stay provision.322 A debtor receives pro-
tection from claims classified as pre-petition under the Code and does
not receive protection from post-petition claims.323 By adopting the con-
duct approach rather than the accrual approach to determine whether a
claim is pre-petition or post-petition, the Tenth Circuit allows more
claims to be classified as pre-petition than the accrual approach allows.32n
The conduct approach uses federal, rather than state, law. The use of
federal law keeps claims from being classified as post-petition just be-
cause state law would prevent claims from being brought until after the
bankruptcy proceeding.325 Thus, the conduct approach protects debtors
by not creating a loophole for pre-petition conduct to be classified as a
post-petition claim under state law.326
In re M. Frenville Co., decided by the Third Circuit, the only circuit
that uses the accrual method, illustrates the greater protection the conduct
approach grants debtors in comparison to the accrual approach. Recall in
In re M. Frenville Co., the creditor A&B worked for the debtor Frenville
as an independent auditor.327 Frenville later petitioned for Chapter 7
bankruptcy.328 When A&B was sued for allegedly preparing false finan-
cial statements for Frenville, A&B sought indemnification from Fren-
ville.329 The conduct giving rise to the claim was the creation of false
financial statements, and occurred prior to Frenville filing for bank-
ruptcy.33 If the Court had followed the conduct approach, A&B's claim
would have been considered a pre-petition claim and the debtor Frenville
would have received relief from the Code's automatic stay provision.
Instead, using the accrual approach, the court looked to state law to de-
termine whether the creditor could have brought the indemnification
cause of action prior to the bankruptcy.331 Under the accrual approach,
because A&B could not have brought their claim against Frenville until
after the date of the bankruptcy proceedings, A&B's claim was classified
as post-petition and not subject to the automatic stay provision.332 Thus,
in Frenville, the debtor would have received greater protection had the
321. See In re Parker II, 313 F.3d at 1269-70.
322. Azaria, supra note 81, at 209.
323. Id. at 207-08.
324. See John W. Ames et al., Toxins-Are-Us, Future Claimants in Mass Tort Bankruptcy
Cases, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 8, 8 n.1 (1994).
325. See id. See generally Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744
F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying New York law to resolve a bankruptcy issue).
326. See Ames et al., supra note 324, at 8 n. 1.
327. In re M. Frenville Co., 744 F.2d at 333.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 333-34.
330. Id. at 334.




court used the conduct approach for purposes of the automatic stay pro-
vision of the Code.
In re Parker II also illustrates the protection the conduct approach
affords the debtor under the automatic stay provision.333 Watson, the
creditor, argued that Kansas law prevented her from bringing a cause of
action until after Parker, the debtor, filed bankruptcy.334 The Tenth Cir-
cuit, by adopting the conduct approach in In re Parker II, did not look to
state law to determine whether the creditor's claim was pre-petition or
post-petition.335 Thus, the Tenth Circuit protected the debtor by adopting
the conduct approach because the accrual approach to the automatic stay
provision may have classified the claim as post-petition, precluding dis-
charge of the debt in the bankruptcy proceeding.
CONCLUSION
In In re Parker II, the Tenth Circuit chose two paths of interpreting
the Bankruptcy Code. Both of the Tenth Circuit's chosen paths of inter-
pretation show the Tenth's Circuit's desire to protect the debtor and
promote the Code's "fresh start" philosophy. The Tenth Circuit's adop-
tion of the mechanical approach protects the debtor in a Chapter 7 no
asset, no bar date bankruptcy by not requiring the debtor to reopen the
case to receive a discharge. The mechanical approach further protects the
debtor by finding that section 523(a)(3)(A) cannot change an otherwise
dischargeable debt into a nondischargeable debt because of the debtor's
failure to originally list it. Finally, the conduct approach the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted in In re Parker H protects the debtor by not creating a loop-
hole for pre-petition conduct to be classified a post-petition claim under
state law. It does not allow state law to reach into the Code and create the
possibility of varying levels of debtor protection depending upon the
state law that applies. In In re Parker II, the Tenth Circuit not only chose
the most traveled paths of Bankruptcy Code interpretation, but also the
paths protecting the debtor and the philosophy of the Code.
Lydia M. Floyd*
333. See In re Parker 11, 313 F.3d at 1269-70.
334. In re Parker 1, 264 B.R. at 695.
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COLORADO V. SuNoco: THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S STAND ON
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR CERCLA COST RECOVERY
ACTIONS
INTRODUCTION
In 1980, the United States Congress responded to a series of na-
tional environmental disasters' by passing the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). 2 Con-
gress wrote the legislation in hopes of protecting human health and the
environment by providing a "comprehensive response and financing
mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated with aban-
doned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites."3 In 1986, Congress
amended CERCLA with the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act ("SARA"), and further facilitated the "prompt clean-up of haz-
ardous waste sites' 4 by enhancing the effectiveness of CERCLA's pri-
mary financing tool, the Superfund.5 SARA broadened the extent of the
Superfund as a financial resource because it allowed for payments into
the fund from producers of chemicals and petroleum products, often in
exchange for CERCLA liability exemptions.6 In essence, the Superfund
provides the government with the capital necessary to immediately re-
spond to toxic releases at dangerous hazardous waste sites, without ini-
tially having to deal with the often intricate and lengthy process of as-
signing liability.7
After the government spends Superfund dollars to facilitate re-
sponse at a hazardous substance release site, it may then concentrate its
efforts on the assignment of liability, using CERCLA's cost-shifting pro-
visions.8 The Superfund Amendments of 1986 ensure that after the gov-
1. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir.
1999) ("Congress enacted CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, in the wake of the Love Canal disas-
ter .... ).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (2000).
3. H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 1(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125.
4. See generally Brock Elliot Czeschin, United States v. Navistar International Transporta-
tion Corp.: Seventh Circuit Bars Government's CERCLA Claim Based on Violation of the Statute of
Limitations, 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 399, 429 (1999). "Congress enacted ... the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) . . . to correct perceived inadequacies in the CERCLA
framework." Id. at 399 n.2.
5. Id. at 429. In January of 2002, Congress again amended CERCLA with the "Brownfields
Amendments." United States v. Domenic Lombardi Realty, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d 198, 209 (D.R.I.
2003). These amendments provided certain exemptions for CERCLA liability, namely in allowing
property owners or surveyors to re-develop certain CERCLA sites without fear of facing liability.
See Domenic Lombardi Realty, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 2d at 209.
6. See Ulvestad v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 818 F. Supp. 292, 293-94 (C.D.Cal. 1993); see also
Consumers Power Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 597 N.w.2d 274, 281 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
7. See Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d at 1181.
8. See Morrison Enters. v. McShares, Inc., 302 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002).
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emnment promptly responds to a release or threat of release of a hazard-
ous substance, it can then "shift the cost of environmental response from
the taxpayers to the parties who benefitted [sic] from the wastes that
caused the harm." 9 Further, CERCLA imposes retroactive, strict, and
joint and several liability upon several classes of potentially responsible
parties ("PRPs"). l0 Such liability may attach to:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility [where the re-
lease occurred],
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of,
(3) any person who . . . arranged for disposal or treatment ... of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person .... and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities .... 11
Many courts have found that Congress intended the potential liabil-
ity under CERCLA to be quite expansive. 12 Because CERCLA imposes
joint and several liability, a single PRP may be held liable for all costs
relating to the cleanup of the hazardous substance release, regardless of
that party's degree of responsibility. 13 However, Congress did provide
PRPs various forms of equitable relief, permitting PRPs to spread the
response costs among themselves. 14 If found liable, a PRP may invoke
either the contribution provisions of the statute, whereby "[a]ny person
[that is held liable under the statute] may seek contribution from any
other person who is liable or potentially liable,"' 5 or the PRP may choose
to initiate its own cost recovery action against another PRP.16 By allow-
ing PRPs to initiate CERCLA cost recovery actions themselves, Con-
gress provided an avenue through which response costs are spread only
among the responsible parties, sparing taxpayers the burden of financing
the cleanup of hazardous wastes.
17
9. Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d at 1181.
10. Morrison Enters., 302 F.3d at 1132-33.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1)-(4).
12. See Aaron A. Garber, The PRP, the Section 106 Administrative Order, the Contribution
Claim, and CERCLA's Statute of Limitations: A Complete Statutory Analysis, 16 TEMP. ENvTL. L.
& TECH. J. 115, 121 (1997).
13. Id. at 120.
14. See id.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(1).
16. Garber, supra note 12, at 120 ("Jurisdictions are split over who may bring section 107
[i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 9607] cost-recovery actions. Since the adoption of SARA, some jurisdictions have
granted section 107 cost-recovery actions only to voluntary or innocent parties; thereby, limiting a
PRP's right to recover clean-up costs to section 113 [i.e., 42 U.S.C. § 9613] contribution claims.").
17. Id. at 118.
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It is clear that under CERLCA, Congress intended for PRPs, not
taxpayers, to bear the costs of all responses to hazardous substance re-
leases into the environment.' 8 To protect PRPs from perpetual liability,
Congress incorporated a statute of limitations into CERCLA, which lim-
its the timeframe during which the government or private individuals
may pursue cost recovery actions.19 CERCLA's statute of limitations is
said to both encourage the "timely clean-up of affected sites and to en-
sure replenishment of the [Super]fund ....
Some courts have found CERCLA's statute of limitations funda-
mentally vague.2' However, where the interpretation of CERCLA's stat-
ute of limitations is at issue in a case, courts traditionally have construed
the statute of limitations in favor of the government.22 Courts have
adopted such a construction to further the underlying structures and poli-
cies Congress intended in passing the law, primarily, the notion that
PRPs, not taxpayers, should bear the costs of hazardous substance
cleanup. 23 Courts have interpreted CERCLA as a "broad remedial stat-
ute, 24 mandating that "those who benefit financially from a commercial
activity internalize the environmental costs of the activity as a cost of
doing business.,,25 Although it appears that reasonable policy concerns
would encourage courts to construe CERCLA's statute of limitations in
favor of governmental cost recovery, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
recently rejected such a construction in Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc.
26
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Sunoco is questionable because of
its departure from the reasoning many courts have adopted in construing
CERCLA's statute of limitations. This comment will first examine
CERCLA's statute of limitations as applied to both removal and remedial
actions. Most courts typically lend deference to administrative bodies in
characterizing such actions, as was done by the Tenth Circuit in Sun-
oco.27 In light of the traditional deference afforded to agency characteri-
zations, one would assume that a court should also defer to the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's ("EPA") application of statutes of limitation
according to its preferred characterizations, such as the "operable units"
characterization at issue in Sunoco.28 This comment will also examine
the Tenth Circuit's deference to the EPA's characterizations of response
actions at the Sunoco site. Next, this comment will contrast that degree of
18. United States v. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d 385, 403 (D.N.J. 2000).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(g)(2)(A), (B).
20. United States v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 152 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1998).
21. E.g., Kelley v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir. 1994) (apply-
ing presumptions to CERCLA's statute of limitations because of perceived statutory ambiguity).
22. See, e.g., Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 403.
23. Id.
24. B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted).
25. B.F. Goodrich, 99 F.3d at 514 (internal quotations omitted).
26. 337 F.3d 1233, 1241-42 (10th Cir. 2003).
27. Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1243.
28. See id.
2004]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
deference with the court's less deferential stance toward the EPA's ap-
plication of CERCLA's statute of limitations to separate "operable units"
of a CERCLA site. Further, this comment will examine and contrast
other jurisdictions' treatment of the "operable units" issue, and address
the pragmatic reasoning and policy concerns underlying those courts'
decisions. Finally, this comment will evaluate the negative implications
of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Sunoco-for the environment, taxpay-
ers, and responsible parties alike.
I. CERCLA's STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS APPLIED TO SEPARATE
OPERABLE UNITS
A. Background: CERCLA 's Statute of Limitations for Cost Recovery
Actions
For purposes of applying CERCLA's statute of limitations, 42
U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2), Congress divided response activities into two cate-
gories: removal actions and remedial actions.29 A removal action gener-
ally "costs less, takes less time, and is geared to address an immediate
release or threat of release [of a hazardous substance]., 30 Therefore,
CERCLA's statute of limitations requires that the initial cost recovery
suit for a removal action be filed within three years after the completion
of that action.31 A remedial action is typically more comprehensive, im-
plementing a permanent solution to the release or threatened release of
hazardous substances at the site.32 Remedial actions are often signifi-
cantly more costly and time consuming than removal actions, and conse-
quently Congress mandated that a government entity or private party
must initiate the cost recovery suit for a remedial action within six years
"after initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action
.... Notably, Congress also structured the statute of limitations in a
flexible manner, anticipating the complexity and long-term nature of site
cleanups, along with the potential for unforeseen future costs commonly
associated with CERCLA response actions. 34 Such flexibility is exhibited
in 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2), which requires that the court hear an initial
cost recovery action prior to issuing a declaratory judgment, allowing the
plaintiff to file subsequent cost-recovery actions to recapture further re-
sponse costs incurred at the site.35 A party must commence a subsequent
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(g)(2)(A), (B).
30. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d 1177, 1182 (10th Cir. 1999).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(A).
32. Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d at 1182.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B). The section goes on to state that where remedial actions begin
within three years of completion of the removal action on the same site, a party may recover the





action to recover additional costs "no later than 3 years after the date of
completion of all response action. 36
B. Degree of Deference Lent to the Environmental Protection Agency in
Determining Appropriate Response to Hazardous Substance Releases
In providing the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") with
two means of responding to the release of hazardous substances at a par-
ticular site, Congress declared that EPA's decision on the matter should
receive a substantial degree of deference from courts. In 42 U.S.C. §
9613(j)(2), Congress set forth the standard it deemed appropriate for
judicial review of EPA's determination of a proper response, in declaring
that "the court shall uphold the President's decision in selecting the re-
sponse action unless the objecting party can demonstrate . .. that the
decision was arbitrary and capricious ....
However, some courts have lent somewhat of a lesser degree of
deference to EPA in both its characterizations of response actions and in
its interpretation of environmental laws.38 Although CERCLA does grant
EPA substantial deference in choosing methods of response, CERCLA
does not directly speak to the appropriate standard that courts should
utilize when reviewing EPA's characterizations of response actions.39 In
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the
United States Supreme Court ruled that where a "statute is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific issue," the proper standard of review
is whether "the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction
of the statute. 40 Courts grant such a wide degree of deference only in
cases where "Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law," and where the agency's determina-
tion in question "was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.
41
Not all agency actions or decisions may warrant Chevron-type def-
erence.42 However, EPA characterizations of response actions will often
carry at least some weight on judicial review.43 Courts base this lesser
degree of deference on Skidmore v. Swift & Co., where the United States
Supreme Court held that an agency's rulings and opinions are due at least
some weight, being "made in pursuance of official duty, based upon
36. Id. Case law suggests that no statute of limitations applies where a PRP seeks contribution
from another PRP. See Garber, supra note 12, at 122.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 96130)(2).
38. See, e.g., American Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1196-97 (10th Cir. 2001); see
also United States v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 152 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir. 1998).
39. Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., 337 F.3d 1233, 1243 (10th Cir. 2003).
40. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
41. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). Courts typically refer to this
degree of deference as "Chevron deference." Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226.
42. See Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1243.
43. Id. (holding that because of EPA's "expertise in selecting and executing removal and
remedial actions," agency characterizations of those actions are due at least some weight).
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more specialized experience and broader investigations" than what are
likely to arise in a courtroom.44
Courts may either defer to EPA characterizations as carring the
force of law, or consider them with somewhat lesser weight. Either
way, it is clear that in furthering the statutory purposes behind CERCLA,
both Congress and the Supreme Court intended that an EPA characteriza-
tion made in the course of responding to a hazardous substance release,
such as the characterization of a removal versus a remedial action, de-
serves at least some deference by a court reviewing those agency deci-
sions.46
C. The Environmental Protection Agency's Characterization of Operable
Units
The release of hazardous substances into the environment poses a
substantial risk to human health and the environment.47 Governmental
response to such releases should be rapid and thorough.48 It seems appar-
ent that courts should lend at least some deference to the governmental
agency's decisions, expertise, and characterizations necessary to success-
fully carry out that response.49 One frequently disputed characterization
made in relation to CERCLA response actions is EPA's organization of a
Superfund site into 'operable units,' and EPA's separate application of
CERCLA's statutes of limitation thereto.5 °
The EPA will approach a site where a hazardous substance release
threatens to occur or is occurring, evaluate possible cleanup options, and
issue a final Record of Decision ("ROD") to officially memorialize the
response decision. 51 A single Superfund site may contain several types of
waste requiring differing methods of treatment, or the waste may con-
taminate several types of media; therefore, a ROD may set forth multiple
response actions for a single site, as is suggested by 42 U.S.C. §
9621(d).52 Where a site requires separate "phases" of remedial action, the
44. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944). Courts typically refer to this type of
deference as "Skidmore deference." See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d at 1181.
45. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40.
46. See Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1243.
47. Gates Rubber Co., 175 F.3d at 118 1(quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. I, at 1 (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6125).
48. Id. (citing OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1578 (5th
Cir. 1997)).
49. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40.
50. See, e.g., Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1241; United States v. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d 385, 399
(D.N.J. 2000).
51. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 401. However, a ROD is required only in cases where the EPA
places the site on the National Priorities List ("NPL"). United States v. Ambroid Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d
86, 89 (D.Mass. 1999). If the site is not on the NPL, and depending upon the nature of the response
action, the EPA may choose to issue an "Action Memorandum." See Ambroid Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d at
90.
52. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 401 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)). Reports accompanying the
SARA legislation suggested that the agency should issue a separate ROD for "'each separate and
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EPA has commonly labeled those phases as "operable units,"53 defined
as:
a discrete action that comprises an incremental step toward compre-
hensively addressing site problems. This discrete portion of a reme-
dial response manages migration, or eliminates or mitigates a release,
threat of a release, or pathway of exposure. The cleanup of a site can
be divided into a number of operable units, depending on the com-
plexity of the problems associated with the site. Operable units may
address geographical portions of a site, specific site problems, or ini-
tial phases of an action, or may consist of any set of actions per-
formed over time or any actions that are concurrent but located in dif-
ferent parts of a site.
54
In facilitating cleanup of a hazardous substance, in encouraging eq-
uitable remedies in assigning liability, and in support of Congress' intent
to create economic disincentives for businesses engaging in activities
that threaten human health and the environment, courts have addressed
and consequently accepted the EPA's characterization of operable units
as an essential tool in the comprehensive remedial design. Courts have
found that when EPA encounters a complex CERCLA site, "it is benefi-
cial to divide response actions into different operable units and RODs
because EPA is therefore able to move quickly to reduce health and envi-
ronmental risks while continuing the process of studying other matters on
the site. 56
Not only does the division of response action into operable units aid
the EPA in cleanup, but operable units can also help in apportioning li-
ability between various PRPs in subsequent cost recovery or contribution
actions.57 At a Superfund site where numerous substances are present and
where several PRPs are potentially liable, it may be true that a single
PRP contributed to the release of a particular substance, or it may have
released that substance in one particular geographic portion of the site.58
When the EPA divides its response actions into operable units, it will do
so according to the perceived ease of dealing with various substances
individually, or in separating response action by geographical area.59
Therefore, the costs accrued in response to a particular operable unit will
distinct phase of a response action ....' Id. at 402 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-962, at 224
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3317).
53. Id. at 402.
54. Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 300.5 (2000)).
55. See, e.g., id.
56. Id. at 403.
57. Interview with Nancy Mangone, Enforcement Attorney, United States EPA Region VIII,
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be more accurately known, and more fairly apportioned among PRPs
based upon their actual liability.
60
In recognizing the important role that operable units play both to the
EPA and to PRPs, some courts have sustained the separate application of
CERCLA's statute of limitations upon each operable unit of a remedia-
tion plan.6' However, in its recent Sunoco decision, the Tenth Circuit
disagreed with the reasoning of these courts, and narrowly construed the
statute of limitations provisions of CERCLA.62
D. Tenth Circuit: Colorado v. Sunoco
1. Facts
The Sunoco case was filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado.6 3 In January 2001, the State of Colorado brought a
cost-recovery action under CERCLA § 107 against a series of defen-
dants, including A.O. Smith Corporation, ASARCO, Inc., Bechtel Cor-
poration, and Sunoco, Inc. 64 The District Court granted the defendant
corporations' ("Sunoco") motion for summary judgment, holding that
Colorado's claims were time-barred by CERCLA's six-year statute of
limitations for remedial actions.65 Colorado appealed the judgment, and
with the United States filing as amicus curiae, the Tenth Circuit heard the
case on August 5, 2003.66
In Sunoco, the State of Colorado sought to recover costs accrued in
cleaning up mine waste and contaminated water that had originated from
the abandoned Summitville mine site in southern Colorado. 67 At the fil-
ing of the suit, cleanup at the Summitville site was ongoing and expected
to continue until early 2006, with anticipated total costs exceeding $200
million.68
The Summitville Mine Site was first operated in the late 1870s and
was most recently operated as a cyanide heap leach facility in the 1980s
and early 1990s. 69 During the mine's historic operations (between 1890
and 1950), its shafts and tunnels often filled with groundwater, requiring
the mine's operators to drill adits (horizontal openings intended to drain
60. Id.
61. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 402-03.
62. See Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1242.
63. See id. at 1235.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 1233.
67. Id. at 1236.
68. Appellant's Reply Brief at 1, Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., 337 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2003)
(No. 02-1014).
69. Interim Record of Decision for Water Treatment at 4, Summitville Mine Superfund Site,




water).70 Following abandonment of the mine, highly contaminated,
acidic water seeped from two main locations within the site: the Chan-
dler adit and the Reynolds adit.71
A second source of contamination at the Summitville site was the
heap-leach mining pad.72 Heap-leach mining was a technique employed
by the later-day operators of the mine, which entailed spraying a sodium
cyanide solution over piles of crushed ore in efforts to extract gold.73
After abandonment, snow and rainwater would leach through the piles of
ore, and collect high amounts of residual cyanide and metals.74 Due to a
leaky and generally faulty water treatment system, the water, rich with
cyanide and toxic metals, had accumulated into a million gallon holding
pond on the site.75 Periodically, the mine would experience releases of
the cyanide and metal-rich water from the holding pond.76 These releases
caused numerous operational problems at the site and presented substan-
tial danger to fisheries and ecosystems within the surrounding Alamosa
River Watershed.77
In 1992, EPA, at the request of the State of Colorado, took emer-
gency control of the Summitville site from the bankrupt operator and
initiated a response plan, whereby the primary goal was treatment and
containment of the millions of gallons of contaminated water until EPA
could formulate a more permanent remedial plan. 78 The three actions of
interest to the court in this case were "(1) the plugging of the Chandler
adit; (2) the installation of monitoring wells in the Reynolds and Chan-
dler adits; and (3) the construction of the sludge disposal area., 79 The
first two actions commenced in 1994; the sludge disposal area was con-
structed sometime thereafter, and other long-term remedial actions began
at the site in the spring and summer of 1995.80 Colorado as well as the
United States filed an initial cost-recovery suit in May 1996; however,
that suit did not include the present defendants. 81 Instead, the State filed
the suit against Sunoco in January 2001.82 In the latter suit, the district
70. Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1236.





76. Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., Civil Action No. 01-N-0001, at 2-3 (D. Colo. Sep. 14, 2001)
(order and memorandum opinion).
77. Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1237 n.1.
78. Id. at 1236-37.
79. Id. at 1237-38.
80. Id. Some sources indicate that construction began on the sludge disposal area sometime in
1994, while other sources suggest that it had not begun until April of 1995. ld. at 1238.
81. Id. at 1238.
82. Id.
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83court rejected Colorado's arguments, and held that the governments
had initiated construction of the three "remedial" actions prior to January
of 1995, therefore rendering cost-recovery claims for those actions time-
barred by CERCLA's statute of limitations.84
After entry of the District Court's judgment, Colorado filed a mo-
tion to reconsider, asserting the response action at the Summitville site
could be separated into five operable units, each worthy of its own re-
covery action and thus, its own statute of limitations.85 The district court
rejected this argument on the merits and on grounds of timeliness, stating
that Colorado had sufficient time to brief the issue in its response to Sun-
oco's motion for summary judgment.86
2. Decision
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit overturned the district court's holding
on the grounds that it had not properly deferred to EPA characterizations
made in the course of its response at the Summitville Mine Site, and it
had inaccurately characterized EPA's actions at the site.87 EPA and Colo-
rado had argued before the Tenth Circuit that the three response actions
in question at the Summitville site were "removal" actions and not "re-
medial" actions as the district court had found.88
This distinction had a direct impact upon the timeliness of the pre-
sent claim because according to the district court's classification "the
initiation of those ["remedial"] activities [would have] triggered the run-
ning of the [six year] statute of limitations under § 9613(g)(2)(B)," ren-
dering the present cost recovery actions untimely. 89 However, if the ac-
tions at the site were deemed "removal" actions, as the agencies con-
tended, the cost recovery claim would have been timely assuming sched-
uled "remedial" actions commenced as planned.90 Under § 9613(g)(2)(b),
when a subsequent "remedial" action commences within three years of a
prior "removal" action, the statute of limitations for cost recovery on the
second-stage "remedial" actions is extended.91 The EPA was to com-
mence construction of remedial actions at the Summitville site in the
summer of 2004.92 Therefore, when the EPA commences its planned
"remedial" action at the Summitville site in the Summer of 2004, this
action would fall within three years of the completion of the "removal"
83. Id. "Colorado asserted there were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether
activities undertaken at the Site constituted removal or remedial actions and when physical on-site
construction of a remedial action began at the Site." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1238-39.
87. Id. at 1243.
88. See id. at 1245.
89. Id. at 1243.
90. Id. at 1238.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B).
92. Mangone interview, supra note 57.
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action at the site, and toll the statute of limitations for cost-recovery for
another six years after the initiation of on-site construction of EPA's
planned "remedial" action, according to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(B).93 if
Colorado could label the plugging of adits, the installation of monitoring
wells, and construction of the sludge-disposal area as "removal" actions
(and label the planned response action as "remedial"), it would then toll
CERCLA's statute of limitations for six additional years, thus rendering
the present cost-recovery action timely.94
The Tenth Circuit found that EPA's characterization of the three ac-
tions at the Summitville site were not worthy of Chevron-type deference,
because it found "no indication that Congress intended for the EPA 'to
speak with the force of law' in characterizing response actions for pur-
poses of the application of CERCLA' s statutes of limitation."
95 However,
the Tenth Circuit did find the district court had erred in that such deter-
minations by EPA were made in continuance of a congressionally as-
signed duty, and were worthy of Skidmore-type deference, which carries
a weight on review not acknowledged by the district court.
96 The Tenth
Circuit evaluated the plugging of the Chandler and Reynolds adits and
the installation of the adit monitoring wells, concluding that those actions
by the EPA constituted removal actions and not remedial actions as the
district court had found.97 Further, the Tenth Circuit found that genuine
issues of material fact existed as to when the sludge disposal area was
constructed.98 Such a finding rendered a "removal" versus "remedial"
determination irrelevant for this activity, and once again, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the district court erred in classifying that action as "reme-
dial." 99
A key, albeit collateral, argument made by Colorado in the case as-
serted that "cost recovery statutes of limitation in CERCLA were in-
tended by Congress to apply separately to each individual removal and/or
remedial action."' ° Colorado suggested several policy considerations to
the Tenth Circuit that would underlie such a reading of the statute.1
01 One
of the most compelling arguments suggested by Colorado was its con-
cern over the risk of mismanagement of government resources.
02 Colo-
rado pointed out that in highly complex response actions, the cleanup of
hazardous substances should be the primary focus of government re-
sources, and therefore, the court should allow separable response actions
93. See Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1241-42.
94. Id. at 1237; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(g)(2)(A), (B).
95. Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229).
96. See id. (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
97. See id. at 1243-44 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)).
98. Id. at 1245.
99. Id. at 1245-46.
100. Id. at 1240.
101. Id. at 1240-41.
102. Id.
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so that the government would be free from prematurely undergoing ex-
tensive investigations and the filing of speculative recovery actions
against every PRP imaginable at an early juncture in the response pe-
riod. 103 Furthermore, Colorado suggested that separating response actions
into operable units "encourages at least partial government recovery of
its cleanup costs from responsible parties, even if early time periods for
recovery expire. ' 4
Given the admonishment to the State that it did not raise the issue
below, and having conceded that the issue of operable units may not
have properly been before it, the Tenth Circuit chose to evaluate the is-
sue nonetheless. °5 After acknowledging Colorado's policy arguments in
favor of applying separate statutes of limitations to operable units, the
court proceeded to a highly textual analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2),
finding that Congress's use of the articles "a" and "the" in the modifica-
tion of the phrases "removal action" and "remedial action" obviated a
congressional intention to render those actions whole and inseparable.1°6
The court further affirmed this conclusion with an argument in equity,
noting that 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2)(A), (B) allows for the filing of subse-
quent actions to recover further costs, so long as the initial action is filed
within the statutory period. 0 7 The Tenth Circuit, following this analysis,
barred the application of CERCLA's statutes of limitation to separate
operable units within a Superfund site.10 8 Although the court's decision
in regard to operable units may prove questionable, the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Sunoco does leave potential for at least partial governmental
cost recovery.109 A favorable outcome remains possible if on remand
Colorado can prove the actions were indeed removal actions, which were
then followed by subsequent remedial actions within at least three years,
tolling the statute of limitations according to 42 U.S.C. §
9613(g)(2)(B) 1 °
103. See id.
104. Id. at 1241.
105. See id.
106. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9613(g)(2)(A), (B).
107. Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1241-42. However, this conclusion fails to address the very point that
Colorado was asserting. That is, investigations following complex CERCLA response actions may
uncover additional PRPs not contemplated at the initiation of the suit, or within the statutory time
period. However, the court does point out that the defendants in this particular case were known at
the filing of the initial action and the State simply failed to include those parties in the initial action.
Id. at 1242 n.2.
108. Id. at 1240.




E. Differing Analyses of the Operable Units Argument
1. United States v. Manzo" 1
a. Facts
The case of United States v. Manzo was a CERCLA cost-recovery
action heard before the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey. 12 The defendants in that case acquired several lots of land
that their predecessors had used as a landfill and as disposal areas for
"waste oil, used filter clay, and [chemical] sludge." ' 13 After acquiring the
land, the defendant leveled waste lagoons, spread waste over portions of
the land parcels, mixed the waste with sand and gravel, and used some of
this product to build a road through the land. 14 In 1979, EPA and the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection ("NJDEP") (collec-
tively "the Agencies"), discovered the presence of several hazardous
substances at the site, 15 and entered into a cooperative agreement to use
Superfund dollars for a response action."
16
The Agencies initiated the response by dividing the remedial action
into three operable units, each with a separate ROD." 7 At the time of the
Agencies' filing of this suit, EPA had expended over $8 million in re-
sponse costs at the Manzo's property, with additional costs expected in
the future to undertake further response action."18
b. Decision
The court in Manzo first granted the United States' partial motion
for summary judgment on grounds of liability for the response costs.
119
Next, the court addressed the Manzos' affirmative defense that the
United States' claims were barred by CERCLA's statute of limitations.
120
The court acknowledged that little case law existed to guide it in apply-
ing "the statute of limitations provisions for cost recovery actions under
CERCLA in the context of multiple RODS and operable units."' 2 ' How-
ever, the court found that "[g]iven the prominent role of the concept of
111. 182 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D.N.J. 2000).
112. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
113. Id. at 389. The defendants also used portions of the land as a landfill until 1969, when a
zoning injunction banned such a use. Id.
114. Id. at 390.
115. Id. At the Manzo's property, the EPA and NJDEP discovered various contaminants,
including "polychlorinated bi-phenyls ("PCBs"), lead, methylene chloride, trichloroethylene, chloro-
form, and benzene .. " id.
116. Id. at 391.
117. Id. at 391-92. The operable units were designated OU1, OU2, and OU3, each with a
corresponding ROD, designated as RODI, ROD2, and ROD3. Id.
118. Id. at 393. The $8 million figure included only the costs incurred through OU2 and OU3
response actions. Id.
119. Id. at 396.
120. Id. at 399.
121. Id.
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operable units in the administrative framework governing the actual im-
plementation of CERCLA, the Court cannot conclude that it is irrelevant
for purposes of the statute of limitations whether EPA divided its task
into different operable units."'' 22 Therefore, the court addressed the issue
finding guidance in reasonable judicial presumptions, EPA's administra-
tive framework, and policy considerations.
1 23
The court in Manzo adhered to the general notion that in aims of at
least partial government recovery of response costs, statutes of limitation
should be construed liberally in the United States' favor.124 The court
recognized that the designation of operable units as part of EPA's re-
sponse plan was vital to the effective cleanup of the site, and at least de-
served some degree of deference.1 25 In light of the policy concerns and
practical advantages126 of recognizing separate operable units and stat-
utes of limitations, the court concluded that, "the statute of limitations
does not bar compensation for [subsequent] operable units qualifying
under the limitation even if the plaintiff is barred from seeking compen-
sation for earlier operable units.' 27 The court therefore denied Manzo's
affirmative defense to bar cost recovery for OU2 and OU3, while the
United States acknowledged that the statute of limitations had already
barred cost recovery for OU1.1
28
2. United States v. Azko Nobel Coatings, Inc. 1
29
United States v. Azko Nobel Coatings, Inc. was a cost recovery ac-
tion against owners of a landfill in Lapeer County, Michigan. 3° Over the
course of response activities on the site, EPA had issued two RODs, out-
lining two separate operable units within the response action. 131 In the
cost recovery action, the defendants moved for summary judgment on
grounds of CERCLA's statute of limitations. 32 However, the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, without exten-
sive analysis of the issue, concluded that in following with United States
Supreme Court precedent, statutes of limitation should be strictly con-
strued "in favor of the Government where application of them might
122. Id. at 402.
123. Id. at 399.
124. Id. at 401.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 402-03 ("The United States asserts that, because of the complexity of Superfund
sites, it is beneficial to divide response actions into different operable units and RODs because EPA
is therefore able to move quickly to reduce health and environmental risks while continuing the
process of studying other matters on the site.").
127. Id. at 402.
128. Id. at 403.
129. 990 F. Supp. 897 (E.D.Mich. 1998).
130. Azko, 990 F. Supp. at 899.
131. Id. at 902-03.
132. Id. at 900. EPA estimated at one point in the feasibility study that the response costs for
OU1 alone would exceed $20 million. Id. at 902.
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otherwise bar its rights.' 3 3 Therefore, the Azko court separately applied
CERCLA' s statutes of limitation to the two operable units at the site, and
further concluded that each response action fell within the allowable
statutory period, thus dismissing the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.1
34
3. United States v. Ambroid Co. 135
In United States v. Ambroid Co., the United States District Court for
the District of Massachusetts found that CERCLA's statute of limitations
barred an EPA cost-recovery action on grounds that the response action
must be divided into separable units. 136 The court noted that most courts
have interpreted "removal action" broadly so as to further the "essential
purposes of CERCLA [which entails] cleaning up hazardous waste and
doing so at the expense of those who created it."'13 7 Here, the United
States tried to merge several phases of removal actions into one action,
with hopes of tolling the statute of limitations upon the completion of the
entire removal action. 38 However, the court begrudgingly held that con-
trary to the acknowledged underpinnings of CERCLA, the "broadest
reasonable statutory interpretation ... cannot save this case from its fate
of partial summary judgment."'' 39 Interestingly, the court did not hesitate
to separate ongoing response into distinct removal actions, and applied
the statute of limitations to bar recovery for costs spent on the first "divi-
sion. '14° The court divided the response action regardless of the fact that
EPA had issued no official documentation (such as a ROD for a remedial
action, or for removal actions, an Action Memorandum) for any removal
actions undertaken at the site.' 4 ' Such an unrestrained action suggests
that the court in Ambroid Co. felt unhindered from freely separating mul-
tiple response actions within a site, and applying a separate statute of
limitations to each.
II. ANALYSIS
It is apparent from the preceding cases that congressional intent,
policy considerations, and practical concerns all have contributed to a
broad statutory interpretation of CERCLA's statute of limitations.
Courts' interpretation of CERCLA's statute of limitations has repeatedly
allowed for governmental recapture of response costs in cases where the
133. Id. at 904; E.L. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456 (1924)).
134. Azko, 990 F. Supp. at 903.
135. 34 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.Mass. 1999).
136. See Ambroid, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 91.
137. Id. at 87 (citing Kelley v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir.
1994)).
138. See id.
139. Id. at 90.
140. See id. at 89-90.
141. See id. RODs were not required because the site was not listed on the National Priorities
List. Id. at 89.
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PRP attempts to escape financial responsibility for its actions. 42 In addi-
tion, courts have generally deferred to EPA expertise in responding to
releases at CERCLA sites, and as argued in this comment, they should
continue to do so by giving EPA significant deference in characterizing
response actions as removal or remedial, and by allowing EPA to apply
separate statutes of limitations to operable units at a site.143 Such defer-
ence allows for an orderly and phased approach to site cleanup without
requiring the Agency to exhaust resources on liability investigations and
legal proceedings at the expense of human health and the environment.
In the Sunoco decision, the Tenth Circuit rejected such an ap-
proach. 144 For the most part, the court sided with opponents to an expan-
sive reading of CERCLA's statute of limitations who based their ration-
ale upon a perceived congressional "intention that the government bring
CERCLA suits in a prompt and timely manner,"' 45 and upon a fear of
unbridled and unlimited governmental recovery suits, potentially extend-
ing PRP liability indefinitely. 146 The opponents to multiple statutes of
limitations argue that CERCLA's retroactivity may hold PRPs liable for
actions taken decades in the past, and if left unbridled, liberally applied
statutes of limitations may hold PRPs liable for decades into the future. 147
However, this concern merely amounts to a balancing of public inter-
est.148 Courts that have considered this balancing test have found that the
"promotion of. . . [CERCLA's] goals outweighs the ... argument that
[broad] construction would permit the United States to extend the period
of liability indefinitely ....
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals voiced its objection to a
broad reading of CERCLA's statute of limitations in United States v.
Navistar International Transportation Corporation. °50 The dispute in
Navistar, like in Sunoco, centered on whether the cost recovery actions
filed by the United States were time-barred by CERCLA's statute of
limitations. 15 However, the court in Navistar focused its analysis upon
whether the action filed constituted an "initial" cost recovery action, or a
"subsequent" cost recovery action.152 In Navistar, the Seventh Circuit
rejected the United States' arguments that it should construe statutes of
142. See generally Czeschin, supra note 4, at 402.
143. E.g., United States v. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d 385, 401 (D.N.J. 2000).
144. Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., 337 F.3d 1233, 1235 (10th Cir. 2003).
145. Czeschin, supra note 4, at 419.
146. See Garber, supra note 12, at 116.
147. See generally Czeschin, supra note 4, at 421 (construing United States v. Navistar Int'l
Transp. Corp., 152 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 1998)).
148. Czeschin, supra note 4, at 400.
149. Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 403.
150. 152 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 1998).
151. Navistar, 152 F.3d at 705-06.
152. Id. at 706. In Navistar, if the court chose to label the suit before it a "subsequent action," it
would have withstood the statute of limitations challenge. Id. The court instead labeled the action an
"initial" one, and consequently barred the suit because the cost-recovery action was for a remedial
action and had not commenced within six years of the initiation of on-site construction. Id.
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limitations in the government's favor, and instead strictly interpreted
CERCLA's statute of limitations as congressional recognition of a "need
for filing of cost recovery actions in a timely fashion, to assure that evi-
dence concerning liability and response costs is fresh ... The court
in Navistar also asserted that "in order to achieve timely clean-up of af-
fected sites and to ensure replenishment of the fund, cost recovery ac-
tions must commence in a timely fashion."'
154
The reasoning proffered by the court in Navistar, and implicitly fol-
lowed by the Tenth Circuit in Sunoco, seems to accomplish little but to
frustrate CERCLA cost-recovery actions. It appears ironic that in
claimed efforts of ensuring replenishment of the fund, these courts did
little but strengthen PRP defenses against the government in cost-
recovery actions. These arguments also have the effect of placing gov-
ernment agencies and PRPs at risk of filing haphazard cost recovery suits
in situations where evidence may be incomplete or undiscovered. Fur-
ther, the approach taken by the Navistar and Sunoco courts may lead to
rushed liability assignments, and may therefore bar cost-recovery claims
against additional PRPs that government agencies have not yet been able
to investigate or identify.
To refute the strict judicial interpretation of CERCLA's statute of
limitations, opponents of the Navistar court's decision have submitted
that "the negligence of public officers, who fail to act within the statutory
period, should not prejudice the public interest the statute seeks to pro-
tect."' 55 CERCLA was enacted primarily to protect human health and the
environment, and secondly to ensure that the responsible parties, not the
general public, are held financially accountable for cleaning up the pollu-
tion they caused. 156 In safeguarding these two concerns, Congress con-
templated that several response actions may occur at a single site and
thus intended courts to treat those response actions separately when chal-
lenged. 157 Such intent is apparent in the legislative history surrounding
the enactment of CERCLA's statutes of limitation, in that Congress
found the structure of CERCLA's statute of limitations "consistent with
the overall structure of CERCLA, which contemplates that the President
may bring a series of claims for response costs ... with regard to a par-
ticular site . . . ., Congress intended for courts to apply CERCLA's
statutes of limitation separately to operable units because such applica-
tion is consistent with typical deference lent to EPA characterizations
made in the fulfillment of congressionally-assigned duties. 59 In addition,
153. Id. at 708 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 138 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3043).
154. id. at 707.
155. Czeschin, supra note 4, at 410.
156. Garber, supra note 12, at 118.
157. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-962, at 221 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3314.
158. H.R. REP. No. 99-962, at 223 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3316.
159. See generally Manzo, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 402.
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such application encourages expeditious cleanup of hazardous sub-
stances, and it rightly confers financial obligations for cleanup upon re-
sponsible parties.,60
Undoubtedly, Colorado could have avoided the unfortunate decision
of the Tenth Circuit in Sunoco had it filed the Sunoco action with the
initial complaint in 1996, or in some intermediate time thereafter. As
mentioned previously, Colorado knew of the current defendants at the
filing of the initial action, and therefore if the State had joined Sunoco at
that time it could have ensured at least partial recovery of costs accrued
at the Summitville Mine Site. Moreover, if the State had properly set
forth the operable units argument in its motion to deny summary judg-
ment, the argument may have fared better with the Tenth Circuit on ap-
peal. As it stood, the State set forth the operable units argument on a mo-
tion to reconsider and the Tenth Circuit proceeded to address the issue in
its decision. If the issue was fully briefed and considered on its merits,
the Tenth Circuit may have concluded differently, possibly finding per-
suasion from other jurisdictions' treatment of the operable units issue. As
it stands, the decision in Sunoco may prove damaging for future cost-
recovery claims arising from separate operable units of a response action.
The Tenth Circuit, by finding the district court's determinations of
response actions inadequate, lent typical Skidmore-type deference to
EPA characterizations of removal versus remedial actions, and remanded
the case for further proceedings. However, when considering EPA's
determinations of CERCLA's statutes of limitation as applied to separate
operable units, the Tenth Circuit found no need to extend Chevron-type
deference or even Skidmore-type deference. In effect, the Tenth Circuit
honored government agency decision-making in technical characteriza-
tions, but undercut the agencies as soon the time came to enforce those
determinations in the manner that the agencies saw fit.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit decision in Sunoco will have an uncertain impact
on future cases. In supposedly issuing a "wake-up call" to state and fed-
eral agencies to file timely and prompt cost-recovery actions, the Tenth
Circuit may have overstepped its aims and in so doing, damaged future
cost-recovery claims. The Tenth Circuit provided PRPs with a stronger
affirmative defense than what Congress likely intended, and implicitly
freed other potential PRPs from liability by mandating rushed or possibly
incomplete agency investigations. On a different note, the decision may
also harm PRPs in that the operable unit determination is advantageous
to PRPs in their own cost-recovery or contribution actions, and the Sun-
oco decision impairs the enforceability of that characterization.
160. Czeschin, supra note 4, at 399-400.
161. Sunoco, 337 F.3d at 1243.
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In the future, it is certain that legitimate CERCLA cost recovery ac-
tions will require an expansive reading of CERCLA's statute of limita-
tions to ensure that all PRPs are discovered, and to guarantee that suffi-
cient facts are known so that the agencies can competently prosecute
them. Because of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Sunoco, government
agencies may now have to divert resources away from site cleanup ac-
tions, and toward evidence collection and legal actions at early stages of
the response. This decision circumvents Congress' intent to protect hu-
man health and the environment from hazardous substances at the ex-
pense of those profiting from the endangerment, and rewards them by
allowing them to benefit from the fruits of their misfeasance. In so doing,
the decision leaves the American public with the inherent dangers of
hazardous substances while also requiring them to foot the bill for the
cleanup.
Steve Rypma*
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Denver College of Law. The author would like to
thank Nancy Mangone for her guidance in researching and writing this comment.
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RECONCILING PLEADING STANDARDS UNDER PIRRAGLIA:
THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT V.
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B)(6)
INTRODUCTION
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA")' has been
a source of turmoil since its introduction in 1995 2 Congress adopted the
PSLRA in hopes of reducing some of the abuse of securities litigation,
specifically in the area of strike suits, 3 that had been steadily increasing
in number up until the PSLRA's formation.4 The statute was also enacted
in response to "routine filing of lawsuits ... whenever there is a signifi-
cant change in an issuer's stock price,. . . abuse of the discovery process
to impose costs so burdensome that it is often economical for the victim-
ized party to settle; ... [and] manipulation by class action lawyers of the
clients ... To discourage these suits, the PSLRA contained a height-
ened pleading standard that would make it tougher for a plaintiff to get a
frivolous claim past a motion to dismiss action.6
This comment will focus specifically on a problem the circuit courts
recently faced: 1) how to merge the heightened pleading standard under
the PSLRA with the general pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) 7, or 2) how to decide which will prevail when the two
go to war with each other? Section I summarizes the history of the
PSLRA and the current state of securities law within the circuit courts.
Section II focuses on the current split in the circuit courts regarding the
conflicting pleading standards under the lenient Rule 12(b)(6) and the
strict PSLRA. Section III analyzes the most recent ruling on the topic by
the Tenth Circuit in Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 8 which is a case of first
impression within the circuit. Section III then compares the Tenth Cir-
cuit's reasoning and outcome to other circuit courts that have ruled on
the matter. Finally, Section IV reveals the author's conclusion on the
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2. Bruce Cannon Gibney, The End of the Unbearable Lightness of Pleading: Scienter After
Silicon Graphics, 48 UCLA L. REv. 973, 975 (2001).
3. City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2001) (discussing
the enactment of the PSLRA). The court defined a strike suit as a: "'Shareholder derivative action
begun with [the] hope of winning large attorney fees or private settlements, and with no intention of
benefiting [the] corporation on behalf of which [the] suit is theoretically brought."' Fleming, 264
F.3d at 1258 n.16 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1423 (6th ed. 1990)).
4. Gibney, supra note 2, at 975.
5. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
6. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1259 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted
in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
8. 339 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2003).
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matter, specifically that the Tenth Circuit, through a fundamental depar-
ture from traditional motion to dismiss procedures, now applies a test
that adequately reconciles the Rule 12(b)(6) and PSLRA pleading stan-
dards. This advances the legislative intent in enacting the PSLRA by
providing protection to corporations from frivolous litigation, while si-
multaneously preserving a plaintiffs rights to survive a motion to dis-
miss when bringing a meritorious claim.
I. PSLRA BACKGROUND
A. Pre-PSLRA Securities Law
Prior to the PSLRA's introduction, confusion regarding the pleading
standards for securities lawsuits had arisen among the circuit courts.9 The
Securities Act of 193310 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193411 gov-
erned securities law at the time.' 2 In particular, Section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act' 3 and subsequent SEC Rule lOb-514 spoke to issues concern-
ing fraud in the securities context.' 5 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
9(b),' 6 which governs pleading requirements for fraud causes of action,
had to be satisfied in order for plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss.17
Rule 9(b) proscribes a heightened pleading standard where "the circum-
stances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
18
Substantial debate arose among the circuit courts concerning the actual
elements that must be proven to sustain a lOb-5 action, particularly as to
whether scienter 9 was a mandatory element, or if negligent conduct
alone would suffice.2° In Hochfelder, the United States Supreme Court
issued a response to the debate and, after a discussion concerning the
plain language of the statute and the legislative intent, determined that
the rule required a showing of scienter. 21 The Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he words 'manipulative or deceptive' used in conjunction with 'de-
9. Gibney, supra note 2, at 979.
10. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a -77aa
(2000)).
11. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78mm (2000)).
12. Jeffrey A. Berens, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995, 31 COLO. LAW. 39, 39 (2002).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
15. Scott H. Moss, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: The Scienter Debacle, 30
SETON HALL L. REV. 1279, 1279 (2000) (Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 "regulate[] and limit[] mis-
representations, omissions, and insider trading in securities.").
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
17. Moss, supra note 15, at 1279.
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
19. Scienter is defined as: "[A] mental state embracing [an] intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
20. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197.
21. Id. at 201-02.
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vice or contrivance' strongly suggest that 10(b) was intended to proscribe
knowing or intentional misconduct.,
22
This ruling did not end the problems plaguing securities lawsuits,
however. The actual pleading requirements alleging scienter that would
suffice to survive a motion to dismiss were still in flux. Two extremes
arose, one within the Ninth Circuit 23 and the other within the Second
24Circuit. The Ninth Circuit had the most relaxed pleading requirements
and did not require a plaintiff to allege any specific facts supporting sci-
enter; a party only had to "aver scienter generally.., simply by saying
that scienter existed., 25 In contrast, the Second Circuit devised a test
whereby the plaintiff must present facts sufficient to show a "strong in-
ference" of scienter.26 The "strong inference" could be demonstrated by a
showing of actual knowledge; demonstrating that a defendant had the
"motive to commit fraud and an opportunity to do so; ,2 7 or by presenting
facts of "circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious behav-
ior.",28 The Second and Ninth Circuit approaches differed significantly in
the procedural requirements that a plaintiff must fulfill in order to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss. In response to this concern, among others, the
legislature enacted the PSLRA to bring some consistency to securities
law.29
B. The Congressional Response to the Securities Dilemma
In December of 1995 Congress passed the PSLRA in hopes of re-
ducing "abusive class action securities fraud litigation," while still pro-
tecting investors and preserving investor confidence in the market.30 To
bring these hopes to fruition the PSLRA established a uniform pleading
standard that requires a plaintiff involved in securities litigation to "state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind. 3 1 The pleading standard seems to
contain the scienter element required by the Supreme Court in
Hochfelder and also contains some of the same language used by the
Second Circuit insofar as facts must be stated giving rise to a "strong
inference., 32 Because the "strong inference" language was lifted from
22. Id. at 197.
23. See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994).
24. See In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
25. GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1547.
26. Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268.
27. Id. at 269. This test is commonly referred to as the Second Circuit's "motive and opportu-
nity test." Berens, supra note 12, at 40.
28. Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269.
29. Gibney, supra note 2, at 975.
30. Berens, supra note 12, at 40.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
32. See generally Gibney, supra note 2, at 979 (The author notes that "Congress made no
attempt to provide a more precise definition [of scienter] when enacting the PSLRA .... [However,]
[t]he PSLRA raised the pleading bar through [the] strong inference standard, which is based in part
on the Second Circuit test.").
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Second Circuit precedents, debate arose among the circuit courts as to
whether the PSLRA also codified the "motive and opportunity" test set
forth by the Second Circuit as a means of establishing what constitutes a
"strong inference. 33 Three separate views have emerged within the cir-
cuit courts and the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue.
34
1. Alleging Motive and Opportunity Alone is Sufficient to Plead
Scienter
Two circuit courts have concluded that a plaintiff need only allege
motive and opportunity to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Not surpris-
ingly, the Second Circuit adopted its own test as the correct means of
establishing a "strong inference. 35 Likewise, the Third Circuit adopted
the view that "it remains sufficient for plaintiffs [to] plead scienter by
alleging facts 'establishing a motive and an opportunity to commit fraud,
or by setting forth facts that constitute circumstantial evidence of either
reckless or conscious behavior.'
36
2. Alleging Motive and Opportunity Alone is Never Sufficient to
Plead Scienter
The Ninth Circuit recently determined that it would take an ironic
step in the securities litigation arena. Once the bastion of the most lenient
pleading standard among circuit courts in pre-PSLRA securities litiga-
tion, the Ninth Circuit has now established the most stringent and restric-
tive standard among the circuit courts. In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securi-
ties Litigation37 set the standard following the introduction of the PSLRA
within the Ninth Circuit. The court made it clear that pleadings merely
alleging motive and opportunity were insufficient to establish a "strong
inference" that the defendant acted with the requisite intent.38 Further-
more, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the PSLRA language that securities
litigation plaintiffs must "state with particularity all facts" as requiring a
plaintiff to "list ... all relevant circumstances in great detail. 39
3. Motive and Opportunity Can Provide Some Evidence of Scienter
The majority of the circuit courts that have passed judgment on the
issue have adopted a middle ground approach to the "strong inference"
standard.
33. Moss, supra note 15, at 1282.
34. See Berens, supra note 12, at 39-40 (discussing the "tripartite split among the circuit
courts").
35. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537-39 (2d Cir. 1999) (The court
held: "In this case, [Plaintiff] barely alleged motive and opportunity, but he nonetheless satisfied the
pleading standards.").
36. In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Weiner v.
Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 318 n.8 (3d Cir. 1997)).
37. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
38. Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974.
39. Id. at 983-84.
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The Sixth Circuit espoused a view that pleadings of motive and op-
portunity are not enough to allege scienter under the PSLRA. 40 However,
facts demonstrating motive and opportunity that also can provide some
insight as to whether the defendant acted with the requisite mindset can
establish a "strong inference" of scienter.41 Therefore, the pleading of
motive and opportunity could have some relevance in the "strong infer-
ence" analysis within the Sixth Circuit.42
In a short discussion in Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc.43 the First
Circuit adopted a similar stance to that of the Sixth Circuit. 44 There the
court rejected the view that pleadings of motive and opportunity cannot
be sufficient to demonstrate scienter.45 The court warned, however, that
only pleading motive and opportunity, without more, cannot rise to the
level of a "strong inference" regardless of the strength of the motive and
opportunity circumstances alleged.46
The Eleventh Circuit pointed to Comshare in holding what plead-
ings are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under the PSLRA.47
The Eleventh Circuit "reject[ed] the notion that allegations of motive and
opportunity to commit fraud, standing alone, are sufficient to establish
scienter . . . ". However, it sided with the Sixth and First Circuits in
finding that evidence of motive and opportunity have some relevance in
a motion to dismiss action under the PSLRA.4 9
4. The Tenth Circuit Takes a Side
In September 2001, the Tenth Circuit had its first occasion to re-
view the PSLRA and the effect that it would have on securities litigation
within the circuit. In City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 50 the court
had to decide what position to take on pleading scienter given the three-
way split among the circuit courts in applying the PSLRA "strong infer-
ence" requirement.51
a. Facts
The plaintiffs were a certified class bringing a securities fraud ac-
tion on the part of all people who held stock in Fleming Companies, Inc.
("Fleming") from the period of November 15, 1993 through March 14,
40. In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999).
41. Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551.
42. Id.
43. 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999).
44. Greebel, 194 F.3d at 197.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285 (11 th Cir. 1999).
48. Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285.
49. Id. at 1285-86.
50. 264 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2001).
51. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1248-49.
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1996.52 The defendants in the case consisted of Fleming, which is a large
wholesale food distributor with stock listings on the New York, Midwest,
and Pacific stock exchanges, and four Fleming corporate officers that
signed documents alleged by plaintiffs to contain fraudulent information:
Robert Stauth, R. Devening, Donald Eyler, and Kevin Twomey.53 In
1989, Fleming entered into a "cost-plus" contract with David's Super-
markets, Inc. (David's) where Fleming would provide food and other
products to David's at "Fleming's cost plus a fixed percentage over the
actual cost ... ". In August 1993, David's filed suit against Fleming
alleging that Fleming was overcharging David's by utilizing various dis-
counts and incentives to overstate Fleming's costs in violation of the
"cost-plus" contract, and alleging damages in an amended complaint of
over $400 million.55 In March 1996, the suit went to judgment and the
jury awarded $200 million in damages plus costs to David's. 56 Fleming
had not explicitly disclosed the existence of the suit until the judgment
was awarded,57 and as a result, shares of Fleming to dropped from $19.63
to $14.00 within days.58 In May 1996, however, the verdict was set aside
due to information regarding a conflict of interest between the trial judge
and the plaintiffs. 59 Fleming settled the case for $19 million plus an un-
disclosed amount before a new trial was conducted. 60 The plaintiffs as-
serted that Fleming stock never recovered.6'
In March 1996, after Fleming's disclosure of the lawsuit, nine sepa-
rate class actions (consolidated for this case) were brought, alleging that
the defendants did not disclose mandatory information regarding the
David's litigation to the SEC or within Fleming's quarterly and annual
stock reports.62 The plaintiffs asserted that these omissions were "materi-
ally misleading" and in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and Rule 1Ob-5 thereunder.63 The City of Philadel-
phia and Ronald Goldstein were named lead plaintiffs and a consolidated
amended class action complaint was filed on April 30, 1997.64 The dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint ruling that scienter had not been pled
appropriately under the PSLRA.65 The district court pointed out that the
"'[p]laintiffs simply [made] conclusory allegations that defendants were
senior officers; therefore, they had actual knowledge or should have had
52. Id. at 1249.
53. Id. at 1249-50.
54. Id. at 1250.
55. Id. at 1250-51.
56. Id. at 1251-52.
57. Id. at 1253-54.
58. Id. at 1251-52.
59. Id. at 1252.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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actual knowledge of the 'true facts.' ' 66 The court concluded that "[s]uch
conclusory allegations of scienter are not sufficient under Rule 9(b),
much less under the PSLRA. 67 The district court also rejected the plain-
tiffs' motive and opportunity arguments. 68 A second amended class ac-
tion complaint was filed in April 1999 that contained an "Additional
Scienter Allegations" section; this complaint reached the same fate as the
original.69 The plaintiffs also alleged five motives that may have enticed
the defendants to conceal the litigation "despite their 'knowledge' that
the litigation was material .... ,,70 The dismissal of this complaint re-
sulted in the Fleming appeal.71
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit first engaged in a thorough discussion of securi-
ties pleading requirements in the circuit prior to the PSLRA, a discussion
about the background and legislative formation of the PSLRA, and a
discussion of how Hochfelder interpreted scienter in the securities con-
text.72 The court next went on to explain the three different approaches to
scienter pleading adopted by the other circuit courts.73 The Tenth Circuit
opted to side with the First, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits in finding a
middle ground to apply to motive and opportunity. 74 It reasoned that be-
cause "[a]llegations of motive and opportunity, with nothing more, could
allow potentially frivolous lawsuits to go forward with only minimal
allegations of scienter," the congressional intent behind the PSLRA to
"eliminate frivolous securities litigation through its heightened scienter
pleading requirements" would be undermined.75 The court went on to
state, however, that motive and opportunity could be among the pieces
that can be brought together to show the PSLRA "strong inference" re-
quirement.76 The Tenth Circuit opined that the entirety of the allegations
must be considered without worrying about pigeon-holing certain facts
into categories such as "motive" and "opportunity," and that a court




70. Id. at 1256. The defendants' alleged motives were:
(1) to facilitate notes offerings on December 8, 1994; (2) to avoid jeopardizing the suc-
cess of the FFMP [Fleming Flexible Marketing Plan]; (3) to minimize the possibility of
future lawsuits alleging similar claims; (4) to "protect and enhance their executive posi-
tions and the substantial compensation and prestige they obtained thereby;" and (5) to
enhance the value of their own Fleming stock.
Id. at 1256-57.
71. Id. at 1257.
72. Id. at 1257-59.
73. Id. at 1261.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1263.
76. Id.
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should only make a determination of whether a plaintiffs complaint
gives rise to a "strong inference" when looked at as a whole.7
The court continued, upholding the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs' action because the allegations pled did not rise to the level of a
"strong inference" that the defendants acted with scienter.78 The court
first stated that the plaintiffs failed to provide particularized facts con-
cerning why the court should infer that Devening and Twomey knew
about the David's litigation or the materiality thereof.79 Next, the court
ruled that allegations directed at Stauth and Eyler were conclusory in
nature, and that zissuming merely because someone is a senior officer,
they knew or should have known about certain aspects of the business,
are "exactly the type of conclusory assertions of liability that the PSLRA
was designed to prevent., 80 Next, the court pointed out that the plaintiffs
failed to provide sufficient facts pertaining to why the David's litigation
was material and therefore subject to mandatory disclosure.1 In doing
so, the court looked to the regulatory requirements for reporting pending
lawsuits which state that only litigation involving greater than ten percent
of current assets need be revealed.82 Because the plaintiffs did not pre-
sent any facts of Fleming's assets at the time of the litigation, the court
could not rule on the materiality of the litigation and whether the exis-
tence of which should have been divulged.83 Finally, the court reviewed
all of the plaintiffs' motive arguments but found them to be unpersua-
sive.84 None of the arguments, either by themselves or taken as a whole
within the totality of the pleadings, gave rise to the "strong inference"
85that the defendants acted with scienter. The motives the plaintiffs for-
warded were motives shared by any corporation and its executives and
were insufficient to impose liability on the defendants.86
II. THE PSLRA AND THE RULE 12(B)(6) PLEADING STANDARD: THE
NEW CIRCUIT SPLIT EMERGES
In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court normally will view all
facts and allegations as true and in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.87 The reason for this is because, on a motion to dismiss,




80. Id. at 1264.
81. Id. at 1265.
82. Id. at 1266. (citing 17 C.F.R. § 229.103, Instruction 2 (2000)). The court determined that
the ten-percent limit in 17 C.F.R. § 229.103, Instruction 2, established a "materiality threshold." Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1269-70.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1269 ("[G]eneralized motives shared by all companies and which are not specifi-
cally and uniquely related to Fleming in particular, are unavailing.").
87. Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Sutton v. Utah
State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999)).
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the plaintiffs claim to see if relief can be granted. 88 This results in leni-
ency for the plaintiff at this stage. The PSLRA pleading standard is much
more rigid, however, and cuts against the leniency of the 12(b)(6) stan-
dard by mandating that plaintiffs must "specify each statement alleged to
have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is mis-
leading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made
on information and belief, ... [the plaintiff must] state with particularity
all facts on which that belief is formed., 89 "[W]ith respect to each act or
omission," the plaintiff must also "state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state
of mind."90 The following section outlines how the circuit courts have
dealt with the conflict between the PSLRA and 12(b)(6) pleading stan-
dards, and specifically looks at how the Tenth Circuit has merged the
two standards in Pirraglia.
A. Circuit Courts Attempt to Reconcile the Conflicting Standards
1. First Circuit - Aldridge v. A. T. Cross Corp.91
The First Circuit takes the position that the pleading standards under
Rule 12(b)(6) are unchanged by the PSLRA.92 In Aldridge, on a motion
to dismiss, the court made it clear it would continue to view all circum-
stances in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs.93 The First Circuit did
not render the PSLRA's stricter standards impotent, however, because
the "strong inference" standard would still need to be shown by the
plaintiffs in order to survive a motion to dismiss. 9 4 If, after looking at all
of the plaintiff's pleadings in the best possible light, the plaintiffs had not
pled with the specificity necessary to rise to the level of a "strong infer-
ence of scienter," then the motion to dismiss would be upheld.95
This view is the most relaxed pleading standard and provides plain-
tiffs with the best opportunity to survive a motion to dismiss. Other cir-
cuit courts have espoused views that have dramatically altered the face of
12(b)(6) hearings.
2. Sixth Circuit - Helwig v. Vencor, Inc.
9 6
The Sixth Circuit takes the most restrictive view of pleading stan-
dards under the PSLRA at the 12(b)(6) stage.97 While the First Circuit
did not diverge from the established 12(b)(6) standard, the Sixth Circuit
88. Pirraglia, 339 F.3d at 1187 (quoting Sutton, 173 F.3d at, 1236).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).
90. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
91. 284 F.3d 72 (1 st Cir. 2002).




96. 251 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2001).
97. See Helwig, 251 F.3d at 553-54.
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made a plaintiffs task at the 12(b)(6) stage more difficult by allowing
the defense to present their own ideas concerning the individual facts of a
case for consideration by the court instead of just allowing the court to
only view the plaintiff s allegations.
In Helwig, the court started off by declaring, "[o]ur willingness to
draw inferences in favor of the plaintiff remains unchanged by the
PSLRA. ' 98 The court then proceeded to justify this statement by looking
to the policy behind the enactment of the PSLRA.99 Congress did intend
to heighten the pleading standard for security lawsuits, but the overriding
purpose of protecting investors under the statute could not be served if
the ."strong inference" requirement prevented otherwise valid claims
from proceeding through the judicial process. 1°°
However, this line of reasoning did not prevent the court in finding
a means to place some teeth in the PSLRA standard. The court followed
with a discussion of how the "strong inference" standard did in fact
change the 12(b)(6) pleading standard.' 0' Instead of looking at all rea-
sonable inferences, the court maintained that the plaintiff will only have
the benefit of the "most plausible of competing inferences.' 0 2 As sup-
port for the decision, the court discussed the meaning of "strong infer-
ences" and ultimately concluded that the strength of the inference was
attributable to the plausibility of concluding that the facts alleged by the
plaintiff would point to some wrongful act committed by the defen-
dant.' O3
This new pleading standard certainly diverges from the 12(b)(6)
standard. It is unclear what the phrase "most plausible of competing in-
ferences" refers to exactly. 1°4 Perhaps it is a balancing test, where the
plaintiffs allegations are weighed against the defendant's and only if the
plaintiff's argument is more "plausible" will the motion to dismiss under
12(b)(6) fail. If this is the case, then the Sixth Circuit certainly forwarded
the legislature's intent of creating a heightened pleading standard. But
how can the court also claim that it is avoiding a "choke-point for meri-
torious claims"' 0 5 when all a defendant must do to eliminate legitimate
litigation is to create a more logical, and therefore more "plausible", ar-
gument even when the plaintiff s allegations may still hold true?
One thing is clear from the Sixth Circuit holding. A securities plain-
tiff that wishes to survive a motion to dismiss in the Sixth Circuit must
take extra care in compiling pre-motion pleadings to make sure that their
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version of the facts will lead to an inference not only favorable to them,
but also one that will be more plausible than any inferences that the de-
fense might argue. The type of discovery that this type of pleading might
require will most likely far surpass that which is normally sufficient at
that stage of litigation. Consequently it could be argued that the Sixth
Circuit's pleading standard will put plaintiffs in a disadvantaged position
that would be at odds with the intent of the original Securities Acts of the
1930's. This strictest of standards is only currently adopted in the Sixth
Circuit, however.
3. Eighth Circuit - Kushner v. Beverly Enters., Inc. 1
06
Contrary to Helwig, the Eighth Circuit did not choose to adopt a
pleading standard that would allow for the defense to introduce compet-
ing theories or inferences to those alleged by the plaintiff. The Eighth
Circuit instead takes a position strikingly similar to that of the First Cir-
cuit, albeit under the guise of different terminology.
Whereas the First Circuit openly declared that the motion to dismiss
pleading standards were unchanged by the PSLRA,' °7 the Eighth Circuit
stated "inferences ... will not survive a motion to dismiss if they are
only reasonable inferences-the inferences must be 'both reasonable and
strong.' ' 10 8 Because the "both reasonable and strong" terminology was
taken from Helwig, it would seem that the Eighth Circuit adopted the
Sixth Circuit pleading standard. This was not the case, however, because
the Eighth Circuit openly denounced the Sixth Circuit's plausibility de-
terminations at the 12(b)(6) stage of the proceedings in the earlier Eighth
Circuit case of In re K-tel International, Inc. Securities Litigation.0 9
Why then is Kushner most similar to Aldridge when it seems that
from the statements by the two courts they reach differing conclusions on
the issue of pleading standards? The similarity comes from the function-
ing of the two standards when actually applied. While the First Circuit
stated the 12(b)(6) standard was unchanged because it still took all alle-
gations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff was still
required to meet the PSLRA "strong inference" standard in order for
their case to survive. 1 ' This functions in the same way as the Eighth
Circuit's "reasonable and strong" standard."' Under Kushner, a plaintiff
in the Eighth Circuit will still have all reasonable inferences looked at in
the light most favorable to him, but a reasonable inference is not enough
.106. 317 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2003).
107. Aldridge, 284 F.3d at 78.
108. Kushner, 317 F.3d at 827 (quoting Helwig, 251 F.3d at 551).
109. 300 F.3d 881, 889 n.6 (8th Cir. 2002) ("[W]e do not believe that [the Eighth Circuit]
adopted Helwig's statement about 'the most plausible of competing inferences' as the law of this
Circuit.").
110. Aldridge, 284 F.3d at 78.
111. Kushner, 317 F.3d at 827.
676 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:3
to satisfy the pleading standard.' 12 Like the First Circuit, an Eighth Cir-
cuit plaintiff must still allege facts that produce a "strong inference."
' 13
Therefore, for reasons other than semantics, the First and Eighth Circuits
are in agreement over the proper pleading standard under the PSLRA.
4. Ninth Circuit - Gompper v. VISX, Inc.
11 4
The Ninth Circuit has decided to take a middle of the road ap-
proach. While the pleading standard in the Ninth Circuit does not adopt
the most plausible of competing inferences approach, and is conse-
quently not as restrictive as the Sixth Circuit approach, the Ninth Circuit
still will look at inferences promoted by the defense that are negative to
the plaintiff's allegations.
After stating that it was the legislature's "crystal clear" intent that
the heightened pleading standard under the PSLRA was to be the new
pleading standard under a motion to dismiss, the Ninth Circuit proceeded
to espouse a different pleading standard.!15 The usual assumption that all
reasonable inferences would be examined was maintained; however, the
phrase "in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs" was deleted and the
new standard set in place that all reasonable inferences would in fact
mean all.'1 6 From that point forward, whenever looking at a securities
case, the court would also draw inferences against the plaintiff that could
be used in the determination of whether the plaintiff's case survived the
12(b)(6) motion.' 7 The Ninth Circuit then stated that both the reasonable
positive inferences from the plaintiffs allegations and any reasonable
negative inferences proposed by the defense must be contemplated as a
whole and only then should a decision be made whether the plaintiffs
pleadings meet the PSLRA pleading requirement for scienter. 118 This was
not an exact adoption of the Sixth Circuit's most plausible of competing
inferences standard, however, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that it is
impossible to determine whether allegations give rise to a strong infer-
ence when the plaintiff's allegations are evaluated in a vacuum.'1 9
As an example of how this works, the plaintiffs in Gompper pled
that the defendants engaged in numerous patent infringement suits
against competitors because the defendants knew that their patents were
invalid and wanted to intimidate the competitors. The Ninth Circuit
commented that this was a reasonable inference but also looked at the
defendant's inference that the reason the defendants engaged in this liti-
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 298 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2002).




119. Id. at 896.
120. Id. at 896-97.
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gation was because they felt the patents were valid and that the survival
of the company rested on the successful litigation of patent infringement
cases. 12' The court ruled that the defendants' negative inference cut
against the plaintiffs' inference to a point that the plaintiffs were unable
to have their allegation rise to the level of a strong inference.1
22
B. The Tenth Circuit's Stance in Pirraglia
The Tenth Circuit first addressed the issue of the PSLRA in 2001
while deciding City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos.123 In Fleming, the
court made the statement that at the 12(b)(6) stage of litigation the court
looks at all allegations in the plaintiffs favor. 124 The court did not dis-
cuss, however, how the PSLRA pleading standard interacted with the
12(b)(6) standard. Therefore an initial viewing of Tenth Circuit prece-
dent would seem to put it in line with the First Circuit, which also main-
tained that the motion to dismiss pleading standard was unchanged by
the PSLRA.
125
Curiously, however, in 2003 the Tenth Circuit decided Pirraglia
and declared the issue of pleadings under both the PSLRA and Rule
12(b)(6) to be an issue of first impression within the circuit. 26 According
to the court, Fleming did not touch on the precise issue to be decided in
Pirraglia, which was to determine if, like the Ninth Circuit, the court
should take into account reasonable inferences that are promoted by the
defense and are negative to those pled by the plaintiffs.
127
1. Facts
Pirraglia involved Novell, a computer software manufac-
turer/distributorship, along with some officers within the corporation as
defendants and several investors who owned Novell stock as plaintiffs.
28
The plaintiffs accused Novell of violating securities laws by making ma-
terially false statements and producing faulty financial reports that re-
sulted in losses for the investors when Novell stock prices dropped.
29
Subsequent to a stock price decrease following the release of the third
quarter 1996 earnings report, Novell obtained a new Chairman and CEO,
John Young, as well as a new President, former Vice President Joseph
Marengi; both were pressured to increase Novell stock prices.130 Novell's
fourth quarter 1996 reported earnings exceeded earlier estimates and this
121. Id. at 897.
122. Id.
123. 264 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2001).
124. Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1257.
125. Aldridge, 284 F.3d at 78.
126. Pirraglia, 339 F.3d at 1187.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1184-85.
129. Id. at 1185-86.
130. Id. at 1185.
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growth was attributed, per Novell, to increased demand for products that
would continue through first quarter 1997.131 First quarter 1997 actual
earnings did not reflect this optimistic outlook, however, and the reported
decline caused Novell shares to decrease from $13 to $10.132 Young was
subsequently fired and new Chairman and CEO, Eric Schmidt, was an-
nounced just prior to declaring second quarter 1997 earnings lower than
projected, which in turn resulted in another price drop to $7.133 The sec-
ond quarter results yielded massive layoffs within Novell including the
dismissal of Marengi, and Novell looked to reduce inventory in hopes of
recovering. 134 The plaintiffs filed a class action naming Novell, Marengi,
Young, and the CFO, Tolonen, as defendants. 135 Among the allegations
were that 1) the defendants made fraudulent claims to investors that
Novell had generally high demand for its products, 2) the defendants
falsely stated that fourth quarter 1996 and first quarter 1997 strong finan-
cial reports were not based on special dealings with distributorships in an
effort to reduce backlogged inventory, 3) that inventory remained in line
with consumer needs, and finally 4) that defendants engaged in fraudu-
lent accounting practices and inflated financial reports.
136
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit pointed out that there is no conceivable way to
determine if an inference is a strong one without having other inferences
to compare it to. 137 With this foundation, the court proceeded to accept
the Ninth Circuit's view that inferences contrary to the plaintiffs posi-
tion can indeed be drawn upon in an evaluative framework to determine
what inference is strong in a given fact situation. 38 "[W]e consider the
inference suggested by the plaintiff while acknowledging other possible
inferences, and determine whether plaintiffs suggested inference is
'strong' in light of its overall context."'139
The Tenth Circuit next distinguished its holding from the Sixth Cir-
cuit's holding and, like the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, did not accept the
"most plausible of competing inferences" standard."4° The role of the
court in a motion to dismiss under the PSLRA is to determine the
strength of the plaintiff's inference and not to weigh two or more com-
peting inferences, a role better suited for the fact-finder.1 4 The court






136. Id. at 1186.
137. Id. at 1187.
138. Id. at 1187-88.
139. Id. at 1187.
140. Id. at 1188 (quoting Helwig, 251 F.3d at 553).
141. Id.
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tiff and one favorable to the defendant that seems to be equally strong,
the court should not make a determination between the two; instead, the
court should view the plaintiff's inference in the context of all reasonable
inferences including the negative one to determine the overall strength of
the plaintiffs inference.
42
The Tenth Circuit then moved to the plaintiffs' case specifically to
see if the district court's dismissal should be affirmed.
143 "[T]o satisfy the
[PSLRA] pleading requirements, plaintiffs must (1) specify all allegedly
misleading statements and the reasons why those statements are mislead-
ing, and (2) state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that defendants made those statements with the requisite scienter."'
44 The
court looked individually at each of the four allegations presented by the
plaintiffs and determined that the first three allegations were pled insuffi-
ciently under the PSLRA.145 Pleadings were not pled with particularity as
to allege fraudulent statements made by the defendants concerning posi-
tive demand for Novell products because the plaintiffs failed to provide
any reasoning why the statements were misleading or that customer de-
mand was so low that these statements might be misleading.
46 Further-
more, the court stated that even if the allegations were pled with suffi-
cient particularity, these vague statements of confidence are not action-
able under the PSLRA.1
47
Second, the court discussed the plaintiffs' allegations that the de-
fendants made statements that Novell's favorable financial reports were
not obtained through special deals and its supply remained in proportion
to demand.148 The court held that these allegations were not pled suffi-
ciently because the PSLRA requires that where "'an allegation ...is
made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particular-
ity all facts on which that belief is formed"' and the plaintiffs failed to
provide these facts. 149 Because the plaintiffs' allegations were not based
on first-hand knowledge of the statements made, but only on a good faith
belief that they were true, the plaintiffs were required to plead facts giv-
ing rise to this belief. 50 They failed to do this.' 5' Consequently, the dis-
trict court's dismissal of these allegations was upheld by the circuit
court. 52 Because the plaintiffs failed to plead the facts with the requisite
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1188-94.
144. Id. at 1188.
145. Id. at 1189-90.
146. Id. at 1189.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1189-90.
149. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1190.
152. Id. at 1194.
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specificity, the court had no need to evaluate them in light of the "strong
inference" standard.
53
The fourth allegation was a different matter, however. The plain-
tiffs' allegations that the defendants made fraudulent statements about
Novell's accounting methods were pled with sufficient particularity and
were sufficient to give rise to a "strong inference" that the defendants
acted with scienter. t54 First, the court found that the allegedly false
statements were clearly identified and the reasoning as to why they were
misleading was adequately explained through proof in the form of state-
ments made by Novell accountants that senior officers had reported un-
approved revenue. 55 After the court made this determination it went on
to assess the scienter portion of the pleading test. t56 The plaintiffs pre-
sented motive evidence that the defendants had special concern over the
safety of their jobs, especially in light of the recent firings that Novell
had undergone. 157 Further, the court cited evidence that the defendants
had opportunity and control over public financial statements and could
influence outsider decision making by altering them.1 58 The court ac-
cepted these motive and opportunity allegations but again cautioned that
motive and opportunity are not sufficient, in and of itself, to allege sci-
enter in the Tenth Circuit.159 Following Fleming, the court proceeded to
review the totality of the pleadings to see if the motive and opportunity
facts could help the plaintiffs allege scienter. t6°
In addition to motive and opportunity, the plaintiffs also alleged di-
rect evidence of scienter in the form of defendants' violations of Gener-
ally Accepted Accounting Practices ("GAAP"), violations of internal
corporate policies, and "damning" evidence of a revenue category listed
on company spreadsheets entitled "In-transit."' 6' Facts were supplied that
the "In-transit" category was "fictitious sales of product that had not
been sold.... to make up the short-fall between actual and targeted sales
numbers."'' 62 The court noted that Rule 12(b)(6) required these allega-
tions to be accepted as true and, as a result, the court determined that
these facts, combined with the "motive and opportunity" allegations,
were sufficient to establish a "strong inference" that the defendants acted
with scienter when viewed in the totality of the pleadings.1 63
153. See id. at 1190-91 (The court refused to review "allegations of scienter with respect to
statements that fail to satisfy the first prong of the [PSLRA].").
154. Id. at 1190, 1192.
155. Id. at 1190.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1191.
158. Id.
159. Id. (quoting Fleming, 264 F.3d at 1262).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1192-93.
162. Id. at 1193.
163. Id.
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The defendants presented a negative inference to be taken into ac-
count by the court; specifically, the "In-transit" allegations were absurd
and not plausible. 64 The court determined that weighing the competing
arguments was the duty of the fact-finder and that the plaintiffs' allega-
tions rose to the level of a "strong inference" even in light of the defen-
dants' argument.165 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's judg-
ment on the fourth allegation and remanded for further investigation. 
166
III. ANALYSIS
Before comparing the Tenth Circuit's decision to those of the other
circuit courts, it is important to recall the reasoning behind the PSLRA.
The heightened pleading standard was an attempt by Congress to provide
some added protection to corporations from meritless securities 
suits.167
The increase of securities based suits was only liable to increase in the
future and the legislature perceived an eventual stranglehold on courts'
time and resources. 168 The increased pleading standard demanding speci-
ficity in allegations, as well as requiring the allegations to rise to the
level of a "strong inference" of wrongdoing on the part of the defendants,
would hopefully weed out claims by investors who merely lost money in
an uncertain stock market or who had no better evidence to base their
claims of scienter on than general motives that would be common to any
high level corporate officer. 169 On the other hand, it is important to real-
ize that while the PSLRA was an answer to a growing dilemma caused
by increased securities litigation, there are still many highly meritorious
claims that deserve judicial attention. After all, the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, which is what the PSLRA hoped to reform in some but not
all aspects, was enacted to protect investors from malfeasance at the
hands of those who were in control and in a position to manipulate busi-
ness actions for personal gain. 70 It is important that circuit courts bal-
ance these competing interests when deciding how to reconcile the
12(b)(6) and PSLRA pleading standards. If a court leans too far in the
direction of the 12(b)(6) standard, then it is undermining exactly what the
legislature hoped to accomplish by requiring the "strong inference" stan-
dard in the PSLRA and will allow a flood of strike-suits and other mali-
cious litigation into the courts unchecked. Alternatively, were a court to
give undue weight to the PSLRA, it may be foreclosing many truly in-
jured parties from receiving the relief they deserve and allowing corpo-
rate controllers to get away with many of the same things that led to the
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1194.
167. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740.
168. Gibney, supra note 2, at 975.
169. City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1258-59, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 2001).
170. Gibney, supra note 2, at 1012.
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original 1934 legislation. With this foundation, the Tenth Circuit ruling
can be reviewed in accordance with how well it balances these two coun-
tervailing policies.
Pirraglia contains a two-step analysis for the PSLRA pleading
standard. 71 First, contrary to traditional pleading under 12(b)(6), infer-
ences can be drawn against the plaintiff. 72 This is a radical step when
taken within the context of our notion that the plaintiffs well-pled com-
plaint is taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff in a motion to dismiss. 3 This is necessary, asserts the Tenth
Circuit, because it is impossible to determine if a "strong inference" has
been presented as mandated by the PSLRA unless there is some other
inference or inferences to set it against for evaluation. 7 4 The strength of
the plaintiff's inference can only be determined within the context of all
reasonable inferences.
Although the court will look to negative inferences for purposes of
evaluating the strength of the plaintiffs preferred inference, the second
step to the analysis requires that the court not weigh multiple inferences
in an attempt to decide which of them will ultimately constitute the pre-
vailing argument. 75 According to the court, this would usurp the func-
tion of the fact-finder in the case and move beyond what a court is called
to do at the 12(b)(6) stage. 176 Evidently, the court sees a difference be-
tween determining whether a plaintiffs inference is strong within the
context of other reasonable, including negative, inferences that might be
raised and "weighing" the plaintiffs inference against the other reason-
able inferences.
The question still remains: did the Tenth Circuit's decision in Pir-
raglia fulfill the intent of the legislature when it enacted both the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 and the PSLRA while still giving credence to
the lenient 12(b)(6) standard? The fact that, ultimately, the court will
take the plaintiff's allegations as true does help injured investors find a
forum for their grievance. Also, the fact that the plaintiff's inference
must still establish the "strong inference" required under the PSLRA will
discourage some frivolous claims. It will also ensure that others that do
not have a legitimate claim will be effectively weeded out in a motion to
dismiss when it is evident that they cannot indicate the alleged wrongful
acts either with the requisite specificity or to the degree necessary to es-
tablish a "strong inference." But does the ability for the court to draw
negative inferences go beyond the protection that even the legislature
171. Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 2003).
172. Pirraglia, 339 F.3d at 1187.
173. Id. (citing Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.
1999)).
174. Id. at 1188.
175. Id. (citing Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1236).
176. Id.
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intended? It seems that maybe the First and Eighth Circuit's standards
provide the best possible combination when trying to accommodate the
competing policy concerns. Why not stop at allowing all allegations pled
to be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, but then still
allow the claim to be dismissed if it seems that the pleading still is not
adequate to rise to what the court believes is a "strong inference?" Per-
haps the best answer can be found in the Tenth Circuit reasoning. It is
not possible to determine what, in actuality, is a strong inference without
having other inferences for comparison. 177 If the only inferences that
could be looked at were those favorable to the plaintiff, it seems that a
motion to dismiss could never succeed. Plaintiffs will only have to face
the hurdle of whether or not their own inferences are reasonable. A dis-
trict court faced with only being able to look at reasonable inferences that
favor the plaintiff would never be able to find that an inference was not
strong because there would be no other viewpoint to weigh it against.
The problem with this reasoning is that securities fraud suits rarely
survive motions to dismiss, even in jurisdictions that claim the 12(b)(6)
standard is unchanged by the PSLRA. Both Kushner and Aldridge are
examples of cases from the most lenient circuit courts that still resulted
in strong-inference requirements for at least some allegations not being
met. The Tenth Circuit's new pleading standard that allows negative
inferences to be taken into account only makes a plaintiffs chances of
surviving a 12(b)(6) motion more remote than they already were. This
must raise concerns about the PSLRA too tightly constricting the chances
of meritorious securities fraud claims surviving until litigation. Does this
mean the Tenth Circuit, as well as others like the Ninth and the strict
Sixth have gone beyond the intent of the legislature and made it impossi-
ble for a plaintiff to successfully bring claims? The answer to this ques-
tion must be a resounding no. Although it will be difficult for plaintiffs at
the 12(b)(6) stage to prove the requisite strong inference standard, Pir-
raglia itself is an example when plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to over-
come a defendant's negative inference and survived the motion to dis-
miss. It would be difficult to argue that the circuit courts have made the
pleading standard too high to overcome when plaintiffs in the stricter
Tenth Circuit were able to successfully plead scienter.
Ergo, although the Tenth and Ninth Circuits may seem to be radical
departures from the common 12(b)(6) pleading standard and make a
plaintiff's task at a motion to dismiss hearing even more trying than was
previously the case, they are also the decisions that make the most sense
in the context of legislative intent for the Securities Act of 1934, the
PSLRA, and Rule 12(b)(6). The decisions also succeed in both protecting
investors and eliminating frivolous securities litigation practices. Ulti-
mately they are the only circuit courts that have reconciled the 12(b)(6)
177. Id. at 1187.
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and PSLRA pleading standards without rendering one or the other void
of all meaning.
CONCLUSION
Although it may seem that the circuit courts' differing views on
how the Rule 12(b)(6) and PSLRA pleadings standards should be recon-
ciled may not differ greatly, it is important to realize how radical the
Tenth, Ninth and Sixth Circuits' departure from the traditional Rule
12(b)(6) standard is. No longer will securities litigation plaintiffs in these
jurisdictions have the benefit of their well-pled complaints looked at in
the light most favorable to them. While their facts must still be accepted
as true at the 12(b)(6) stage, the ability for courts to draw inferences
against plaintiffs based on the facts alleged is a monumental exodus from
the idea that we should provide leniency to plaintiffs at this point in liti-
gation. That said, the Tenth Circuit ruling in Pirraglia has appropriately
advanced the legislature's intent when it enacted the PSLRA, while si-
multaneously preserving much of the leniency inherent in the traditional
Rule 12(b)(6) standard.
As the plaintiffs in Pirraglia found, a negative inference that has
been drawn against their facts can still be overcome as long as particular
facts are alleged that do rise to the level of a "strong inference" when
viewed in the totality of the pleadings. In Pirraglia the Tenth Circuit
provided a legal test that protects both a corporation from frivolous and
malicious litigation, as well as corporate stockholders from abuse by
senior officers in a position to manipulate securities for their own gain.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that this balance is still
skewed towards making it tough on plaintiffs to bring claims that will
survive until litigation. The PSLRA was a reaction to the growing num-
bers of frivolous suits and provided protection primarily to corpora-
tions. 179 On the heels of debacles like Enron and Worldcom, maybe it is
time for the legislature to once again rethink what pleading standards are
in the public's best interest.
Although the public policy behind the PSLRA is admirable and
saves companies considerable amounts of money by helping them to
avoid frivolous suits, maybe a public policy stance that protects investors
and allows them a road devoid of obstacles that plaintiffs in other types
of litigation do not have to overcome would actually benefit the public
more. In the end, the reconciliation of the PSLRA and the Rule 12(b)(6)
standard is important in the context of current law. But ultimately, a re-
178. Id.
179. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740.
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structuring of securities law as a whole may be more beneficial than try-
ing to mold pleading standards.
Rick M. Simmons*
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Denver College of Law.

REMMER's PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE: THE TENTH
CIRCUIT'S POSITION
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
all criminal defendants the right to "a speedy and public trial, by an im-
partial jury ... . ,,' Extraneous information that has a prejudicial effect on
a jury's verdict denies criminally accused individuals this guarantee and,
as such, is inimical to our adversarial system of justice.2
For over a century the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that any private communications with the jury about the case pending
before them, other than the presentations of the parties and the court's
instructions, are "absolutely forbidden, and invalidate the verdict . . .
unless their harmlessness is made to appear."3 Because outside contact
with the jury, regardless of whether or not it was intentional, risks the
jury basing its decision on something other than the record and applica-
ble law, proof of such contacts results in the Remmer presumption of
prejudice.4 The Remmer presumption is not conclusive, but does require
the party defending the verdict to establish that the contacts did not, in
fact, prejudice the jury.5
In recent years, however, several federal circuits have either signifi-
cantly narrowed the Remmer presumption, or held that it has been aban-
doned altogether. While the First, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
maintain that the Remmer presumption must be applied in every case
involving evidence of an external influence on the jury,
6 the Sixth Circuit
has concluded that the presumption no longer applies at all . Most other
circuits have taken a middle ground, reading subsequent Supreme Court
decisions to retreat from or reconfigure the Remmer presumption in vari-
ous and conflicting ways. 8 Nevertheless, whether the Remmer presump-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-74 (1965); see also Remmer v. United States,
347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).
3. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 150 (1892).
4. See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.
5. Id.
6. See United States v. Scull, 321 F.3d 1270, 1280 (10th Cir. 2003); Schaff v. Snyder, 190
F.3d 513, 533-34 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 550 (11th Cir. 1994);
United States v. O'Brien, 972 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1992).
7. United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532-33 (6th Cir. 1984).
8. See United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 933-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (arguing Remmer
standard was reconfigured by Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) and United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725 (1993)); United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (questioning
the appropriate breadth of Remmer and suggesting that the District of Columbia Circuit no longer
treats the presumption as "particularly forceful"); Stephens v. S. At. Canners, Inc., 848 F.2d 484,
485-89 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1537 n.9 (4th Cir.
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tion applies, and in what form, is a question with serious implications,
and the split in the circuits undoubtedly means the outcomes in like cases
will vary depending upon the circuit in which they arise.9
Part I of this survey reviews the Supreme Court's relevant prece-
dents. Part II of this survey then reviews several cases from the Tenth
Circuit, examining how the Tenth Circuit interprets and applies the
Remmer presumption. Finally, Part III of this survey suggests that, while
the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions in Smith v. Phillipsl° and United States v. Olano"l
may have limited its application, the Remmer presumption remains good
law. Moreover, were the Supreme Court to exercise its certiorari jurisdic-
tion in order to settle the split in the federal circuits over this question, it
would likely uphold the Remmer presumption's validity as a necessary
safeguard for the protection of our constitutional right to a fair trial by an
impartial jury.
I. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court first squarely addressed the problem of im-
proper extraneous influences in Mattox v. United States.12 In Mattox, the
bailiff discussed the case with the jury, conveying information not pre-
sented at trial regarding the defendant's past criminal record.13 In addi-
tion, a newspaper article that contained details of the trial and the
strength of the government's case against the defendant was left in the
jury room. 4 Nevertheless, the trial court refused to consider juror affida-
vits describing these facts on the ground that juror testimony could not be
used to impeach a verdict, and denied the defendant's motion for a new
trial. 15
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that while jurors may not tes-
tify as to their particular state of mind or reasons for reaching the verdict,
they may "testify to any facts bearing upon the question of the existence
of any extraneous influence .. ,, Furthermore, the court declared that
"[p]rivate communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third
persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden,
and invalidate the verdict ... unless their harmlessness is made to ap-
1986) (modifying the Remmer presumption and applying it only to cases in which the party chal-
lenging the verdict makes a threshold showing that the exparte contact was "more than innocuous").
9. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Baker, 531 U.S. 919
(2000) (No. 00-90).
10. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
11. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
12. 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
13. Mattox, 146 U.S. at 142.
14. Id. at 142-44.
15. Id. at 141,144.
16. Id. at 148-49.
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pear." ' 7 Thus, the affidavits in question were "material" evidence of
prejudice and, accordingly, their exclusion constituted reversible error.' 
8
A half a century later, in Remmer v. United States,19 the Supreme
Court set out the procedure the trial court should follow when unauthor-
ized contact with jurors occurs.2° In Remmer, after the jury had returned
its verdict, the petitioner learned for the first time that during the trial an
unnamed person commented to a member of the jury, later the jury fore-
man, that he could profit by delivering a verdict favorable to the peti-
tioner.21 'The juror reported the incident to the judge, who informed the
prosecuting attorneys ... ,22 An investigation took place.23 Based on its
report, the judge and the prosecutors concluded the statement to the juror
was made in jest and took no further action.24 However, the court failed
to inform the petitioner of the incident before the verdict, and he learned
25
of the matter only after reading about it in the newspapers.
The Supreme Court held that "any private communication, contact,
or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the
matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presump-
tively grejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court
... .,,6 Although the presumption of prejudice is not conclusive, the
prosecution bears the heavy burden of proving that such communication,
contact, or tampering constitutes harmless error.27 Furthermore, a trial
court should not make decisions ex pane, but rather should "determine
the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not
it was prejudicial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to
participate. 28
The Supreme Court decided Remmer prior to the enactment of Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 606(b). Rule 606(b) sets the boundaries for author-
ized intrusions into the province of the jury. 29 In particular, the Rule pro-
hibits a juror from testifying about his mental processes in reaching a
verdict. 30 A juror may, however, testify as to "whether extraneous preju-
dicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
17. Id. at 150.
18. Id. at 149.
19. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
20. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229-30.





26. Id. at 229.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 229-30.
29. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
30. Id.
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juror."'" As such, Rule 606(b) "allows testimony about the fact and na-
ture of the contact ... but not about the effect it produced on the juror's
state of mind.
32
The Supreme Court considered the application of Rule 606(b) in
Tanner v. United States.33 In Tanner, the defendant sought a new trial
because, after his conviction, Tanner's attorney received a telephone call
from one of the jurors informing him that several of the jurors drank al-
cohol during their lunch breaks and slept through the afternoons.34 After
the district court denied the motion for a new trial, and while the case
was on appeal, Tanner's attorney received another call from a different
juror, who informed him that he and three other members of the jury had
smoked marijuana regularly during the trial.35 Furthermore, the juror
observed at least two other members of the jury ingest cocaine during the
trial; one in particular "described himself.., as 'flying."'
' 36
The Court held that it was not error for the district court to refuse to
conduct an evidentiary hearing that would have included juror testimony
because Rule 606(b) barred juror testimony regarding drug and alcohol
use by jurors during trial. 37 Rule 606(b), the Court stated, was grounded
in the long-standing common law rule that prohibited jury testimony to
impeach a verdict once delivered by the jury, unless in regard to any
"'extraneous influence"' which may have affected the jury's delibera-
tions.38 The rule was meant to shield the jury's deliberation from public
scrutiny so that what was intended to be a private deliberation did not
become the "subject of public investigation--to the destruction of all
frankness and freedom of discussion and conference," and the integrity
of the judicial system.39
In Smith v. Phillips,4 ° the Supreme Court first called into question
the issue of whether bias may be inferred where there is a question about
whether some factor other than the evidence presented in the particular
case has affected the juror's ability to remain impartial.4 ' In Phillips, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a habeas petitioner
was entitled to a new trial based on the alleged partiality of a juror who
31. Id.
32. United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see Tanner v. United
States, 483 U.S. 107, 116-27 (1987) (explaining the origins of and rationale behind the rule).
33. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
34. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 113.
35. Id. at 115.
36. Id. at 115-16.
37. Id. at 125.
38. Id. at 117 (quoting Mattox, 146 U.S. at 149).
39. Id. at 119-20 (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915)).
40. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
41. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215-17.
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previously applied for a job in the prosecutor's office.42 Although the
trial court conducted a hearing and determined the juror was not preju-
diced, the federal courts concluded that the trial court should have con-
clusively presumed prejudice given the facts.43
The Supreme Court, citing Remmer, reversed, holding that due
process requires only that the trial court hold a hearing to determine the
existence of prejudice.44 The court thought it was improper to presume
prejudice because the pre-trial voir dire and the post-trial hearing were
sufficient to protect the defendant's rights.45 Furthermore, the Court con-
cluded "[t]his Court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror
partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove
actual bias.",46 Some have read this particular statement as a retreat from
the Remmer presumption because if a presumption of prejudice existed,
the defendant would not need an opportunity to prove the jury was bi-
ased.47
The Supreme Court again shed doubt on the Remmer presumption
in United States v. Olano.48 There, the defendants were convicted in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington on
charges relating to a loan kickback scheme.49 On appeal, the defendants
contended it was plain error for the trial court to allow alternate jurors to
sit with the jury during deliberations, despite being told not to partici-
pate.
50
After the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the defendant's
convictions,51 the Supreme Court reversed concluding that because the
conceded error did not effect substantial rights, the Appeals Court was
without authority to correct it.52 Moreover, in discussing what it called
"intrusion jurisprudence," the Court stated "[t]here may be cases where
an intrusion should be presumed prejudicial, but a presumption of preju-
dice as opposed to a specific analysis does not change the ultimate in-
quiry: Did the intrusion affect the jury's deliberations and thereby its
verdict?,
53
42. Id. at 214.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 217.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
47. See Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 496; see also United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 934
(5th Cir. 1998).
48. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
49. Olano, 507 U.S. at 727.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 731.
52. Id. at 741.
53. Id. at 738-39 (citations omitted).
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II. UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS DECISIONS
A. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit, without qualification, follows the principles first
established in Mattox and Remmer.54 In Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp. of
Wichita, Inc., 55 the court declared that "[t]he law in the Tenth Circuit is
clear. A rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises whenever a jury is
exposed to external information in contravention of a district court's in-
structions. 56 While acknowledging the split in the circuits over the
validity and applicability of the Remmer presumption, in its most recent
decision, the Tenth Circuit shows no sign of retreating from this posi-
tion.57
1. United States v. Greer
58
a. Facts
In Greer, the defendant was convicted in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma of drug violations.59 On
appeal, the defendant alleged improper contact between a United States
Deputy Marshal and the jury prejudiced him.6°
At a lunch break during trial, the Marshal presented information to
the jury concerning possible sentencing under the Federal Youth Correc-
tions Act. 6' The allegedly improper contact came to the trial court's at-
tention after the verdict was entered and the defendant was sentenced.62
Following a hearing, the trial court held that the contact was not prejudi-
cial.6 3
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit, citing Remmer, held that "[a]ny private contact
with jurors during trial about the matter pending before them is 'pre-
sumptively prejudicial.' 64 Moreover, "[i]f a guilty verdict following
prejudicial contact is to be sustained, the government must 'establish...
that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.' 65 The
54. See United States v. Scull, 321 F.3d 1270, 1280 (10th Cir. 2003); Mayhue v. St. Francis
Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 969 F.2d 919, 922 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d
1040, 1044-45 (10th Cir. 1988).
55. 969 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 1992).
56. Mayhue, 969 F.2d at 922.
57. Scull, 321 F.3d at 1280 n.5.
58. 620 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980).





64. Id. at 1385 (quoting Rerner v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954)).
65. Id. (quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229).
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court concluded, however, that Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) radi-
cally modified Remmer's requirement that the trial court "'determine the
circumstances (of the contact), the impact thereof upon the juror, and
whether or not it was prejudicial."'
66
"Under Rule 606(b), an inquiry into a verdict is limited to a deter-
mination 'whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly
brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was im-
properly brought to bear upon any juror.' ' 67 Courts can, thus, no longer
inquire into the effect of extraneous information or outside influence
upon a juror's "'mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dis-
sent from the verdict.' 68 As a result of this, the court concluded, "a pre-
sumption of prejudice cannot be overcome once a jury has reached its
verdict."69 Accordingly, the court suggested that Rule 606(b) "may re-
quire the courts to narrow [Remmer's] definition of 'presumptively
prejudicial' ....,70
2. United States v. Hornung7t
a. Facts
In Hornung, the Tenth Circuit applied the Remmer presumption in
upholding a jury verdict despite improper contact between a juror and a
bank teller.72 In Hornung, the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Oklahoma convicted the defendant of conspiring to de-
fraud the United States by concealing taxable income.73 On appeal, the
defendant contended that the trial court should have granted his motion
74
for a new trial because of an improper third-party contact with a juror.
While a juror was conducting routine business at his bank, a teller
informed him of the defendant's illicit activities at the bank.75 The teller
mentioned she was familiar with the defendant because he had come into
the bank with another man and attempted to launder $6,000.00.76 The
juror indicated in his affidavit that the information imparted by the teller
in the course of their brief conversation was unsolicited and that he had
77discussed the conversation with another juror.
66. Id. (quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 330).
67. Id. (quoting FED. R. EViD. 606(b)).
68. Id. (quoting FED. R. EvID. 606(b)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1385 n. 1 (quoting Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229).
71. 848 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1988).
72. Hornung, 848 F.2d at 1044.
73. Id. at 1042.
74. Id. at 1043.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1043-44.
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The trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether possible
juror misconduct had occurred and, if so, whether it was prejudicial to
the defendant.78 Upon the completion of the hearing, the court denied the
defendant's motion for a new trial. 9
b. Decision
In the course of discussing the juror's exposure to extrinsic influ-
ences, the Tenth Circuit stated that the trial court has broad discretion in
reviewing the possible effect of extraneous information upon the jury's
verdict.80 Moreover, contrary to what the defendant argued, Greer does
not stand for the proposition that the Remmer presumption is irrebut-
table.81 Rather, the majority of the court simply rejected the application
of a conclusive presumption, and maintained the presumption can be
overcome by showing the contact with the juror was harmless. 82 In Hor-
nung, while the court deemed the communication to be "about the matter
before the jury," and would be treated as "presumptively prejudicial," it
concluded "the presumption was rebutted by the overwhelming evidence
of the defendant's guilt. '83 Accordingly, the district court did not err by
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial.84
3. United States v. Scull
85
a. Facts
Recently, in Scull, the Tenth circuit again upheld the validity of the
Remmer presumption. 86 Following a jury trial, the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico convicted Gus Bono of a "variety
of counts relating to manufacturing, possessing, and distributing crack
cocaine, and conspiracy to commit the same. 87 On appeal, the defendant
maintained his case should have been remanded for a new trial because
the district court erred by denying him his Sixth Amendment right to a
fair and impartial jury.8 In particular, the defendant argued the court
mishandled his allegation of juror taint and prejudice.89
On the second day of trial, an alternate member of the jury informed
the court that he believed he observed the defendant's counsel speaking




82. Id. at 1044-45.
83. Id. at 1044 (internal quotations omitted).
84. Id. at 1046.
85. 321 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2003).
86. Scull, 321 F.3d at 1280 n.5.
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with another jury member. 90 Upon learning of the allegation, the court
separately questioned both members of the jury and allowed the lawyers
for both parties to do the same.9' After dismissing the jurors, the court
concluded the alternate juror's allegation was a case of mistaken iden-
tity.
92
Nevertheless, the defendant's counsel objected to the juror's contin-
ued presence on the jury, arguing "he's compromised. 93 However, be-
cause the juror was the second alternate and was likely to be excused
from the jury's deliberations, the court did not dismiss him.94 The judge
then informed the jury that "an allegation of attorney/juror contact had
been raised" and, though he failed to mention that the report was inaccu-
rate, the trial proceeded.95
The defendant argued the court's statements exposed the jury to ex-
traneous information that prejudiced him. 96 Specifically, the defendant
argued that by failing to explain to the jury that the accusation was false,
the judge could have caused the jury to conclude that the court believed
the accusation was true and, hence, made them biased against him. 97 The
defendant asked the court "to order a new trial or remand this case for a
determination regarding the extent of any jury bias. 98
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit, relying on the decisions in Mattox and Remmer,
reiterated its belief that when members of a jury are exposed to extrane-
ous information, there is an automatic presumption of prejudice.99 More-
over, the presumption weighs heavily in favor of the defendant and the
burden of proving the exposure to extraneous information was harmless
falls solely upon the government.l°°
The court noted that the Tenth Circuit and others have questioned
the appropriate breadth of Remmer's presumption of prejudice, arguing
the standard should either be significantly narrowed or replaced alto-
gether.' 0' In United States v. Greer,10 2 for example, the Tenth Circuit
itself concluded Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) may require that courts
narrow the Remmer presumption. 0 3 Furthermore, in United States v.






96. Id. at 1279-80.




101. Id. at 1280 n.5.
102. 620 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980).
103. Scull, 321 F.3d at 1280 n.5 (noting Greer, 620 F.2d at 1385 n.1).
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Sylvester,'°4 the Fifth Circuit argued the Remmer standard could not sur-
vive Phillips and Olano, under which Remmer's presumption of preju-
dice is no longer automatic, but rather determined at the trial court's dis-
cretion.1°5 Likewise in United States v. Williams-Davis,0 6 the D.C. Cir-
cuit argued the Supreme Court's decisions in Phillips and Olano have
diminished the presumption of prejudice and given the trial court broad
discretion to assess the effect of alleged intrusions. 107
Nevertheless, the court stated that in the absence of Supreme Court
authority to the contrary, it would review the defendant's claim "under
Remmer's rubric." 108 While there was an overwhelming amount of evi-
dence to support the defendant's guilt, the defendant did not present any
evidence that the court's statements regarding the alleged attorney/juror
contact tainted the jury.' 9 Accordingly, the court concluded that the dis-
trict court did not plainly err by failing to take further steps to determine
the existence of jury bias."
10
B. The D.C. Circuit
While the Tenth Circuit has steadfastly maintained the validity of
the Remmer presumption, various other circuits have either narrowed its
applicability in response to the Supreme Court's decisions in Phillips and
Olano and the enactment of Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, or abandoned it altogether."' The following cases, mentioned in
Scull, illustrate the divergent views among the Federal Circuits over the
question of whether the Remmer presumption remains good law.
1. United States v. Williams-Davis
112
a. Facts
In Williams-Davis, the defendants were found guilty of conspiring
to distribute and possess with intent to distribute illegal drugs. 1 3 After
the verdicts were returned, the district court granted the defense counsel
permission to speak with the jurors. 14 The defendants returned to court
shortly thereafter, filing a motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for a new
104. 143 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998).
105. Scull, 321 F.3d at 1280 n.5 (noting Sylvester, 143 F.3d at 933).
106. 90 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
107. Scull, 321 F.3d at 1280 n.5 (noting Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 496).
108. Id.
109. ld. at 1281.
110. Id.
111. See Sylvester, 143 F.3d at 933-34 (arguing Remmer standard was reconfigured by Phillips
and Olano); Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 496 (questioning the appropriate breadth of Remmer and
suggesting that the District of Columbia Circuit no longer treats the presumption as "particularly
forceful"); see also United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532 (6th Cir. 1984) (arguing that the
Remmer presumption should be abandoned altogether).
112. 90 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
113. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 493.
114. id. at 494.
[Vol. 81:3
REMMER'S PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE
trial based on affidavits from four jurors claiming numerous instances of
juror misconduct." 5 In their affidavits, the jurors asserted that the fore-
woman said her husband told her to "nail" the defendants'16 On appeal,
the defendants argued "first that prejudice must be presumed, and second
that the judge should have held a more extensive hearing."
' 17
b. Decision
The District of Columbia Circuit ("D.C. Circuit") concluded that
Phillips and Olano had significantly narrowed the Remmer standard."
8
By assuring the defendant "'an opportunity to prove actual bias,"' the
Phillips' decision was inconsistent with the Remmer presumption, under
which a defendant would not need an opportunity to prove the jury was
in some manner biased.19
Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit read Olano as backing away from the
Remmer presumption, viewing Remmer as simply "a case illustrating the
importance of weighing the likelihood of prejudice rather than as a
source of rigid rules. 1 20 The court also noted that, although often refer-
ring to Remmer, the D.C. Circuit has "not treated the supposed 'presump-
tion' as particularly forceful," and places more discretion with the trial
court to determine if jury exposure to extraneous information was preju-
dicial.' 21 Accordingly, the district court was correct to "inquire whether
any particular intrusion showed enough of a 'likelihood of prejudice' to
justify assigning the government a burden of proving harmlessness.' 22
"[W]here the court conducts an inquiry broad enough to lead it to a rea-
sonable judgment that there has been no prejudice ... it has fulfilled its
procedural as well as its substantive duty."'
123
C. The Fifth Circuit
1. United States v. Sylvester 24
a. Facts
In Sylvester, a Fifth Circuit court convicted the defendants of as-
sorted drug-related crimes. 125 During the course of the trial, "[t]here were
three separate instances of potential jury tampering.' ' 126 The first two
115. Id.
116. Id. at 495.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 496.
119. Id. (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 496-97.
122. Id. at 497.
123. Id. at 499.
124. 143 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1998).
125. Sylvester, 143 F.3d at 926.
126. Id. at 931.
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involved unknown persons contacting members of the jury at home and
asking them to discuss the case. 127 The third instance of potential jury
tampering was raised in an ex parte meeting between the district court
judge and a particular jury member who reported that a concession stand
vendor at the courthouse had implored her to "take it easy on the broth-
ers." 1 28 On appeal, the defendants contended that: 1) the district court
erred by conducting ex parte voir dire with individual jurors during its
investigation of jury tampering; and 2) the government was automati-
cally required to prove the absence of prejudice.
129
b. Decision
The Court of Appeals held that the district court abused its discre-
tion in conducting the ex parte voir dire.1 30 To begin with, when the pos-
sibility of outside influence on the jury arises, "'the failure to hold a
hearing in such a situation constitutes an abuse of discretion and is re-
versible error.'"" 31 Moreover, after Remmer, the court noted, the Fifth
Circuit consistently required the inclusion of all parties in such hear-
ings.
132
In addition, the court concluded that the government is not auto-
matically required to prove the absence of prejudice. 133 While Remmer
held that any outside influence on the jury was presumptively prejudicial
and the burden fell on the government to rebut this presumption, the Su-
preme Court since has backed away from this position.1 34 Like the D.C.
Circuit did in Williams-Davis, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Rem-
mer presumption could not survive the Supreme Court's subsequent de-
cisions in Phillips and Olano, which indicated that the presumption of
prejudice and the assignment of the burden of proof are not triggered
automatically but are imposed at the discretion of the district court. 1
35
In Phillips, the Supreme Court stated it had "'long held that the
remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defen-
dant has the opportunity to prove actual bias."",136 This language, the
Fifth Circuit maintained, was "difficult to reconcile with a presumption
of prejudice warranting rebuttal by the government" because if such a
presumption indeed existed, why would a defendant need to prove actual
bias?
131
127. Id. at 931-32.
128. Id. at 932.
129. Id. at 931, 933.
130. Id. at 932.
131. Id. (quoting United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 338 (5th Cir. 1984)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 933.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 934 (quoting Remmer, 455 U.S. at 215) (emphasis added in quotation).
137. Id.
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Likewise, the Supreme Court's decision in Olano further reconfig-
ured Remmer.138 In that case,
[t]he Court summarized what it termed "intrusion jurisprudence,"
quoted Phillips, and concluded:
There may be cases where an intrusion should be presumed
prejudicial, but a presumption of prejudice as opposed to a
specific analysis does not change the ultimate inquiry: Did
the intrusion affect the jury's deliberations and thereby its
verdict?
139
Thus, if the court determines that prejudice is likely, only then may
it require the government to prove otherwise.140 This rule, the court held,
comported with the Fifth Circuit's "longstanding recognition of the trial
court's considerable discretion in investigating and resolving charges of
jury tampering."
141
D. The Sixth Circuit
1. United States v. Pennell
142
a. Facts
Finally, in Pennell, United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Michigan convicted the defendant of "one count of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine, one count of attempt to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine, seven counts of unlawful use of a com-
munications facility, and one count of unlawful carrying of a firearm
during the commission of a felony."'' 43 Two days after deliberations be-
gan, five jurors received anonymous phone calls. 44 In all five instances,
the caller urged the juror to find the defendant guilty and then quickly
hung up. 14 5 On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court should
have declared a mistrial.
46
b. Decision
The Sixth Circuit explicitly construed Phillips as working "a sub-
stantive change in the law,"' 147 eliminating any presumption of prejudice
138. Id.




142. 737 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1984).
143. Pennell, 737 F.2d at 523 (citations omitted).
144. Id. at 529.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 532 n. 10.
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and placing the burden on the defendant to show prejudice. 48 The court
read Phillips as holding that "Remmer does not govern the question of
the burden of proof where potential jury partiality is alleged."' 149 Rather,
Remmer simply provided that a hearing must be held, where the defen-
dant could present evidence, to determine the effects of such alleged
conduct on the jury's deliberations.
50
Moreover, the district court's decision should be reviewed solely for
abuse of discretion and "deference should be accorded [to] . . . findings
made after a properly conducted hearing . . . ,,151 Because the district
court appropriately conducted a hearing to determine whether the partial-
ity of the five juror members had been compromised, and in view of "the
jurors' repeated assertions of unimpaired impartiality," the district court




Unauthorized communications with members of the jury about the
matter pending before them violates a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury, and can result in a mistrial.
153
Whether the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Mattox and
Remmer remain good law,154 and a presumption of prejudice still exists,
or whether the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and inter-
vening decisions of the Court have implicitly overruled them,155 is, thus,
an important question with significant implications.
Rule 606(b) prohibits juror testimony as to the effect of any extra-
neous prejudicial information or outside influence on the juror's state of
mind to impeach a verdict. 56 The policy behind this rule is to discourage
harassment of jurors, insulate the jury room to facilitate free and open
discourse, and reduce opportunity and incentive for jury tampering.
157
Some argue that Rule 606(b) makes it difficult, if not impossible, for the
government to prove post trial that the alleged misconduct did not affect
the verdict.1 58 However, Rule 606(b) does not foreclose testimony by
148. Id. at 532.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 532.
152. Id. at 534.
153. John P. Faggiano, Criminal Law - Potential Witness' Casual Conversation With Jurors
Held Harmless to Defendant - United States v. O'Brien, 972 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1992), 27 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 1090, 1090 (1993).
154. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
156. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.9(f) (2d ed. 1999).
157. Developments in the Law, Racist Juror Misconduct During Deliberations, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1595, 1599 (1988); see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 119-20 (1987) (quoting
McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267-68 (1915)).
158. 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 156, § 24.9(f).
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jurors as to prejudicial extraneous information or other outside influences
brought to bear upon the deliberative process. 159 Thus, a juror may testify
as to statements by the bailiff or the introduction of a prejudicial news-
paper account into the jury room, 160 and "there is little doubt that the
exception applies in a case where the jurors have been provided with
prejudicial information not admitted into evidence." 16'
Furthermore, in Phillips, "the Court stated that the remedy for jury
misconduct was 'an opportunity' for the defendant 'to prove actual
bias."1 62 Accordingly, an increasing number of lower courts now require
the defendant to demonstrate some "likelihood of prejudice" before the
court assigns the government the burden of proving harmlessness.
163
However, other federal appellate courts continue to uphold Remmer's
statement of the legal standard for evaluating the effect of an improper
contact with a juror.164 In particular, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit distinguished Phillips from the improper juror con-
tact issue involved in Remmer on the grounds that Phillips involved an
allegation of intrinsic juror bias, which may be revealed during voir
dire. 65 While Phillips stands for the proposition that even though it is
improper in certain cases to impute prejudice where procedures have
been used to protect the defendant's rights, the use of such a presumption
was not foreclosed in appropriate circumstances. 166 In fact, Justice
O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, expressed her view that a presump-
tion of prejudice still exists for certain egregious cases. 167
In addition, some have interpreted Olano as having in some way re-
configured the Remmer presumption. 168 As discussed above, based in
part on Olano, the court in Williams-Davis rejected Remmer's automatic
presumption, and concluded that a district court should instead "inquire
whether any particular intrusion showed enough of a 'likelihood of
prejudice' to justify assigning the government a burden of proving harm-
lessness.' 69 However, the Olano court, itself, rejected such a broad pre-
clusion, stating "[t]here may be cases where an intrusion should be pre-
sumed prejudicial . ,."0 While Phillips and Olano may arguably have
narrowed the scope of presumptive prejudice, they did not "preclude
159. See FED. R. EViD. 606(b).
160. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892).
161. James W. Diehm, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts: Tanner v. United States and Beyond, 65
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 389, 422 (1991).
162. 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 156, § 24.9(f); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215
(1982).
163. 5 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 156, § 24.9(f).
164. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215.
165. See Haley v. Blue Ridge Transfer Co., 802 F.2d 1532, 1535 n.5 (4th Cir. 1986).
166. See Jenkins v. State, 825 A.2d 1008, 1024 (Md. 2003).
167. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 221-22.
168. See United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also United
States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1998).
169. William-Davis, 90 F.3d at 497.
170. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739 (1993).
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such a presumption in all situations, i.e., where excessive or egregious
jury misconduct or improper contact by a third party occurs.' ' l
CONCLUSION
Even if the fundamental principles of Mattox and Remmer have
been in some form limited by the Supreme Court's decisions in Phillips
and Olano, until overruled, the federal circuit courts must continue to
apply them where they are directly applicable. 172 Because only some
federal courts continue to adhere to those cases, the Supreme Court
should exercise its certiorari jurisdiction and decide this matter once and
for all. 
173
Fundamental to the American criminal justice system is the princi-
ple, embedded in the Constitution of the United States, that "every per-
son accused of a crime is entitled to be tried by a fair and impartial jury
of his peers and to be convicted, if at all, on the basis of evidence prop-
erly adduced at trial.' 74 It remains critical, as Chief Justice Fuller first
declared in 1892, that "the jury should pass upon the case free from ex-
ternal causes tending to disturb the exercise of deliberate and unbiased
judgment. Nor can any ground of suspicion that the administration of
justice has been interfered with be tolerated.' 75 Accordingly, while the
Supreme Court may be willing to limit the application of the Remmer
presumption to those instances of jury misconduct or improper third
party contact that are particularly egregious, it will likely not abandon the
presumption entirely.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal's decisions on this matter,
though bound by those of the Supreme Court, indicate a willingness to
consider narrowing and/or modifying the Remmer presumption. How-
ever, absent Supreme Court authority to the contrary, the Tenth Circuit is
correct in continuing its application.
Bradley Tennyson Smith*
171. Jenkins, 825 A.2d at 1026.
172. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 30, Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Baker, 531 U.S. 919 (2000)
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173. Id.
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